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Thesis Summary 
 
Related Party Transactions (RPTs) have been considered recently in research as a 
phenomenon which is associated with several financial scandals, shareholder’s 
wealth expropriation and is used for earnings management (EM) purposes by the 
reporting entity. This study aimed to: (i) assess the extent of EM and RPTs in 
Greece; (ii) investigate the association between RPTs and EM; (iii) investigate 
the association between corporate governance and EM; (iv) investigate the 
association between corporate governance and RPTs; and (v) investigate the 
impact of RPTs on Accounting Quality. Greece was selected for this study as it 
provides a special context due to poor investor protection, high levels of EM and 
unhealthy financial reporting environment where wealth extraction and EM are 
more likely. This study examines the relationship between earnings management 
and RPTs for the firms listed on the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE). Moreover, It 
examines the association between earnings management and corporate 
governance activities. The results show a negative and significant relationship 
between EM and RPTs. This finding does not support the conclusion that RPTs 
are necessarily conducted to mask fraud or the extraction of firm resources. The 
results show that firms audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms are associated with 
less EM. Additionally, the study investigates the relationship between RPTs and 
accounting quality. The findings show that that there is no significant difference 
in accounting quality between RPTs firms and non-RPTs firms. This study 
contributes to the EM, accounting quality and corporate governance literatures. 
This research suggests recommendations for researchers, data providers and 
policy makers on ways to reduce the problems associated with RPTs. 
 
Keywords: Accounting Quality, Agency Theory, Corporate Governance, 
Earnings Management, Greece, Investor Protection, Related Party Transactions. 
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Chapter One 
Research Background, Objectives and Structure 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Most of the firms all over the world have concentrated ownerships or are 
controlled by a family, financial institution, or the Government (La Porta et al., 
1998). Controlling shareholders, family, institution or Government are usually 
referred to as insiders whether other shareholders are often referred to as outside 
shareholders or minority shareholders. These insiders usually use their 
concentrated ownership stakes and enjoy control rights that exceeds their cash 
flow rights and this provides insiders with additional opportunities to expropriate 
outside shareholders through firm’s operating and financing decisions (Gopalan 
and Jayaraman, 2012).  
Related party transactions (RPT) are a potential means that could be used by  
insiders to expropriate outside shareholders (Ryngaert and Thomas, 2012) and 
have been directly associated with several cases of financial fraud scandals and 
declined earnings quality (Ge et al., 2010). Prior research have investigated the 
relationship between RPTs and expropriation of firms’ resources by controlling 
shareholders. These studies found evidence on the association between 
expropriation and RPTs (Djankov et al., 2008; Johnson et al., 2000) which is 
consistent with the argument that managers can manage reported earnings by 
structuring RPTs (Healy and Whalen, 1999). Other studies have found evidence 
12 
 
that RPTs can represent conventional transactions and are not necessarily 
conducted to manage earnings or to expropriate firms’ resources but play a role as 
legitimate commercial transactions. For example, Chien and Hsu (2010) argue 
that RPTs might lead to lower transaction costs and enable the firm to utilise its 
assets more efficiently. 
According to US GAAP Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 57 (SFAS 
57) and International Accounting Standard 24 (IAS 24), Related Party 
Transactions are defined as transactions between a company and its subsidiaries, 
affiliates, principal owners, officers or their families, directors or their families, or 
entities owned or controlled by its officers or their families. Transactions between 
related parties include sales and acquisitions of assets, sales of goods and services, 
cash payments, loan guarantees and other types of transactions (IAS 24). The 
presence of an accounting standard governing the presentation of RPTs in the 
financial statements aims at reflecting changes in financial position caused by 
those transactions (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2010). 
Despite the continuous efforts of the regulatory bodies and accounting standards 
setters to further develop accounting standards governing the transactions 
between connected parties, the research on RPTs shows significant evidence that 
problems associated with RPTs and with their appropriate disclosures are 
significant. A number of large corporate scandals have brought attention to the 
potential for accounting manipulations associated with RPTs. Also academic 
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research shows that RPTs are associated with a decline in the quality of reported 
earnings (Ge et al., 2010). Djankov et al., (2008) mentions that RPTs may provide 
direct opportunities for related parties to extract cash from listed companies 
(Johnson et al., 2000). Gordon and Henry (2005), Cheung et al., (2006, 2009), 
Berkman et al., (2009), Chen at al., (2009), Chalevas (2011), Ge et al., (2010), 
Lei and Song (2011) and others, recorded a significant relationship between the 
presence and the volume of RPTs and inflated earnings, decline of minority 
shareholder wealth, decline in firm value, and negative excess returns. 
According to agency theory, RPTs are viewed as a facet of conflict of interest that 
can compromise management’s agency responsibility to shareholders or board of 
director’s monitoring function. RPTs are transactions within the firm involving 
‘insiders’ and RPTs may present opportunities to expropriate firm resources. If a 
firm’s executives or board members engage in RPTs to expropriate firm resources, 
then they have an incentive to manage earnings to mask the extraction of the 
firm’s resources impacting earnings quality (Gordon and Henry, 2005). 
Contrariwise RPTs may play a role as a natural part of business transactions not 
necessarily related to accounting or financial fraud (Gordon et al., 2007). RPTs 
can rationally fulfil other economic demands for the company, or are a 
mechanism that bonds the related party to the company. In this case there would 
be no need to manage earnings nor to offset the RPTs as they were not conducted 
to mask an extraction of firm’s resources as in the agency view. Consequently, 
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this view does not expect a relation between EM and RPTs (Gordon and Henry, 
2005).  Prior literature suggests that the assumption that RPTs are a facet of 
conflict of interest should be implemented with caution. Gordon and Henry (2005) 
and Ryngaert and Thomas (2012) suggest that the assumption that RPTs reflects 
opportunism or agency problem should not be generalised as some RPTs have 
proven to be innocuous from the conflict of interest assumption. 
Hence, the effect of RPTs on EM remains an empirical question. The reason for 
this void in the literature is twofold. First, prior studies investigating the 
association between EM and RPTs were conducted either in the US (Gordon and 
Henry, 2005) or in Asian economies (Jian and Wong, 2010; Lo et al., 2011). Both 
settings (US and Asia) have unique institutional factors that are likely to make the 
results obtained from those studies not generalised to other economies (Gordon 
and Henry, 2005; Cheung et al., 2006). Second, studies that investigated the 
association between EM and RPTs in several cases have used indirect proxies of 
EM. For example Chen et al. (2011) and Aharony et al. (2010) used the changes 
in ROA around IPOs as an indicator of EM in Chinese firms.  
The main question that needs to be empirically investigated is whether RPTs are 
systematically related to EM or not. In responding to this issue this research 
investigates whether RPTs are associated with EM behaviour that is aimed to 
mask wealth extraction by managers and controlling shareholders.  
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It is also important to investigate the relationship between EM and corporate 
governance. Corporate governance is assumed to restrict any EM behaviour by 
the management. Prior studies found evidence that good corporate governance 
activities can improve the company’s reporting quality (Beasley 1996; Dechow et 
al. 1996; Klein 2002; Peansell et al. 2005). Corporate governance can also limit 
opportunistic behaviour of management,  increase the value of a firm and increase 
the efficiency of RPTs and decrease the conflict of interest in those transactions 
(Denis and McConnell, 2003; Gordon and Henry, 2005; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; 
Chien and Hsu, 2010 and Abdulwahab et al., 2010). Thus, corporate governance 
is assumed to constrain the negative effects of RPTs. Finally, this research 
examines the relationship between RPTs and accounting quality and whether 
firms engaging in RPTs exhibit lower accounting quality or not compared to 
firms that are not actively undertaking RPTs. 
I investigate the relationship between RPTs, EM and corporate governance and 
also the effect of RPTs on accounting quality during the period from 2009 to 
2011 for companies listed on the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE). Luez et al. 
(2003) examined systematic differences in EM across 31 countries. Among 31 
countries Greece scores the highest EM score. This indicates that Greece reflects 
the highest level of EM across all sample countries. Greece has often been in the 
spotlight for the inadequate quality of financial reporting (Tsipouridou and 
Spathis, 2012). Other empirical studies of international comparison among 
countries have illustrated that Greece exhibits the highest levels of EM 
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(Bhattacharya et al., 2003). This study aims to investigate the relationship 
between EM and RPTs in a country with poor investor protection, low accounting 
quality and unhealthy financial reporting environment where wealth extraction 
via RPTs is more likely.  
This chapter (Chapter One) is organised as follows: Section 1.2 discusses how 
this study contributes to knowledge. Section 1.3 presents the research objectives 
and questions, and Section 1.4 presents the organisation of the study. 
1.2 Contributions of the Study 
This study contributes to the rapid growing literature on EM. Prior studies have 
provided evidence that executives engage in EM through accruals (Healy, 1985; 
Healy and Whalen 1999; Kothari, 2001; Fields, 2001) or through the 
manipulation of real activities (Roychowdhury, 2006). Moreover, Healy and 
Whalen (1999) argue that RPTs could be used to manage earnings, but the 
evidence on the link between EM and RPTs is scant. This study aims to provide 
empirical evidence whether RPTs are normal transactions conducted for solely 
business purposes or a tool to manipulate financial statements and mask 
extraction of firm resources.  
This study also contributes to the corporate governance literature examining the 
link between internal governance activities and EM. Although prior work has 
provided some evidence that corporate governance is an important determinant of 
EM, the results of these studies remain contradictory (Garcia-Meca and 
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Scanchez-Ballesta, 2009) and not sufficient to draw substantive conclusions 
(Larcker et al., 2007). This study provides evidence on the association between 
EM and corporate governance in Greece. The results show that audit quality is 
associated with lower levels of income smoothing and hence, EM.  Additionally, 
it shows that the negative association between EM and RPTs is robust only to the 
subsample of companies that have their financial statements audited by Big-4 
audit firms. This shows that audit quality plays a major role in the association 
between EM and RPTs. 
There are three main differences between the current study and related prior 
studies. This study differs from the studies conducted by Cheung et al. (2009), 
Jian and Wong (2010) and Lo et al. (2010) in the institutional setting. The latter 
studies were conducted in the Chinese context which is affected by the 
concentrated ownership and controlling shareholders motives to expropriate 
shareholders and the inferences deduced from these studies do not necessarily 
apply to other markets (Gordon and Henry, 2005) . The vast majority of RPTs 
studies were conducted using samples from Asian countries which enjoy a unique 
and different institutional setting which suggests that those results are not 
generalisable for other settings (Gordon and Henry, 2005).  
This study applies different measures from the ones used by Gordon and Henry 
(2005). I refrain from following Gordon and Henry (2005) measuring RPTs using 
monetary values as this includes nontrivial measurement error (Ryngaert and 
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Thomas, 2012). I also avoid following them in the usage of the Jones (1991) 
model to estimate discretionary accruals to avoid measurement error as well 
(Dechow et al., 2010).  Finally, this study also differs from the study conducted 
by Ryngaert and Thomas (2012) which investigates whether ex-ante RPTs have 
different impact on firm’s value than ex-post RPTs in the US relying on the 
historical dimension of the transaction and providing evidence from a strong 
investor protection environment. 
This study  extends the literature on RPTs by examining the relationship between 
accounting quality and RPTs. Prior studies have investigated and found evidence 
on the association between earnings management and RPTs (Chen et al., 2011; 
Jian and Wong, 2010;  Aharony et al 2010). Those studies have used indirect 
measures of earnings management that could not be attributed to accounting 
quality or financial reporting system. They used changes in ratios like ROA or 
price earnings (Chen et al., 2011; Aharony et al., 2010) or operating profits (Jian 
and Wong, 2010) as an indication of earnings manipulation around IPOs without 
investigating accounting quality attributes. Therefore, the question whether RPTs 
are associated with lower accounting quality remains an empirical question with 
insufficient evidence. 
Finally, this study contributes to accounting quality literature. Prior accounting 
quality literature studied the overall impact of accounting standards (IAS) on 
accounting quality. This study extends the accounting quality literature and 
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examines if firms that conduct RPTs exhibit a difference in accounting quality 
compared to their counterparts. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
The current research has achieved the following objectives: 
1. Assess the extent of EM and RPTs in Greece 
2. Investigate the association between the existence of RPTs and EM in Greece . 
3. Investigate the association between corporate governance and EM in Greece. 
4. Investigate the association between corporate governance and RPTs in Greece 
5. Investigate the impact of RPTs on the quality of accounting reports in Greece. 
1.4 Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis is organised into seven chapters. Figure 1.1 shows the organisation of 
the study. 
This Chapter (Chapter One) has given a background to the study, and has mainly 
focused on outlining the research problem, highlighting the relevance and the 
intended contribution of the study. 
Chapter Two discusses the Greek context its special peculiarities of the that are 
relevant to the scope of this study. Accounting and financial reporting are 
affected by the several variables that vary across different countries. Chapter Two 
is devoted to discussing several contextual factors that have an impact on 
financial reporting like ownership structure and investor protection, accounting 
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standards , financial reporting quality , audit quality corporate governance and the 
legal enforcement. 
Chapter Three sets out the theoretical background of the study. This chapter 
discusses the main theories underpinning this research. First, I discuss Agency 
Theory which is widely regarded as the major theory contributing to our current 
knowledge of corporate governance. This discussion goes on to shed light on the 
application of Agency Theory in RPTs and corporate governance research. I also 
consider the application of Transaction Cost Economics Theory and its 
relationship with RPTs.  
Chapter Four reviews the literature on RPTs. In this chapter, I begin with a 
discussion on RPTs and how it has been associated with corporate scandals and 
shareholder’s wealth expropriation. Then I present the definition of RPTs as 
defined in accounting standards and describe the main types of different RPTs as 
discussed in prior literature. Further, I present and discuss the proxies used to 
opertionalise RPTs and comment on the weaknesses of those proxies. I also 
accumulate and present evidence on the determinants and consequences of RPTs 
and compare and contrast the findings or prior studies. Finally, I discuss the 
weaknesses and challenges of RPTs research and explain how these challenges 
contribute to significant gaps in the literature to date.  
Chapter Five reviews the literature on earnings management. First, I present 
different definitions of earnings management and highlight the differences 
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between the opportunistic and informative perspectives of earnings management. 
Further, I discuss the consequences of earnings management on firm value and 
performance. Finally, I explain and discuss the different proxies used to measure 
earnings management. 
Chapter Six examines the relationship between earnings management and RPTs 
for the firms listed on the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE). I examine EM using 
income smoothing and assess whether income smoothing is systematically related 
to RPTs. Moreover, I examine the association between earnings management and 
corporate governance activities, namely, audit quality as measured by audit firm 
size, size of the board of directors and independence of board members. The 
results show a negative and significant relationship between EM and RPTs. This 
finding does not support the conclusion that RPTs are necessarily conducted to 
mask fraud or the extraction of firm resources. The results show that firms 
audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms are associated with less EM.  
Chapter Seven investigates the relationship between RPTs and accounting quality 
for the firms listed on the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE). In particular, in this 
chapter I compare accounting quality across two groups of firms. The first group 
contains firms that conduct material RPTs and the second group contains firms 
that do not conduct material RPTs. 
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The findings show that that there is no significant difference in accounting quality 
between RPTs firms and non-RPTs firms.  
Chapter Eight recaps the objectives of the study and provides a summary  of the 
findings. Furthermore, I discuss the contribution of the study and the implications 
of the findings, highlight the limitations of the study and provide suggestions for 
future research. 
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Chapter Two 
The Greek Context 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to discuss the Greek context and its special peculiarities that 
are relevant to the scope of this study. Accounting and financial reporting are 
affected by the several variables that vary across different countries (Barth et al., 
2008). There are several contextual factors that have an impact on financial 
reporting like ownership structure and investor protection (Leuz et al., 2003) 
accounting standards (Barth et al., 2008), financial reporting quality (Tsipouridou 
and Spathis, 2012), audit quality (Caramanis and Lennox, 2008), corporate 
governance (Dimitropoulos and Asteriou, 2010) and the legal enforcement (Hope, 
2003; Hail and Leuz; 2006; Mertzanis, 2011). This chapter is devoted to shed 
light on these factors. 
This chapter will be organised as follows: Section 2.2 discusses the ownership 
structure and investor protection in Greece. Section 2.3 addresses the Greek 
accounting environment. Section 2.4 will present the Greek audit market and the 
regulatory framework for auditing in Greece. Section 2.5 will discuss corporate 
governance in Greece. Finally, Section 2.6 summarises the chapter.  
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2.2 Ownership Structure and Investor Protection In Greece 
Greece is a French-civil law country (LaPorta et al., 1998). La Porta et al., (1998) 
examined legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors 
in 49 countries and the results indicate that in French-civil law countries, such as 
Greece, creditor and investor protection and enforcement are weak.  LaPorta et al. 
(1998) developed the investor protection index based on measures of shareholder 
protection. These measures are the shareholder rights index that captures several 
rights provided to the shareholders, creditor rights index that summarises legal 
creditor protection variables, efficiency of judicial system, corruption and 
accounting transparency and disclosure. 
Poor legal protection of investors usually correlates with high ownership 
concentration. Controlling shareholders may wish to keep controlling a firm in a 
country with poor investor protection as receiving private control benefits will be 
more attainable (LaPorta et al., 1999). High ownership concentration applies to 
Greece (Tsalavoutas et al., 2012). According to Spanos et al. (2005) each Greek 
company had an average of three shareholders owning at least 5%  of the 
company’s shares and that theses shareowners on average owned 49% of the total 
shares. Additionally, Spanos et al. (2005) found that large families controlled 
many of the companies and that the state controls large percentages of votes in a 
significant number of listed companies.  
The interaction between weak investor protection and high ownership 
concentration provides incentives for the controlling shareholders to expropriate 
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wealth from minority shareholders (Gopalan and Jayaraman, 2012). Therefore, in 
Greece or in any poor investor protection environment, insiders are more likely to 
manage earnings to conceal their private benefits from outsiders to avoid the 
disciplinary actions that might be taken by outsiders if those benefits were 
detected (Shelifer and Vishny, 1997; Leuz et al., 2003).  This could create an 
incentive for the controlling shareholders to construct RPTs that would enable 
them to conceal any private control benefits or shareholder expropriation 
(Ryngaert and Thomas, 2012). 
2.3 The Greek accounting environment 
Greek culture, politics and economics have been influenced by many 
international forces. During the last few decades the traditional corporatism has 
been modified by neo-liberal, free market influences (Caramanis, 2005). 
However, Greece is characterised as  a country with  low trust society (Ballas et 
al., 1998), high statutory control, uniformity, conservatism, uncertainty avoidance 
(Hoefstede 1980, 1991; Gray 1988), high power distance (Ballas et al., 2010) and 
a secretive culture (Hope et al., 2008). 
The family firm has been an important component of the Greek economy, where 
ownership is concentrated and closely tied to a group of people (Spanos et al., 
2005). Hence, family members are involved in the direct management of the firm 
(Spanos et al., 2005).  In family firms managers can report the firms’ performance 
directly to the owners of the firm without relying on financial statements (Tzovas, 
2006). 
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Banks are the major source of financing (Tzovas, 2006). However, ASE has been 
considered a developed market since 2000 indicating an increase in the 
importance of raising finance through equity markets as well. However, in many 
cases banks could obtain all the financial reports without having to rely upon 
publicly disclosed data using their connections with managers and shareholders. 
Moreover, banks consider several variables rather than the financial data when 
taking a financing decision. Therefore, the importance of public accounting is 
relatively diminished (Tzovas, 2006). 
The Greek accounting system has been stakeholder oriented, tax-driven and 
conservative (Ballas et al., 2004). The income taxes in Greece are unfairly high 
which leads to tax avoidance and evasion as well managing earnings. Empirical 
evidence shows that in multi-country studies, Greece exhibits the highest level of 
earnings management (Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Leuz et al., 2003).  
From 1 January, 2005, IFRS have been compulsory for all Greek listed 
companies. The transition to IFRS in Greece has been challenging due to the huge 
difference between the two accounting regimes (Tsalavoutas et al., 2012). Greece 
was among the first adopters of IFRS in EU (Ballas et al., 2010). Usually 
countries with weak shareholder protection bond themselves to superior 
accounting standards to improve the disclosure policies and accounting systems 
and enhance the integration of domestic markets into world markets and to 
accelerate economic growth (Hope et al., 2006).  
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Higher quality standards do not automatically lead to higher accounting quality 
(Ball, 2001). IFRS has only minor impact on the value relevance, conditional 
conservatism of accounting income (Karampinis and Hevas, 2011). This suggests 
that the legal enforcement mechanisms of IFRS in Greece were weak. This view 
is supported by Li (2010), as they show that Greece has the lowest score of legal 
enforcement mechanisms regarding IFRS implementation. IFRS adoption should 
be accompanied by enforcement regulations to improve the overall quality of 
accounting reports (Christensen et al., 2013).  
2.4 The Greek Audit Market 
Corporate auditing in Greece began in 1955 with the establishment of a state-
controlled body of Sworn-In Accountants (BSA). In 1979, the international 
accounting firms established a rival organisation, the Society of Certified 
Accountants-Auditors (SCAA), which lobbied for the termination of BSA’s 
monopoly (Caramanis and Lennox, 2008). The government eliminated BSA in 
1992 and liberalized the Greek auditing profession. The government then created 
a new accounting body, SOEL, to self-regulate the audit profession (Caramanis 
and Lennox, 2008). Many of BSA’s former employees formed together a very 
large Greek audit firm, SOL SA. Meanwhile, smaller Greek firms were formed 
and began to supply statutory audit services with international audit firms 
(Caramanis and Lennox, 2008). 
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The Greek Auditing Standards (GAS) were developed according to the IAS. The 
Greek legislation, with law 3639/2008, is in full compliance with Directive 
2006/43/EC on statutory audits of annual and consolidated accounts (Tsipouridou 
and Spathis, 2012). 
The Greek Ministry of Economy established the Committee of Accounting 
Standardization and Auditing (ELTE) in 2003. The committee was supposed to 
conduct random annual inspections on listed firms’ financial statements. In 
cooperation with the Hellenic Capital Market Commission (HCMC), ELTE 
attempted to act as a supervisory body in order to mitigate concerns over audit 
quality of financial reporting in Greece ((Tsipouridou and Spathis, 2012). Yet, 
concerns over accounting quality and auditors’ potential opportunistic behaviour 
persist. 
2.5 Corporate Governance in Greece 
The upgrade of the Greek capital market to a mature market status in 2000 and 
the global competition for capital increased the importance of corporate 
governance for all firms listed on the ASE and for the market participants and led 
the Greek government to introduce a specific legislative framework in order to 
secure the efficient functioning of the market (Dimitropoulos and Asteriou, 
2010).  
Greek listed firms are governed by Law 3016/2002. That law specifies detailed 
instructions about the firm’s corporate governance and specifically the structure 
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of the board of directors (Dimitropoulos and Asteriou, 2010). The legislation 
aimed to promote corporate governance activities to respond to the increased 
importance of corporate governance as a tool for investor protection 
(Dimitropoulos and Asteriou, 2010). 
In terms of corporate governance codes, the Capital Market Commission initiated 
the Committee on corporate governance in Greece. The committee developed a 
set of principles and best practices rules published on October 1999. The 
committee recognised that existing Greek legislation did not reduce problems 
related to disclosure, minority shareholder rights, mergers and acquisitions and 
executive compensation (Pierce, 2010). It was argued that the corporate 
governance framework in Greece is outdated and it is better to establish a 
regulatory framework that would positively affect accounting and disclosure 
quality (Pierce, 2010). In 2001, The Federation of Greek industries developed and 
published the principles of corporate governance. This is the current corporate 
governance code and it makes extensive use of the concepts and principles first 
developed in 1999. The code follows the “Comply or Explain” approach.  
A major problem with the Greek governance code or any other law is the lack of 
enforcement. According to Lazarides (2010) there is an observed inefficiency in 
the enforcement of rules and regulations by the Hellenic Capital Market 
Commission. He argues that although a number of violations committed by firms 
31 
 
have been spotted and documented, yet, no penalties or other actions have been 
imposed. 
2.6 Summary  
This chapter has provided a discussion about the institutional and contextual 
setting in Greece. The focus has been on ownership structure and investor 
protection, the Greek accounting environment, the Greek audit market and 
regulatory framework and corporate governance regulations and its developments 
in Greece. The concentrated ownership, weak enforcement and the poor investor 
protection environment in Greece are associated with observed criticisms on the 
accounting and audit quality which negatively affects the quality of accounting 
reports regardless of the efforts exerted to develop sound corporate governance 
codes. 
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Chapter Three 
Theoretical Framework 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to articulate the appropriate theories relevant to this 
research. Corporate governance is influenced by many other disciplines. The 
main theories that affected the development of corporate governance are agency 
theory, transaction cost economics, stakeholder theory, and stewardship theory 
(Mallin, 2010). RPTs are always perceived either as opportunistic transactions 
that reflect a conflict of interest between controlling and minority shareholders 
(Agency Theory) or a normal part of business process that have economic 
benefits for the firm (Transaction Cost Economics). This chapter will be 
organised as follows: Section 3.2 discusses agency theory; section 3.3 discusses 
transaction cost economics theory and, finally section 3.4 summarises and 
concludes the chapter. 
3.2 Agency Theory 
Agency theory has played a major role in studies of corporate governance (Bryant 
and Davis, 2012). Agency theory is based on the relationship between the 
principals or the owners of the firm and the agents or the managers. From the 
agency perspective, the separation of ownership and control in modern 
corporations in the developed capital is considered the root of the agency problem 
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(Fama and Jensen, 1983). However, there are also benefits for separating 
ownership and control.  
“These benefits are the reason for the persistence of this organisational 
form for decades. Individuals are not necessarily endowed with both 
managerial talent and financial capital. The ability to separate ownership 
and control allows the holder of either type of endowment to earn a return 
on it. In addition, the ability to raise capital from outside investors allows 
firms to take advantage of the benefits of size, despite managerial wealth 
constrains or managerial risk aversion” (Dennis and McConnell, 2003:1). 
The ultimate element in agency theory is the conflict of interest between 
principals and agents. A principal assigns an agent to have the decision making 
power in the firm and to execute his duties on behalf of the principal (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). If both parties in this relationship act opportunistically, there is 
a good reason to assume that the agent will not always act in the best interest of 
the principal. Additionally, in the current state of corporations where there is a 
huge number of principals (shareholders) that are not involved in decision making 
and appointing their agents (managers). The principal also can limit deviations 
from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and by 
incurring monitoring costs designed to minimise the unusual activities of the 
agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
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Moreover, bonding costs are incurred by the principal to the agent to guarantee 
that no harm of the principal’s interest will occur as a result of the agent’s actions. 
When divergence occurs between the decisions of the agent and the best decision 
for the welfare of the principal the outcome is what is called a residual loss. 
Agency costs are defined as the sum of monitoring costs, bonding costs and the 
residual loss (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Agency theory is concerned with resolving two problems that can occur in agency 
relationships. The first happens when either the interest of agent and principal 
conflict or when it becomes difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what 
the agent is actually doing. The problem here is that the principal cannot verify 
that the agent has behaved properly (Eisenhardt, 1989). The second problem is 
the problem of risk sharing. This problem arises from the different views that 
each of the principal and agent have towards risk (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The conflict of interest between principals and agents can cause negative 
consequences to the firm. Walsh and Seward (1990:444) argued that “if a firm’s 
managers entrench themselves with the sole objective of ensuring their power, 
prestige, and perquisites, the organization is likely to lose sight of its competitive 
environmental position and will fail.” It is important to artificially align 
management goals with shareholder goals. This could be accomplished through 
structuring management incentives like shares or stock options, thus including 
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long-term behaviour and deterring short-run actions that harm future company 
value (Albrecht et al., 2004). 
From its roots in information economics, agency theory has developed along two 
lines: positivist and principal-agent (Jensen, 1983). The two streams share a 
common unit of analysis which is the contract between the principal and the agent. 
They also share common assumptions about people, firms, and information. 
However, they differ in their mathematical rigor, dependent variable and style. 
Positivist researchers focused on identifying situations in which the principal and 
the agent are likely to have conflicting interests and then describing governance 
mechanisms that limit the agent’s self-serving behaviour. Theoretically, the 
positivist stream has been more concerned with describing those governance 
mechanisms that solve the agency problem (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Positivist agency theory can be regarded as enriching economics by offering a 
more complex view of organisations (Jensen, 1983). However, it has been 
criticised by organisational theorists as minimalist (Hirsch et al., 1987; Perrow, 
1986) and by microeconomists as lacking rigour (Jensen, 1983). However, it 
should be mentioned that positivist agency theory has ignited considerable 
research and popular interest (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Principal-agent researchers are more concerned with a general theory of the 
principal-agent relationship, a theory that can be applied to employer-employee, 
lawyer-client, buyer-supplier, and other agency relationships (Harris and Raviv, 
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1978). The principal-agent paradigm involves careful specifications of 
assumptions, which are followed by deduction and mathematical proof 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). 
In comparison to the positivist stream, principal-agent theory is abstract and 
mathematical, therefore, less accessible to organisational scholars. The most 
spoken critics of the theory (Perrow, 1986; Hirsch et al., 1987) have focused their 
attacks primarily on the more known positivist stream of agency theory. Also, the 
principal-agent stream has a broader focus and greater interest in theoretical 
implications that could be tested. On the contrary, the positivists have focused 
almost exclusively on the special case of the owner/CEO relationship in the large 
corporation (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
It is also important to mention that in addition to the classic agency problem there 
is another problem as well. This problem is based on the conflict of interest 
between minority shareholders and controlling block holders (Berkman, et al., 
2009). Literature has highlighted this problem that occurs when large owners use 
their power to oppress smaller ones (Miller and Saradis, 2011). 
According to normative agency theory, corporations should increase incentive 
structures that align the interests of owners and managers (Fama and Jensen, 1983) 
and increase monitoring and control oversight of managers (Bryant and Davis, 
2012). The solution for the agency problems caused by the separation of 
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ownership and control is a system that can act as the monitoring mechanisms 
which is provided by corporate governance.  
Corporate governance is argued to deal with the ways in which suppliers of 
finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on investment and 
make sure that managers do not misappropriate the capital they supply. This 
problem is of particular significance in companies with concentrated ownership, 
because controlling shareholders have the power to expropriate minority 
shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Previous studies suggested that corporate governance is an effective tool to 
control the opportunistic behaviours of management and reduce agency costs 
whether the governance mechanisms undertake are internal or external (e.g., 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Williamson, 1988; Denis and McConnell, 2003; 
Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Chen et al., 2009). Other studies like Lo et al. (2010) 
focused on how corporate governance techniques affect the actions of the CEO 
and top managers. Those studies used company ownership and board structures to 
explain management’s attitudes on corporate restructuring, dividend decisions, 
and pricing of executive options. 
Thus, agency theory views corporate governance mechanisms, especially the 
board of directors, as being an essential monitoring device aiming to ensure that 
any problems that may show up due to the nature of the principal-agent 
relationship are minimised. The board of directors is not only one of the internal 
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corporate governance mechanisms that are used to secure or facilitate the 
alignment of shareholders’ and managers’ interests and to control or remove 
ineffective managers (Park and Shin, 2004). According to Jensen (1993) it is the 
most outstanding governance mechanism of the internal control system. 
Therefore, the board of directors is perceived as a monitoring mechanism from 
the agency view. Blair (1996) mentioned that managers should be the agents of 
the owners; however managers must be monitored and institutional arrangements 
must provide some checks and balances to assure they do not abuse their power. 
Perrow (1986) and others have criticised agency theory for being excessively 
narrow and having few testable implications. Eisenhardt (1989) argues that these 
criticisms might be extreme, but they do suggest that research should be 
undertaken in new areas through expanding to a richer and more complex range 
of contexts. For example, research can go beyond the pure forms of behaviour 
and outcome contracts to a broader range of contract alternatives and not to treat 
contracts as an opposition between behaviour and outcome. The richness and 
complexity of agency theory would be enhanced if researchers would consider 
the broader spectrum of possible contracts. 
Hirsch et al. (1987) also recommended that agency theory should be used with 
other theories. The reason for this is that agency theory only presents a partial 
view of the world that is valid, but ignores the complexity of organisations. 
Several empirical studies discussed this criticism to agency theory. Kosnik (1987) 
39 
 
and Singh and Harinato (1989) studies support agency theory hypothesis, but they 
used complementary theories along. Also, the study by Eisenhardt (1988) 
combined institutional theory with agency theory.  
According to (Chen and Zhang, 2012) taking agency theory into consideration, 
RPTs may be an indication for the presence of an agency problem. Prior research 
have investigated and found evidence on the association between Related Party 
Transactions (RPTs) and expropriation of firms’ resources by controlling 
shareholders (Djankov et al., 2008; Johnson et al., 2000). The reason for this is 
that when concentrated ownership is dominating there is a conflict of interest 
between controlling shareholders and external shareholders. Controlling 
shareholders try to maximise the benefits they enjoy by managing earnings to 
conceal these benefits from outsiders (Leuz et al., 2003). Empirical evidence also 
shows that controlling shareholder can perform RPTs as a tool for EM to conceal 
their private control benefits from other shareholders (Dahya et al., 2008; Gao 
and Kling, 2008). 
Corporate governance should mitigate EM, improve reporting quality and impede 
opportunistic behaviour (Dennis and McConnell, 2003; Gordon and Henry, 2005). 
This also matches the argument previously presented in Chapter 2 of the current 
research that related party transactions (RPTs) may be either an indication of an 
agency problem or just an efficient transaction that achieves an advantage for the 
firm. 
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3.3 Transaction Cost Economics 
The theoretical debate about the nature of related party transactions (RPTs) is 
whether they reflect an agency problem and they take place as a result of 
conflicting interests or a second hypothesis that views that as efficient 
transactions. The second hypothesis related to RPTs is the efficient transaction 
hypothesis which is derived from transaction cost economics theory (TCE) of 
Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975, 1986). TCE was developed by Williamson 
(1975). It emphasises that managers should have strong incentives to ensure that 
staff are tightly controlled so that they do what is expected of them. This theory is 
often viewed as closely related to agency theory.  
 TCE views the firm as a governance structure rather than a nexus of contracts as 
is the case with agency theory. Agency theory argument implies that there is a 
connected group of contracts must be established/designed to align the interests 
between the principal and the agent and that there is no way to have a contract 
that can align the interests of the principal and the agent (Mallin, 2010). 
Williamson (1975) developed TCE from the work of Coase (1937) who 
mentioned that there are certain economic benefits to the firm undertaking 
transactions internally rather than externally. In contrast with the conflict of 
interest approach the efficient transaction hypothesis assumes that RPTs represent 
sound business exchanges, efficiently fulfilling underlying economic needs of the 
firm. Therefore, they do not harm the interests of shareholders and emerge as 
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efficient contracting arrangements with some benefits represented in facilitated 
coordination and convenient terms and conditions (Pizzo, 2013). 
In this view, RPTs are a natural part of business and are not necessarily related to 
accounting or financial fraud (Gordon et al., 2007). Using RPTs firms may 
enhance efficiency by reducing transaction costs in internal capital and 
intermediate goods markets (Williamson, 1975). In particular, group structures 
and internal dealings may provide better allocation of financial resources, 
economies of scale, easier access to finance etc. (Pizzo, 2013).  For example, 
Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2010) find that certain related party transactions with 
executives appear to fulfil economic needs to the firm. Yeh et al. (2012:756) also 
mentioned some potential benefits of RPTs: 
 “The benefits are better allocation and utilisation of assets, better 
coordination among different activities, quicker feedback, deeper 
reciprocal knowledge, and a reduction of the hold-up problems”  
Where related party transactions are implemented appropriately, listed companies 
can make use of them to reduce transaction costs and achieve more efficient asset 
utilization (Chein and Hsu, 2010). The argument that RPTs might not always be 
harmful or maybe sometimes useful is supported by Chang and Hong (2000) who 
found that internal sales and purchases can positively influence firm profitability 
in the absence of cross-subsidisation. 
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Chang and Hong (2000) argued that business groups use their internal capital 
markets to subsidise poorly performing affiliates or new ventures. Cross 
subsidisation occurs when a multi-product firm prices one below average cost and 
makes up for the losses through revenues collected from the sales of other goods 
that are over-priced. In the same sense business groups can support financially 
troubled companies or related firms with great strategic importance. Although 
cross-subsidisation may take place in the form of unilateral transfer of wealth 
from one party to another, the most common way that business groups carry out 
cross-subsidisation is by various forms of internal transactions. 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter presented a detailed articulation of the theories related to the scope 
and context of this research.  The two main theories related to  RPTs (Agency 
Theory and Transaction Cost Economics) were explored in this chapter. Looking 
at RPTs as a source of conflict of interest implies that it is most commonly used 
by controlling shareholders to expropriate the wealth of minority shareholders or 
conceal private control benefits. On the other hand the Transaction Cost 
Economics theory looks at RPTs as a normal business process that achieves 
economic benefits to the firm and is a facet of the efficient transaction hypothesis. 
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Chapter Four 
Related Party Transactions 
4.1 Introduction 
Related party transactions (RPTs) are a potential means for insiders to expropriate 
shareholders and other investors/lenders (Ryngaert and Thomas, 2012). RPTs 
have been directly associated with several cases of financial scandals, fraud and 
declined earnings quality (Ge et al., 2010). In particular, they provide direct 
opportunities for managers, directors and related parties to extract resources from 
minority shareholders (Djankov et al., 2008; Johnson et al., 2000). Although 
RPTs are too often used by controlling shareholders for their self-interest, not all 
RPTs are designed or adopted for the purpose of expropriation and it is reported 
that a significant proportion of RPTs are conducted for solely 
business/commercial purposes as they can be used to improve asset utilisation 
and better allocation of resources (Gordon et al. 2004).  
To address RPTs and the potential problems that could be caused by RPTs 
International Accounting Standard 24 (IAS 24) was first introduced in 1984 and 
became effective for the first time on the 1st of January 1986.  IAS 24 attempts to 
define and restrict the fraudulent use of RPTs.  
The standard was reformulated in 1994. However, this revision does not appear to 
have effectively overcome the problems of RPTs. A report tabled at an IASB 
meeting in 2007 shows that the reformulation that took place in 1994 had merely 
excluded some transactions from the standard, such as agency agreements and 
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management contracts while including others – such as liability settlements by 
related parties. In 2009, a revised IAS 24 was issued. A report published by 
KPMG in November, 2009 titled “First Impressions: Revised IAS 24 Related 
Party Disclosures commented on the revision. 
“ This revision mainly amended the definition of a related party to remove 
some inconsistencies and to make it symmetrical and modified the 
disclosure requirements for government-related entities to enable them to 
limit the extent of details for disclosures about RPTs with the government 
or government-related entities”(P.6) 
The objective of IAS 24 is to ensure that an entity's financial statements contain 
the disclosures necessary to draw attention to the possibility that the financial 
position or profit and loss may have been affected by the existence of RPTs and 
outstanding balances, including commitments with such parties 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2010). Continuous efforts have been exerted by 
regulatory bodies and accounting standards setters to further develop IAS 24. IAS 
24 governs the transactions between connected parties. Yet, the problems usually 
associated with RPTs remained persisting. Chong and Dean (1985) have 
conducted a preliminary evaluation of  IAS 24 and SFAS 57 and found evidence 
that the standards only partially overcome the problems associated with RPTs. 
RPTs literature did not address the effectiveness of IAS 24 or SFAS 57 or the 
amendments that were added to the standards.  
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Research has associated RPTs with a number of corporate scandals. The 
corporate scandals have brought attention to the potential for accounting 
manipulations associated with RPTs to produce a decline in earnings quality (Ge 
et al., 2010). Djankov et al., (2008) argues that RPTs may provide direct 
opportunities for related parties to extract cash from listed companies (Johnson et 
al., 2000). Gordon and Henry (2005), Cheung et al., (2006, 2009), Berkman et al., 
(2009), Chen at al., (2009), Chalevas (2011), Ge et al., (2010), Lei and Song 
(2011) and others, all record a significant relationship between the presence and 
the volume of RPTs and inflated earnings, decline of minority shareholder wealth, 
decline in firm value, and negative excess returns. 
That said, the literature on RPTs needs to be reviewed and compiled for a number 
of reasons that can explain the contribution of this chapter. First, there is an 
observable odd pattern in RPTs research in terms of sampled countries/firms that 
might be unhelpful. Hence, it is important to evaluate the studies and explain the 
possible justifications for this pattern. Explanations are attributed mainly to 
institutional setting. For example, RPTs research is common in studies 
investigating transactions in Asian economies. Asian economies are often typified 
by an extremely high concentrated ownership and concerns around controlling 
shareholder motivation to expropriate shareholders (Gordon and Henry, 2005). 
Additionally, corporate governance reforms after the Asian financial crisis in 
1997 provided due attention to RPTs and created a special context for RPTs 
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studies in Asia (Cheung et al., 2006). Thus, inferences deduced from those studies 
may not necessarily apply to other markets (Gordon and Henry, 2005). 
Nevertheless it might be considered surprising that RPTs did not receive similar 
attention from researchers in the US given the concerns over the presence of 
suspicious RPTs in recent high-profile accounting fraud scandals like Enron, 
Adelphia, WorldCom and Tyco (Gordon et al., 2007) nor in Europe regardless of 
scandals like Rundenwerke, Parmalat and Bremer Vulkan (Bennouri et al., 2011). 
This may be attributed to problems of data availability in regard to RPTs.  This 
lack of available data may have posed a significant challenge and affected interest 
in RPTs research. RPTs are disclosed in financial statements footnotes and hence, 
most researchers who investigated RPTs have had to use hand-collected data 
which implies spending an extensive amount of time to collect the data and also 
restricts the sample sizes (Ryngaert and Thomas, 2012) .  
Second, the terms describing RPTs across the literature are various. Prior studies 
on RPTs show that there are a range of studies that use different terms such as 
RPTs, affiliated transactions, connected transactions, intercorporate loans and 
others to indicate the presence of what is described by accounting standards as 
RPTs. Therefore, it is important to accumulate the evidence provided by all 
studies regardless of the terminology used by each one to define RPTs. Third, this 
chapter presents a summary of RPTs research and discusses what we know based 
on RPTs research conducted to date, what issues that RPTs research needs to 
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address and what are the limitations that accompany the  collection of data, 
research evidence and RPTs research.  
The next section provides an evaluation of what we know about the definition of 
RPTs and the types of RPTs. Section 4.3 sheds light on the proxies used to 
measure RPTs. Section 4.4 discusses empirical evidence on the determinants of 
RPTs. Section 4.5 explores evidence on the different consequences that RPTs are 
said to produce. Section 4.6 discusses the weaknesses and challenges of RPTs 
research. Finally Section 4.7 summarises and concludes the chapter. 
4.2 What are Related Party Transactions 
According to the US GAAP Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 57 
(SFAS 57) Related Party Transactions are defined as transactions between a 
company and its subsidiaries, affiliates, principal owners, officers or their 
families, directors or their families, or entities owned or controlled by its officers 
or their families. The International Accounting Standards (IAS) definition of 
related parties is similar to that of the US GAAP.  “As mentioned in paragraph 
29.2, IAS 24 (revised) a related party can be a person, an entity, or an 
unincorporated business” (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2010). The standard’s 
definition is in two parts. The first part of the definition identifies general criteria 
that results in a person, or a close member of that person’s family, being a related 
party from the perspective of the reporting entity. The second part of the 
definition identifies the conditions that result in an entity being related to the 
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reporting entity. The second part of the standard identifies whether a person or 
entity should be considered as a related party or not.  
According to Ryngaert and Thomas (2012), Jian and Wong (2010) and Cheung et 
al. (2006) transactions between listed companies and their controlling 
shareholders can be classified into five major types: Sales and acquisitions of 
assets, asset swaps, sales of goods and services, direct cash payments (or loans or 
loan guarantees) and transactions with non-listed subsidiaries. 
4.3 Measures or Proxies of Related Party Transactions  
Prior studies used several proxies to measure RPTs. These proxies are designed to 
capture significant RPTs. Measures used in the prior literature can be identified 
under two categories, namely, normal and abnormal RPTs.  RPTs are common 
transactions that can occur on a regular basis between a firm and its subsidiary, 
parent or affiliated firm.  
RPTs are considered to be affected by external factors like industry, firm size or 
debt (Jian and Wong, 2010). The main difference between normal and abnormal 
RPTs is that abnormal RPTs measure try to capture those transactions that are not 
explained by other factors that affect the occurrence of RPTs, while the other 
studies try to control those factors that are expected to be associated with the level 
of RPTs. This section discusses the different proxies used to measure RPTs under 
each category. 
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4.3.1 Abnormal RPTs 
Similar to accounting accruals, the level of RPTs can be analysed as fitting into 
either a normal or abnormal categorisation for the firm (Jian and Wong, 2010). 
Using OLS regressions the normal components of RPTs that are associated with 
industry classifications or firm characteristics such as size, leverage and growth 
can be approximated and excluded from the analysis. In this case the residual 
term from running the regression equation (1) is the measure for RPTs. This 
measure was first used by Jian and Wong (2010). This measure isolates the effect 
of normal components of RPTs that might be associated with industry, size, 
leverage, and growth (Lo and Wong, 2011). Hence, it can be argued that the 
resulting measure can be a more valid proxy to capture RPTs that are not related 
to the main factors that could affect the volume of RPTs. This approach was also 
used by Lo and Wong (2011) and Yeh et al. (2012). Their model uses the 
following formulation. 
RPTs=   α + β1 SIZE+  β 2 SALES GROWTH+  β 3 LEV+ β 3 MB+ε.                           (1) 
Where: 
RPTs  = the dollar value of RPTs 
Size  = natural logarithm of totals assets 
Sales Growth = the percentage of sales growth rate 
Leverage = Total debt divided by total assets  
MB  = market value divided by book value of total equity 
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4.3.2 Normal RPTs 
Most RPTs studies did not isolate the normal component of RPTs from the 
abnormal component using the Jian and Wong (2010) approach. Instead they tried 
to control for these factors. Gordon and Henry (2005) used two measures to 
measure RPTs, namely, the total number and amounts of disclosed transactions. 
Chen et al. (2011) measured RPTs as the aggregate amount of absolute value of 
operating RPTs between a listed subsidiary and its controlling shareholders scaled 
by lagged total assets for a particular year. Gallery et al. (2008) measures RPTs 
using the monetary value of related party payments and loans deflated by average 
total assets. Nekhili and Cherif (2011) used the natural logarithm of the total 
number of RPTs. Similarly Cheung et al. (2009) uses the price of the RPTs 
included in the sample of the study. 
Studies that did not use the Jian and Wong (2010) approach controlled for firm-
performance and firm size variables. Although those studies control for normal 
components of RPTs in order to avoid measurement error by using a proxy that 
captures both normal and abnormal RPTs, it has been criticised for not isolating 
these components using OLS regressions following Jian and Wong (2010). On 
the other hand, controlling for (not isolating) the normal components of RPTs 
could be capable of avoiding potential endogeneity issues. Endogeneity bias is 
any situation that causes the error term to be correlated to one or more 
independent variables which might result from omitting some of the RPTs 
determinants from the analysis (Nikolaev and van Lent, 2005). According to 
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Chen at al. (2011) controlling for factors that might explain the variability of 
RPTs is favoured as this increases the possibility of avoiding potential 
endogeneity problems caused by complete isolation of independent variables that 
can contribute to the explanation of the dependent variable RPTs, and hence 
would increase the explanatory power of the regression model. 
A further group of studies have used indicator variables that take the value of 1 to 
indicate that the firm has conducted RPTs to measure RPTs. Some of these 
studies used indicator variables by assigning to it the value of one to indicate the 
presence or the disclosure of RPTs (Balsam and Gifford, 2007; Dayha et al. 2008; 
Berkman et al. 2009; Ge et al. 2010; Kohlbeck and Mayhew, 2010 and Hwang et 
al. 2013). Other studies have used dummy indicators differently. For example 
Ryngaert and Thomas (2012) used a dummy variable that is equal to one if the 
total value of disclosed RPTs is more than 1% of the firms’ total assets. In other 
studies that use transactions as a unit of analysis instead of firms or firm-years Lei 
and Song (2011) and Peng et al. (2011) use indicator variables to distinguish 
transactions conducted with related parties from other transactions. Ryngaert and 
Thomas (2012) argue that using dummy variables is preferable because assigning 
dollar values to RPTs involves nontrivial measurement error. Assigning dollar 
values is deceptive as it does not account for firm characteristics and thus might 
be misleading with regards to how material are the amounts of RPTs undertaken. 
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Finally, a limited number of studies have used other measures. Aharony et al. 
(2010) use change in related party sales and purchases to investigate the 
relationship between RPTs and earnings management around IPOs. Jiang et al. 
(2010) use the amounts under the item “other receivables” deflated by total assets 
to capture the amount of loans to related parties or inter-corporate loans as they 
refer to it.  
4.4   Determinants of Related Party Transactions 
This section reviews the literature on the determinants of RPTs. There are three 
categories of determinants: (1) firm characteristics, (2) capital market incentives 
and (3) governance and controls.  
4.4.1 Firm Characteristics 
Several studies provide evidence on the relationship between RPTs and firm 
characteristics. Size has appeared to be positively correlated with RPTs (Yeh et 
al., 2012; Chen et al., 2011; Jian and Wong, 2010; Gordon and Henry, 2005). 
This may be due the fact that there is more value to be expropriated in large firms 
and that large firms are more likely to be the core of fund transferring in a 
business group. Moreover, market-to-book equity is positively correlated with 
related sales while negatively correlated with related lending and guarantee and 
related borrowing. This could be based on the idea that the opportunity cost of 
tunnelling funds through RPTs is higher for firms with high market-to-book ratios 
(Yeh et al., 2012). Ye et al. (2012) use market-to-book ratio as a proxy for the 
growth potential of the firm. They argue that this ratio is an indicator to the future 
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growth and performance of the firm. These results are different from the results 
reported in a study that used a sample of French firms by Nekhili and Cherif 
(2011) as they did not document any significant association between RPTs and 
firm size.  
Jian and Wong (2010) find that leverage is negatively and significantly associated 
with related party sales in China. In USA Gordon and Henry (2005) report a 
negative association between RPTs and leverage. The RPTs literature is silent on 
justifications for the negative association between RPTs and leverage, but this is 
explained by the negative association between size and leverage as in Jian and 
Wong (2010) or in prior literature on the link between firm characteristics and 
capital structure similar to Titman and Wessels (1988) who find that leverage is 
negatively and significantly associated with firm size. Nekhili and Cherif (2011) 
provide evidence that cross listing is associated with transactions with 
subsidiaries and affiliated companies for French firms. This follows the evidence 
provided by Coffee (2002), Licht (2003) and Siegel (2009) for whom cross listing 
is not an indicator of less expropriation of shareholder wealth. 
In Australia Gallery et al. (2008) show that firms with negative ROA have 
relatively higher values of RPTs. Researchers have investigated whether poor 
performing firms engage in accounting tactics to manage their earnings and found 
that weak performance provide incentives in earnings management (Dechow et 
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al., 2010). This can explain the negative association between firm 
performance/profitability and RPTs. 
Empirical evidence from studies investigating loan guarantees to related parties 
provided support to the evidence provided by prior studies investigating RPTs in 
general. Berkman et al. (2009) provide evidence that firms are significantly less 
likely to issue loan guarantees when they are smaller which is consistent with the 
hypothesis that larger firms are more likely to be the targets for tunnelling. This 
result is also supported by Yeh et al. (2012) as they reported that firms are more 
likely to issue related guarantees when they are more profitable and when they 
have better growth opportunities.  
This is consistent with the hypothesis of Berkman et al. (2009) that tunnelling is 
less likely when the firm is profitable and has good growth opportunities, as 
tunnelling can reduce the value of existing investments and growth opportunities, 
offsetting any gains to the controlling block holders. Moreover they provide 
evidence that tunnelling is less likely when the controlling firm is a State Non-
Corporate entity.  
Finally, La Porta et al. (2003) examined related lending by Mexican banks and 
found that related parties borrow at lower interest rates and for longer maturities 
than unrelated ones. They also post less collateral against their loans and offer 
fewer personal guarantees than normal creditors. Related parties borrow on 
55 
 
advantageous terms and default more frequently and have lower recovery rates. 
This provides direct evidence on opportunistic RPTs. 
4.4.2 Capital Market Incentives 
Yeh et al. (2012) illustrate two factors that motivate the use of RPTs to manage 
earnings. The first one is to avoid reporting losses (Leuz et al., 2003) and the 
second one is when firms expect to issue seasoned equity (Bai et al., 2005). The 
reported earnings are more important for firms that plan to issue equity shares 
than firms that do not. The two factors combined indicate that the motive to 
manage earnings using RPTs is strong when firms expect to issue equity. 
Yeh et al. (2012) find evidence on the association between RPTs and the 
condition that firms are willing to issue seasoned equity offerings in the following 
period in the Taiwanese stock market. This is one of the propping hypothesis 
where RPTs are assumed to be a tool to manage earnings upwards. Firms can use 
RPTs to inflate earnings in order to avoid reporting losses or to prop up 
accounting numbers prior to seasoned equity issuance when the reported earnings 
are crucial. Thus, firms are motivated to report RPTs to avoid reporting earnings 
lower than those of the preceding period (Yeh et al., 2012). Moreover, they report 
a negative association between the change in net working capital and related 
lending and guarantees. This implies that firms that are in need of funds reduce 
the level of related lending to or increase the level of related borrowing from 
other entities in the same business group. Jian and Wong (2010) provide evidence 
that Chinese firms manage earnings through related party sales when the firm 
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needs to achieve a certain ROE benchmark to qualify for issuance of new shares. 
Thomas et al. (2004) provide evidence that Japanese firms manage earnings using 
RPTs to avoid losses, earnings declines and negative forecast errors. 
However, according to the evidence provided by Yeh et al. (2012) corporate 
governance affects the level of RPTs and it moderates the motives of using RPTs 
in Taiwan. According to Yeh et al. (2012) the quality of corporate governance is 
negatively correlated with the level of RPTs. Moreover, the level of RPTs is 
negatively correlated with the interaction term between corporate governance and 
the motives of managing earnings. This indicates that even in the presence of 
capital market incentives to manage earnings using RPTs, corporate governance 
can still mitigate RPTs to manage reported earnings. Similar conclusions on the 
role of governance where provided by Jian and Wong (2010) who found that the 
degree of managing earnings using RPTs is lower when economic institutions are 
stronger. 
4.4.3 Governance and Controls 
Corporate governance and controls proved to have a positive interaction role and 
evidence shows that it can mitigate using RPTs for earnings management 
activities. Additionally, other studies provide further evidence on the link 
between RPTs and corporate governance. 
An agency theory presumption that large boards negatively affect the 
effectiveness of the monitoring role of the board, has been argued to, support 
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reducing the number of board members (Jensen, 1993). Consistent with Jensen 
(1993), Nekhili and Cherif (2011), Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2010) and Gordon 
and Henry (2004) find that large boards are associated with more RPTs. Gordon 
and Henry (2004) argue that an increase in number of directors is an indicator of 
weak governance and is associated with higher occurrence of RPTs, in particular 
transactions involving executive directors. 
In a cross-country study Dayha et al. (2008) finds evidence that board 
independence is negatively associated with RPTs which indicates that more 
independent directors reduce the likelihood of RPTs. Similar results are provided 
in China (Lo et al., 2010) and Australia (Gallery et al., 2008). This follows the 
general expectation in studying the association between board independence and 
RPTs is that independent directors act as more effective monitors than inside 
directors. Hence, board independence is expected to be negatively associated with 
RPTs (Chen et al. 2011).  
Lo et al. (2010) have investigated other governance variables and their 
association with RPTs. They provide evidence that firms with a lower percentage 
of directors representing the parent company, have different people occupying the 
chair and CEO positions, have financial experts on their audit committees are less 
likely to use manipulated transfer prices in RPTs.  
In a US study Balsam and Gifford (2008) show that insider ownership is 
associated with RPTs. In France, Nekhili and Cherif (2011) show that voting 
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rights held by the main shareholder is positively associated with RPTs. Voting 
rights provide expropriation opportunities to the main shareholders through RPTs. 
They do not find evidence on the relationship between the degree of separation 
between ownership and control nor the affiliation to a business group and RPTs.  
4.5 Consequences of Related Party Transactions 
Several prior studies investigated the consequences of RPTs. In particular, 
researchers have been interested in contributing to the debate about the nature of 
RPTs. There are two possible interpretations of RPTs. The first one is that they 
are a facet of conflict of interest and they are harmful to the company and the 
second is that they efficiently fulfil the economic needs of the firm (Gordon and 
Henry, 2005). To support one of the two views researchers needed and still need 
to investigate the consequences of RPTs. This section reviews the literature on 
the consequences of RPTs.  There are three categories of consequences: (1) 
informativeness of financial reporting, (2) market valuations and (3) firm 
performance. 
4.5.1 Informativeness of Financial Reporting 
Previous studies provide empirical evidence that RPTs are used to manage 
earnings for financial reporting and tax purposes (Lo and Wong, 2011). Moreover, 
controlling shareholders can use RPTs to achieve private benefits at the cost of 
minority shareholders (Cheung et al., 2006; Dow and McGuire, 2009). In order 
for the insiders and managers to retain private control benefits they need to 
conceal those benefits (Leuz et al. 2003). A controlling party can appropriate 
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value for himself or herself only when this value is not verifiable, otherwise 
minority shareholders will be capable of providing evidence of appropriation and 
take legal action (Dyck and Zingales, 2004). Hence, insiders and managers use 
their discretion over financial reporting for their own benefit (Leuz et al. 2003). 
Therefore, if insiders and managers have incentives to conceal their private 
benefits this will affect the informativeness of financial statements and 
disclosures.  
Empirical evidence on RPTs supports the argument that if RPTs were used as a 
tool for earnings manipulation the quality of financial statements and disclosures 
will decrease. For example in the USA Henry et al. (2004) find evidence that 
some types of RPTs have been associated with accounting misstatements and 
Gordon and Henry (2005) find evidence that earnings management measured by 
adjusted absolute normal accruals is positively associated with RPTs. Hwang et al. 
(2013) provide evidence on the positive association between RPTs and earnings 
management as measured by discretionary abnormal accruals in China and shows 
that this relationship was mitigated by enactment of the disclosure regulation in 
November 2000. Also in China Lo and Wong (2011) provide evidence of firms 
that are  engaging in RPTs and have incentives to manage earnings are less likely 
to voluntarily disclose the pricing methods of purchasing/selling of raw materials, 
goods and services from.to related parties. Finally, Cheung et al. (2009) find that 
RPTs conducted for expropriation purposes are accompanied by significantly less 
information disclosure. They find evidence on expropriation by examining the 
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valuation effects of these RPTs which appeared to be negatively affecting the 
cumulative abnormal returns. 
4.5.2 Market Valuation 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that, in the extreme case, when a manager 
owns less than 100% of the firm she does not bear the full cost of any 
opportunistic consumption of corporate assets. Consequently, according to 
Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2010) the benefits to managers and other insiders 
engaged in RPTs will outweigh their costs and management will receive full 
benefits of the RPTs and will bear a minor cost. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) assume that investors anticipate this consumption 
and price protect against it (Kohlbeck and Mayhew, 2010) and consequently will 
not correct management’s opportunistic actions. Therefore, insiders and managers 
will try to avoid RPTs or adapt monitoring mechanisms to avoid negative market 
implications of RPTs. However, when contracting is costly and managers own 
less that 100% of a firm it is possible that there might be an equilibrium of 
manager opportunism and investor price protection where managers benefit from 
RPTs and investors protect themselves against the consequences of expropriation 
of firm resources and such an equilibrium will generate negative market 
valuations (Kohlebeck and Mayhew, 2010).  
Earlier studies provide evidence on the valuation effects of RPTs. Firms that 
conduct RPTs experience a reduction in firm value. For example, Cheung et al. 
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(2009), Lei and Song (2011) and Peng et al. (2011) report a negative association 
between RPTs and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and Ge et al. (2010) find 
that RPTs have negative effects on stock price. Similar results were found in 
Hong Kong by Cheung et al. (2006).  In the US Gordon et al. (2004) provide 
evidence on the negative association between RPTs and industry adjusted returns 
and Ryngaert and Thomas (2012) find that RPTs are associated with share price 
declines and with the likelihood that the firm will enter a financial distress or 
deregister its securities. 
Similarly, a number of studies provide empirical evidence on the negative 
association between RPTs and Tobin’s Q. Dahya et al. (2008) find that the 
occurrences of RPTs is associated with lower Qs in a sample of 799 firms across 
22 countries. The negative valuation effects for firms disclosing RPTs are 
confirmed by Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2010) in the US, Lei and Song (2011) in 
China and Nekhili and Cherif (2011) in France. 
4.5.3 Firm Performance 
The RPTs literature also shows that transactions, of this type, have a negative 
impact on firm performance. Although results show that firms use RPTs to 
manage earnings to mask their performance prior to IPOs, these transactions are 
likely to have a lagged negative effect on firm performance. Chen et al. (2011) 
provide empirical evidence that controlling shareholders in a sample of Chinese 
firms structure RPTs in pre-IPO period and these RPTs are associated with a 
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positive operating performance which is not persistent and causes a long-term 
underperformance and negative stock returns.  
Similar results were provided in other studies examining other types of RPTs in 
China. For example, Aharony et al. (2010) provide the same conclusion for firms 
engaging in related party sales of goods and services in China. Jiang et al. (2010) 
show significant negative economic consequences for the shareholders of Chinese 
firms engaging in inter-corporate loans measured by the item “other receivables” 
on the balance sheet. They show that firms with high balances exhibit worse 
future operating performance, both in terms of lower accounting rates of return 
and higher likelihood of entering financial distress. Further, they show that firms 
with high balances for other receivables are more likely to acquire special 
treatment status which indicates that the firms has had two consecutive annual 
losses.  
The negative relationship between RPTs and firm performance is supported by 
several studies and robust to several firm value measures. However, Chien and 
Hsu (2010) show that corporate governance have a positive moderating effect on 
the relationship between RPTs and firm value. 
Although these results seems to suggest that RPTs are a facet of conflict of 
interest and information asymmetry problem, the RPTs literature clearly 
emphasises that not all types of RPTs have the same negative effects. This 
follows the findings of Gordon and Henry (2005) who argue that not all types of 
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RPTs are associated with earnings management. Similarly, Ryngaert and Thomas 
(2012) found some RPTs to be innocuous and not indicative of opportunistic 
behaviour. Those findings suggest that the assumption that RPTs are a facet of 
conflict of interest should not be taken for granted and should only be generalised 
with care. One explanation for the inconsistency in the conclusions deduced by 
the prior literature might be the explanation provided by Jian and Wong (2010). 
Jian and Wong (2010) provide evidence that in the presence of an incentive to 
manage earnings, managing earnings through conducting RPTs or through 
accruals can act as substitutes. This implies that the association between RPTs 
and earnings management when measured using an accruals-based measure might 
be insignificant or even negative.  
One additional problem in the RPTs literature is that up to this point in time there 
is a clear scarcity in cross-country studies on RPTs that can explain whether the 
differences in empirical results that urged researchers to caution the 
implementation of the agency conflict hypothesis of RPTs are really valid or 
these different results are due to differences in institutional backgrounds, RPTs 
proxies, or even some other external factors that vary between one study and 
another. It is important to the field that cross-country research on RPTs is 
enhanced. This will help to disentangle the effect of institutional factors or 
measurement errors on the findings of RPTs studies. 
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4.6 Weaknesses and Challenges in RPTs research 
The RPTs literature suffers from the following weaknesses. RPTs are mainly 
discussed as either a tool to expropriate minority shareholders or manage reported 
earnings. Although both investor expropriation and earnings management may be 
influenced by institutional background and investor protection (La Porta et al., 
1999; Leuz et al., 2003), the RPTs literature is silent on the role of institutional 
differences among countries in examining the association between RPTs and 
shareholder expropriation (tunnelling) or earnings management. There is a severe 
scarcity of cross country comparative RPTs studies.  With the exception of Dayha 
et al. (2008) who examine the relationship between RPTs, corporate governance 
and firm value no study covers RPTs in more than one country to the best of my 
knowledge. Although this helps researchers to remove external variables that 
might affect the investigated relationship, it also keeps RPTs literature with an 
observed weakness as there is no evidence on the variation of negative outcomes 
of RPTs that might be present due to differences in institutional background and 
investor protection. Thus, the role of institutional background on the effects of 
RPTs and its association with shareholders expropriation or earnings management 
and how this varies across different institutional backgrounds needs to be 
empirically investigated.  
This weakness is also justified by another main weakness in RPTs research which 
is the availability of data. Similar to other disclosures, data on RPTs must be 
manually collected from annual reports. This might be one of the main reasons 
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that led to a scarcity in RPTs research that covers firms from different countries. 
RPTs are complicated transactions where disclosed transactions describe a lot of 
information like the type, value and parties of the transaction. I hope that the 
arguments I have made in this chapter could be used to encourage data providers 
to make more RPTs data available. The availability of detailed RPTs data will 
allow the pursuit of additional interesting research questions for RPTs studies. 
Another limitation is that researchers always have to rely on information of RPTs 
disclosed by the firm. This implies that RPTs that are not disclosed or 
transactions with parties not known to the public or auditors could remain 
unobserved. Although the auditor’s failure to recognise or to disclose a related 
party is cited as one of the most common ten audit deficiencies, in the financial 
scandals that are associated with RPTs, namely Adelphia and Enron, the auditors 
were clearly aware of RPTs and related parties  (Gordon et al. 2007). These 
undisclosed transactions are more likely to be used for achieving private benefits 
by controlling shareholders as controlling shareholders always tend to conceal 
their private benefits so that external shareholders do not observe those benefits. 
Therefore, the nature of RPTs can provide opportunities for controlling 
shareholders to achieve private control benefits through undisclosed RPTs. This 
suggests that one solution that  could possibly mitigate the effect of this problem 
is that auditors and not the firm, should disclose all relations and transactions with 
related parties they are aware of. This could help the public and the researchers to 
assess the degree of opportunism in the conducted RPTs. 
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Finally, the RPTs is silent on the effectiveness of IAS 24 in mitigating the 
negative effects of RPTs. Chong and Dean (1985) evaluated both IAS 24 and US 
GAAP SFAS 57 and show that the standards overcome only partially the 
problems associated with RPTs. This is supported by accounting quality studies 
that have investigated the effect of IFRS/IAS adoption as a whole on accounting 
quality like Barth et al. (2008) who provided evidence that accounting quality is 
improved in general due to the adoption of IAS. However other studies like 
Christensen et al. (2013) show that the problem is usually not with the standards, 
but in the country level enforcement. This suggests that RPTs need to be 
addressed in multi-country studies to investigate the impact of institutional factors 
as mentioned earlier and also to separately examine the effect of  IAS 24 and the 
amendments taking place to try to disentangle the effect of IAS 24 on accounting 
quality from other IAS. 
4.7 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter reviews the RPTs literature. I first start by defining RPTs and their 
types. Next, I try to explain the proxies used to measure RPTs. In the following 
sections I refer to studies where RPTs are featured as dependent variable to 
review the literature on the determinants of RPTs. I also refer to the studies where 
RPTs are featured as an independent variable to present the empirical evidence 
provided by the literature on the consequences of RPTs based on the empirical 
evidence provided to date. 
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Firm size is positively associated  with RPTs, on the contrary leverage is 
negatively associated with RPTs as several studies indicate (Yeh et al., 2012; 
Chen et al., 2011; Jian and Wong, 2010; Gordon and Henry, 2005). RPTs also 
have shown positive association with firms’ incentives to manage earnings, to 
inflate earnings or issue equity. Meanwhile, it has been shown that the presence 
of good corporate governance activities can mitigate the occurrence and the 
negative effects of RPTs (Yeh et al., 2012; Thomas et al., 2004). 
Prior research (e.g. Henry et al., 2004; Gordon and Henry, 2005; Lo and Wong, 
2011) partially supports the notion that RPTs are mainly a means of managing 
earnings. Evidence shows that RPTs are associated with earnings management 
when measured by discretionary abnormal accruals and adjusted abnormal 
accruals and they are also negatively associated with the quality of disclosures. In 
addition to earnings management and disclosure quality, evidence (e.g. Cheung et 
al., 2009; Lei and Song, 2011; Peng et al., 2011) shows that RPTs are negatively 
associated with firm value when measured by cumulative abnormal returns, 
Tobin’s Q, industry adjusted returns and share price. Finally, RPTs literature 
shows that notwithstanding that RPTs are conducted to prop up earnings, they are 
associated with negative firm performance in the future as their positive impact 
on operating performance which is not persistent and causes a long-term 
underperformance and negative stock returns (Chen et al., 2011; Aharony et al., 
2010). 
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Finally, I explain three main caveats that have been identified in the RPTs 
research. First is the lack of cross country studies that would enable the researcher 
to examine the effects of different institutional settings on the RPTs and other 
variables of interest. Second, the data for RPTs should be hand-collected which 
requires extensive effort and time to collect relevant data from annual reports. 
Finally, that the main feasible source of data on RPTs is the information disclosed 
by the management of the firm. This implies that whenever there is a transaction 
with an unknown related party or that the firm do not wish to disclose, these 
transactions are likely to remain unobservable and beyond the scope of auditors, 
regulators and researchers as well.  
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Chapter Five 
Earnings Management and Corporate Governance 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a general understanding of earnings management. There are 
several definitions, determinants and consequences for earnings management1. 
Thus, this chapter is designed to discuss the corner stones of the earnings 
management construct and how it is measured in the light of previous earnings 
management literature. 
The organisation of this chapter is as follows: First, the next page displays Figure 
5.1 that summarises the main determinants and consequences of the literature 
review. Section 5.2 aims to define earnings management by identifying  the 
different definitions that have been developed and applied in prior research in the 
area. Section 5.3 discusses the different determinants of earnings management. 
Section 5.4 explores the different consequences and effects of earnings 
management according to prior research. Section 5.5 addresses the different 
measures used in prior research to measure earnings management. Finally, a 
summary for the chapter is presented in Section 5.6.  
 
 
                                                          
1
 The terms earnings management and earnings quality are used interchangeably. Earnings management 
expresses decreased informativeness of disclosed information. In other words earnings management leads to 
lower earnings quality. 
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Figure 5.1 
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Determinants of Earnings Management (EM) 
 
1) Firm Characteristics 
2) Financial Reporting Practices 
3) Governance and Controls 
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5) Capital Market Incentives 
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Consequences of Earnings Management (EM) 
 
1) Market Valuation 
2) Real Activities 
3) Cost of Capital 
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5.2 Earnings Management 
Earnings management is considered to be a central concern affecting the quality 
of financial statements.  The extent to which managers can manipulate earnings 
figures is seen as an indication the investors cannot rely on accounting reports 
(Aharony et al., 2010). The flexibility of accounting choices provided by 
accounting standards provides fertile ground for earnings management practices 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). 
According to Watts and Zimmerman (1990) and Fields et al. (2001), managers 
can exercise discretion over the accounting numbers. Such discretion can be 
either from an opportunistic perspective or a signalling perspective (Beneish, 
2011). Managers have some opportunity to manipulate earnings to maximise their 
own interest or signal their private information, therefore they can influence and 
distort the information content of earnings (Healy, 1985).  
Earnings management can be defined as the alteration of a firms’ reported 
economic performance by insiders to mislead some groups of stakeholders and 
influence contractual outcomes (Healy and Whalen, 1999; Leuz et al., 2003) and 
this is known as an opportunistic exercising of discretion. In this case it is an 
intended misrepresentation or masking of true economic performance (McVay, 
2006). 
Opportunistic earnings management takes place when managers manipulate 
earnings to increase their compensation. Evidence on opportunistic earnings 
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management was provided by Healy (1985) who found that bonus schemes 
influence the accounting choices that managers seems to make towards 
maximising their bonus awards. His results showed a strong association between 
accruals and managers’ income-based incentives in bonus contracts. Prior studies 
provide substantial evidence that executives engage in earnings management 
(Healy, 1985; Healy and Whalen 1999; Kothari, 2001; Fields, 2001; Cheng and 
Warfield, 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Chava and Purnanandam, 
2010). On the other hand the information perspective of earnings management or 
discretion was first articulated by Holthausen and Leftwich (1983). Under this 
perspective managers use the discretion to signal their expectations about the 
firm’s future cash flow. Accounting earnings are more reliable and more 
informative when the opportunistic behaviour of managers is controlled by 
monitoring systems (Dechow et al., 1996) 
An alternative definition of earnings management is provided by Schipper (1999). 
Schipper (1999) defines earnings management as an intended intervention in the 
external financial reporting process. The aim of such intervention in many cases 
is attributed to obtaining private gains. This definition does not include 
managerial accounting reports or activities. However, other studies show that 
managers also can manipulate real activities during the year to meet certain 
earnings targets. Real activities manipulation can take place either through 
investment activities or operational activities (Roychowdhury, 2006). Also 
earnings can be managed by manipulation of accruals with no direct cash flow 
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consequences. Examples include under-estimating bad debts and delaying asset 
write-offs (Roychowdhury, 2006).  
Taking the definitions provided by Schipper (1989) and Healy and Whalen (1999) 
into consideration, Dechow and Skinner (2000) show a discrepancy between the 
perceptions of both academics and practitioners towards earnings management. 
Dechow and Skinner (2000) argue that the difference between earnings 
management and fraud should be more obvious in definitions used by academic 
scholars. The definitions used by academics do not distinguish between 
intentional fraud and making use of one of the aims of accrual accounting which 
is to help investors assess the firm’s performance during a period through the use 
of basic accounting principles such as revenue recognition and matching 
(Dechow and Skinner, 2000). 
The current research defines earnings management in line with Healy and Whalen 
(1999) and Leuz et al. (2003) who assume that earnings management occurs as a 
result of an intention to mislead shareholders or any other stakeholders to achieve 
personal goals. This definition was used in recent studies (e.g., Garcia-Meca et al., 
2009; Gopalan and Jayaraman 2012). Earnings management in the current 
context is affected by corporate governance and investor protection mechanisms 
(Leuz et al., 2003). 
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5.3 Earnings Management Determinants 
Earnings management is an important accounting issue for academics and 
practitioners alike. A large body of academic research examines the causes and 
consequences of earnings management (Dechow et al., 2012). Earnings 
management in several cases is recognised in the accounting and finance 
literature as a manifestation of opportunistic behaviours of management, where 
the quality of financial information disclosed is distorted by managers (Chen and 
Zhang, 2012). The quality of financial statements is affected by managers 
attempts to manipulate reported earnings (Aharony et al., 2000; McNichols, 
2000). 
The aim of this section is to provide a review of earnings management 
determinants. In particular this section discusses the relationship between 
earnings management and governance on one hand  and the relationship between 
earnings management and other firm activities and characteristics on the other 
hand. 
According to Dechow et al. (2010), six main factors can influence the earnings 
management behaviour of a company’s management. Those are (1) firm 
characteristics, (2) financial reporting practices, (3) governance and controls, (4) 
auditors, (5) equity market incentives, and (6) external factors.  
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5.3.1 Firm Characteristics 
Previous studies find evidence that firm characteristics can affect earnings 
management proxies. Firm characteristics like debt (Dechow, 1994; Dechow and 
Dichev, 2002), growth (Gopalan and Jayaraman, 2012) and size (Hirbar and 
Nichols, 2007), have been discussed in prior literature as factors that can 
influence earnings management. 
Several studies investigate the effect of firm performance on firms’ earnings 
management practice. Kinney and McDaniel (1989), Petroni, (1992), Balsam et al. 
(1995), Defond and Park (1997), Keating and Zimmerman (1999) and Doyle et al. 
(2007) provide evidence that weak performance drives earnings management. On 
the other hand DeAngelo et al. (1994) and Francis et al. (1996) suggest that weak 
performance places limits on earnings management opportunities. 
Debt and constraints around the use and acquisition of debt finance has been 
found to provide incentives for earnings management according to prior literature. 
Leverage increases the potential for earnings management through income 
increasing accruals and other income increasing accounting choices.  Prior 
evidence shows that debt is positively associated with income-increasing earnings 
management when firms wish to reduce the probability of debt covenant 
violations and improve the firm’s bargaining power during debt negotiations. 
Support for this position is provided by Sweeny (1994) who found that managers 
of firms approaching default, respond with income-increasing accounting changes 
and that the default costs imposed by lenders and the accounting flexibility 
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available to managers are important determinants of managers' accounting 
responses. The debt covenant hypothesis is also supported by Dichev and Skinner 
(2002).  DeFond and Jiambavlo (1994) also examined the incidence of abnormal 
accruals in a sample of firms that reported debt covenant violations in annual 
reports and found that in the year prior to violation that abnormal levels of 
accruals were significantly positive (both total and working). Beatty and Weber 
(2003) examine whether the provisions of a firm’s bank debt contracts affect its 
accounting choices. Findings show that borrowers whose bank debt contracts 
allow accounting method changes are more likely to engage in income increasing 
earnings management. 
Other studies have investigated the role of growth in earnings management. 
Studies that measured growth using sales growth or net operating asset growth 
provide evidence that higher growth rates are associated with higher levels of 
earnings management (Nissim and Penman, 2001; Penmanm and Zhang, 2002). 
On the other hand, Lee et al. (2006) do not find significant  association between 
growth and earnings management. 
Firm size also has been suggested as a determinant of earnings management. 
Recent studies project that size will be positively associated with earnings quality 
and that larger firms will have lower levels of earnings management. Large firms 
have the capability to maintain an adequate internal control system and 
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experience less internal control deficiencies compared to smaller firms (Doyle et 
al., 2007). 
The abovementioned studies show that firm characteristics can act as a 
determinant of earnings management and that different firm characteristics 
influence earnings quality in particular firm performance, debt, growth and size 
can influence manager’s decisions and hence, could provide an incentive for an 
accounting choice that might entail earnings management. Although the evidence 
on the association between earnings management and firm characteristics is 
mixed, there is no doubt that they need to be considered as determinants of 
earnings management in firms. This explains the inclusion of several firm 
characteristics as control variables in earnings management studies. When a study 
investigates the association between earnings management and any other 
phenomenon, the researchers need to make sure that the change in earnings 
management is explained mainly by the independent variables and that results are 
not influenced by firm performance, size, growth or debt. This is shown in the 
discussion of earnings management measures in Section 3.5. 
5.3.2 Financial Reporting practices 
Prior literature highlights three features of financial reporting practices that 
researchers predict to affect earnings quality. Those features are classified as 
follows: the flexibility of accounting methods or principles, other financial 
reporting practices including financial statement classification and interim 
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reporting and finally, principles based versus rules based methods (Dechow et al., 
2010). 
Some early studies have provided evidence on the relation between accounting 
methods or principles and earnings management. For example the results of 
Barfield and Comiskey (1971) suggest that the choice of depreciation method can 
affect earnings smoothness. Also the results of the study conducted by Beidleman 
(1973) show that firms select certain accounting methods which provide them 
with increased discretion to influence reported earnings. However, Dechow et al. 
(2010) argues that the notion that accounting method choice leads to lower 
quality of earnings, does not have sufficient support. 
The association between other financial reporting practices like financial 
statement classification and interim reporting have been examined by McVay 
(2006) and the results show that managers opportunistically shift expenses from 
core expenses that include cost of goods sold and selling, general, and 
administrative expenses to special items so that meeting analysts forecasts is 
attainable.  
The effects of interim reporting on earnings management have only been thinly 
studied. Those studies indicate that firms time income recognition across periods 
within a fiscal year; this affects the quality of interim versus fourth quarter 
earnings (Dechow et al., 2010). However, the results were mixed whether firms 
manipulate earnings in years when there are high incentives for earnings 
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management (Kerstein and Rai, 2007; Jacob and Jorgensen, 2007) or when those 
firms need to avoid negative earnings surprise at quarters rather than fiscal years 
(Brown and Pinello, 2007). 
The third feature of financial reporting that can be a determinant of earnings 
management is related to the adoption of particular accounting principles. 
According to Barth et al. (2008), principles-based standards have the advantage 
of removing allowable accounting treatments and requiring accounting measures 
that better reflect a firm’s economic performance. This should increase 
accounting quality if these actions could limit the opportunistic discretion of 
management in determining accounting amounts. Thus, principles-based 
standards are assumed to provide higher earnings quality. However, these authors 
also argue that their predictions may not be substantiated. On one hand, 
principles-based standards limit managerial discretion relating to accounting 
alternatives which could eliminate a firm’s ability to report accounting 
measurements that are more reflective of the firm’s economic performance (Barth 
et al., 2008).  
Dechow et al. (2010) indicate that the evidence on the impact of principles-based 
standards versus rules-based standards on earnings management is mixed. The 
results of Barth et al. (2008) indicate that IAS (principles-based standards) is 
associated with less earnings management. In contrast, Cuccia et al. (1995) and 
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Nelson et al. (2002) found that principles-based standards cannot alleviate 
opportunistic earnings management.  
5.3.3 Governance and controls 
Internal controls include monitoring mechanisms chosen by the principal in the 
principal-agent relationship, as well as bonding mechanisms chosen by the agent 
at some cost (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This section will discuss the 
governance and control mechanisms that can mitigate earnings management 
behaviour and enhance the informativeness of disclosed financial statements. The 
mechanisms that will be discussed are the characteristics of the board of directors 
(BOD) and internal control procedures, managerial share ownership and 
managerial compensation. 
5.3.3.1 Board of Directors  
Boards consist of two different types of directors, executive and non-executive. 
Executive directors are responsible for daily management issues in the firm and 
they are directly responsible for all business strategies. The executive directors 
are the subordinates of the Chief Executive officer (CEO) (Weir and Liang, 2001); 
therefore, they are not in a strong position to monitor or discipline the CEO 
(Daily and Dalton, 1993). Cadbury (1992) identified the monitoring role as the 
primary role for non-executive directors. The board of directors is not only one of 
the internal corporate governance mechanisms that are used to secure or facilitate 
the alignment of shareholders’ and managers’ interests and to control or remove 
ineffective managers (Park and Shin, 2004). 
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According to Fama and Jensen (1983), the board of directors is a tool that could 
be used by shareholders to monitor top managers. Boards are not always capable 
of exercising this role effectively. This lack of effectiveness requires more 
analysis of some board issues (De Andres, et al., 2005). Prior research highlights 
the main board issues that are required to be addressed. Among those issues, the 
most important are board independence and board structure as shown by prior 
studies (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Jensen, 1993; Huther, 1997; Rosenstein 
and Wyatt, 1997; Eisenberg, et al., 1998). 
Studies that examine the association between earnings management and the 
structure of the Board of Directors (BOD) provide evidence that some BOD 
characteristics have proven to be successful in mitigating earnings management 
practices. Klein (2002) examined whether the presence of an audit committee and 
BOD independence are associated with less earnings management. The results 
have shown a significant negative relationship between the percentage of 
independent members of an audit committee and abnormal accruals (proxy for 
earnings management). Also, a negative relation is found between BOD 
independence and abnormal accruals.  
These results suggest the enhancement of BOD independence as this increases the 
effectiveness of the monitoring process. Supporting evidence on the role of BOD 
in constraining earnings management is provided by several studies (Beasley, 
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1996; Abbott et al., 2004; Krishan, 2005; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Farber, 
2005; Vafeas, 2005).   
On the other hand a study conducted by Larcker et al. (2007) examined the 
association between fourteen corporate governance dimensions and earnings 
management. The results showing mixed associations with earnings management. 
Therefore, the evidence on the relationship between corporate governance  and 
earnings management remain mixed. 
5.3.3.2 Internal control procedures 
The evidence consistently suggests that stronger internal control procedures are 
associated with less earnings management (Dechow et al., 2010).  Doyle et al. 
(2007) examined the relationship between accruals quality and internal controls  
and they provide evidence that weaknesses in the internal control environment is 
associated with higher levels of earnings management measured in terms of 
accruals quality. Further, they find that this relation between weak internal 
controls and lower accruals quality is driven by weakness in disclosures that are 
relevant to overall company-level controls and hence, may be more difficult to 
audit. They find no such relation for more auditable, account-specific weaknesses. 
In another study by Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008), the effect of internal control 
deficiencies on earnings management was investigated. They used the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act mandated internal control deficiency (ICD) disclosure and external 
auditor opinion on internal control. They document lower quality of earnings for 
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firms with greater numbers of deficiencies in internal controls. Another internal 
control procedure that was examined in the same context is managerial turnover. 
Evidence shows that managerial turnover turned to be a disciplining mechanism 
that mitigates earnings management. Evidence on the association between less 
earnings management and managerial turnover is provided by several studies 
(Moore, 1973; DeAngelo, 1988; Collins and DeAngelo, 1990; Dechow and Sloan, 
1991; Pourcriau, 1993, Geiger and North, 2006). 
In general, it should be taken into consideration that the monitoring nature of 
internal controls can affect earnings quality positively at least in some cases. One 
of the main aims of internal controls is to ensure the informativeness of earnings 
and that the financial statements are reflecting a real picture of the firm’s 
performance (Dechow et al., 2010). 
5.3.3.3 Managerial Ownership 
Following the ideas introduced by Berle and Means (1932), finance and strategy 
researchers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Gedajlovic 
and Shapiro, 1998; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000) focused on the agency costs of 
professional managers that could result from the separation of ownership and 
control. Agency costs are often used to refer to the costs incurred by the principal 
to decrease the likelihood of the agent’s (manager) to pursue his personal interests 
at the expense of the interests of shareholders. 
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Managerial ownership is traditionally viewed as providing a direct economic 
incentive for managers to engage in active monitoring and align ownership and 
control through stock ownership (Bhagat et al., 1999). In some firms, managers 
have limited power due to the large control power possessed by relational 
investors. The term relational investors is usually used to describe influential 
shareholders who hold large proportion of a company’s stock for a long period of 
time and they actively monitor the firm’s performance (Bhagat et al., 2004). It 
could be argued that relational investors are a substitute for corporate control 
(Jensen, 1986).  
It is predicted that lower managerial ownership is associated with both 
contractual constraints that are often denominated in accounting numbers and 
consequent greater managerial motivation to either relax restrictions or capitalise 
on incentives. Moreover, lower managerial ownership is predicted to be 
associated with information asymmetry, informativeness of earnings or earnings 
management (Warfield et al., 1995). This argument is supported by empirical 
evidence which I discuss in the next three paragraphs. 
Prior literature has shown that evidence on the association between earnings 
management and managerial ownership is mixed (Dechow at al., 2010). For 
example, Lafond and Roywchowdhry (2008) examine the effect of managerial 
ownership on financial reporting conservatism. They find that conservatism as 
measured by asymmetric timeliness of earnings declines with managerial 
85 
 
ownership. This is consistent with the conclusion provided by Smith (1976) that 
policy decisions by manger firms smoothed earnings significantly more than 
decisions made by owner firms. These studies are also consistent with Dhaliwal 
et al. (1982) as they examine the relationship between the ownership structure of 
the firms and the accounting methods they apply. Based on the ownership 
structure of the firms, they compare owner controlled versus management 
controlled firms and find that managerial ownership influences the choice of 
depreciation methods adopted for financial reporting. Similar evidence was 
provided by Dyl (1989) who found that managers of widely held firms are more 
likely to choose FIFO method for inventory valuation as it increases reported 
income. 
Other studies find evidence that support the incentive alignment effect of 
managerial ownership. For example, Warfield et al. (1995) records a positive 
association between managerial ownership and earnings explanatory power for 
returns and negative association with the magnitude of accrual adjustments. 
Moreover, Gul et al. (2003) finds that managerial ownership is a moderator of the 
positive association between discretionary accruals and audit fees that can affect 
this relationship negatively. 
5.3.3.4 Managerial Compensation 
Finally, evidence on the relationship between characteristics of managerial 
compensation and earnings management is massive. Studies on managerial 
compensation and its relationship with earnings management included different 
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types of managerial compensation like bonus plans and earnings-based 
compensations, equity-based compensations including executive stock options 
and insider trading. 
Examples of studies that used bonus plans and earnings-based payments include 
Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979), Bowen et al. (1981), Healy (1985), Skinner 
(1993), Holthausen et al. (1995), Gaver et al. (1995) and Guidry et al. (1999). 
Studies of equity-based compensation include Baker et al. (2003), Coles et al. 
(2006) Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), Burns and Keida (2006), Erickson et al. 
(2006), Efendi et al. (2007), McAnally et al. (2008), Johsnon et al. (2009) and 
Armstrong et al. (2010). Up to the best level of knowledge, three studies used 
insider trading to measure managerial compensation (Beneish, 1999; Summers 
and Sweeny, 1998; Darrough and Rangan, 2005). 
According to Dechow et al. (2010), the results of these studies are mixed. 
Dechow et al. (2010) argue that it is not feasible to summarise and compare the 
results of those studies as each study identifies a specific form of compensation-
related incentives to a specific earnings management objective (smoothing or 
meeting targeted earnings). Moreover, each study identifies a specific tool of 
earnings management. The degree of mixed evidence across the studies likely 
reflects the difficulty of correctly matching compensation incentives to the 
earnings management tools.  
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5.3.4 Auditors 
According to Arens et al. (2012) Auditing is defined as the accumulation and 
evaluation of evidence about quantifiable information of an economic entity to 
determine and report on the degree of correspondence between the information 
and established criteria. Auditing should be done by a competent independent 
person (Arens et al., 2012). The objective of an audit of financial statements 
prepared within a framework of recognized accounting policies is to enable an 
auditor to express an opinion on such financial statements. The auditor's opinion 
helps establish the credibility of the financial statements (International Audit 
Practices Committee, 1980). 
It is expected that auditors and audit practices are a determining factor in earnings 
management because of their role in mitigating intentional and unintentional 
misstatements in the financial statements of the firm. The ability of the auditor to 
limit misstatements is dependent on the auditor’s ability to detect material 
misstatements and to adjust for or report it (DeAngelo, 1981). It is hypothesised 
that the ability of the auditor to detect errors depends on the effort and the 
effectiveness of the auditor. It has also been argued that the auditor is usually 
driven by high standards ethicality, independence and reputation which require 
him to detect errors or fraud in the financial statements (Nelson et al., 2002). 
Auditor effort or effectiveness can be measured using different proxies. 
Caramanis and Lennox (2008) used the number of hours spent and Krishnan 
(2003) used auditor industry experience. This latter proxy measures attributes 
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based on the familiarity of the auditor with the industry in which the client 
operates. Solomon et al. (1999) argue that industry specialist auditor firms 
provide higher quality in the audit process. In the studies conducted by Caramanis 
and Lennox (2008) and Krishnan (2003) the results have shown negative 
association between audit effort/effectiveness and earnings management as 
measured by discretionary accruals. 
Other measures for effort/effectiveness include auditor tenure. Johnson et al. 
(2002) examined whether audit tenure is associated with better financial reporting 
quality. The results have shown that short audit-firm tenures are associated with 
lower earnings quality. Those results are contradicting the results of the study 
conducted by Chen et al. (2008); the later study found that audit-firm tenure is 
associated with better earnings quality. 
Evidence on the association between the auditor and earnings quality was 
sometimes based on the categorisation of audit firms by size. Big audit firms are 
hypothesised to provide better audit quality, and thus enhance reporting quality 
and the informativeness of financial statements and disclosures. For example, 
Becker et al. (1998) assume that big audit firms have higher audit quality and 
examine the association between audit quality and earnings management. Their 
results show that audit quality is negatively associated with earnings management. 
This evidence is consistent with Teoh and Wong (1993), DeFond and 
Subramaynam (1998) and Francis et al. (1999). 
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Finally, evidence on the relation between audit fees and earnings management is 
mixed and further depends on the type of fees whether they are audit or non-audit 
fees (NAF), sample firms and the specific measure of accruals quality. Several 
studies have been conducted in this context, but the results were not consistent 
(Frankel et al., 2002; Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Chung and Kallapur, 2003; Gul et al., 
2003; Gul and Srinidhi, 2007). 
5.3.5 Capital Market Incentives 
Regulators and investors have raised concerns that certain management incentives 
could lead to earnings management and this could negatively affect the 
informativeness of the financial statements and contribute to recent corporate 
scandals (Levitt 1998; cited in Cheng and Warfield, 2005). Earnings management 
is always a mean to an end, and uncovering the motives for earnings management 
is the key to explaining the issue (Chen et al., 2011). 
Several studies provide evidence that a firm’s need to raise capital is likely to 
affect the accounting choices it makes. This might lead to using opportunistic 
accounting choices. Therefore, the firm’s accounting choices and thus its earnings 
quality may differ when a firm is raising capital (Dechow et al., 2010). 
The academic literature has long been interested in earnings management by 
companies and how they use it to achieve capital market advantage. For example, 
Aharony et al. (2000) examine the earnings pattern of initial public offering (IPO) 
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firms in China and find significant evidence that sample firms use accruals-based 
earnings management to boost their earnings prior to an IPO. 
A very important research question is “are accruals during IPO opportunistic?” In 
attempting to answer this question Teoh et al. (1998) find evidence that IPO firms, 
on average have high positive issue-year earnings and abnormal accruals, 
followed by poor long-run earnings and negative abnormal accruals. This 
evidence supports the argument that firms manage earnings when they need to 
raise capital. The motives offered in the literature for such opportunistic 
behaviour (e.g., Aharony et al., 1993; Friedlan, 1994; Teoh et al., 1998) suggest 
that such manipulation may be induced by the desire of managers to increase their 
wealth by increasing the value of stock retained and cash receipts from the partial 
disposition of existing stock.  
Aharony et al. (2010) extend this motivation suggesting that inflating earnings in 
the pre- IPO period is motivated by the prospect of tunnelling opportunities in the 
post-IPO period. Johnson et al.’s (2000) define tunnelling as the transfer of assets 
and profits out of firms for the benefit of those who control them. Aharony et al. 
(2010) find evidence that Chinese firms manage earnings upwards in the pre-IPO 
period. 
In a different context, Dietrich et al. (2000) examine whether raising capital in 
debt markets provides incentives for earning management. The findings show that 
managers select accounting methods that will yield in high reported earnings, 
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time asset sales to smooth earnings changes and smooth net asset changes and 
boost fair values prior to raising new debt. 
5.3.6 External Factors 
In addition to all determinants of earnings management that were previously 
mentioned, there are other external factors that can influence the earnings 
management behaviour of a firm. Considerable evidence suggests that external 
factors like capital requirements, regulatory requirements or industry regulations 
are associated with accounting choices and earnings management behaviour 
(Dechow et al., 2010).  
For example, under the 1996-1998 security regulations introduced in China, 
Return on Equity (ROE) has to be at least 10% for three consecutive years for a 
firm to qualify for stock rights offers (Haw et al., 2005). Therefore, managers 
manage earnings through income increasing accruals to meet regulatory ROE 
targets (Haw et al., 2005).  
Jones (1991) investigates whether firms would manage earnings downwards to 
benefit from tariff increases and quota reductions during import relief 
investigations by the United States International Trade commission (ITC). The 
amount of relief granted to a firm depends to a great extent on accounting 
numbers, thus encouraging firms to manage earnings to increase the likelihood of 
obtaining an import relief or increase the amount of relief granted. 
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Han and Wang (1998) investigate whether oil companies that expect increases in 
earnings resulting from sudden price increases during the 1990 Persian Gulf 
crises use accounting accruals to reduce earnings or not.  Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait led to a sudden leap in world oil prices and in gasoline prices in the US. 
Oil firms were accused of price gouging which caused public anger and demand 
for appropriate government actions in the US. Arguing that firms might manage 
earnings to reduce earnings would help decreasing the sensitivity of the political 
situation, Han and Wang (1998) examine earnings management practices by 
firms that are expected to benefit from the sudden increases in oil prices. Results 
show that those companies that expect to profit from the crisis used accruals to 
reduce their reported quarterly earnings during the Gulf crisis. 
5.4 Earnings Management Consequences 
Prior research has highlighted several consequences for earnings management. 
However, this section aims to discuss the consequences that are relevant to the 
context of this research. Therefore, this section explores the studies providing 
evidence for the following consequences of earnings management: market 
valuations, real activities, cost of equity capital and cost of debt capital. 
5.4.1 Market Valuations 
Prior research shows that firms manage reported earnings to avoid earnings 
decreases and losses (Burhgstahler and Dichev, 1997) and meet analysts’ 
forecasts (Burgstahler and Eames, 2003) and that firms manage both earnings and 
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expectations to meet or exceed analysts’ earnings forecast as this will reward the 
firm with higher valuation (Kasznik and McNichols, 2002).  
However, the literature provides evidence that managing earnings through 
discretionary loss reserves are not rewarded with higher firm valuations. Beaver 
and McNichols (1998) and Petroni et al. (2000) record a negative relationship 
between discretionary loss reserves and firm valuation. When firms subsequently 
fail to achieve a target, they are more likely to lose the extra valuation 
immediately (Skinner and Sloan, 2002). Dechow et al. (2010) provides two 
explanations for this. First, they argue that the market rewards some types of 
earnings management and not others. Second, there is a possibility that there is 
greater market mispricing of less transparent earnings management techniques.   
5.4.2 Real Activities 
Earnings quality is positively associated with investment efficiency through 
reducing information asymmetry between managers and shareholders (Biddle and 
Hilary, 2006). McNichols and Stubben (2008) also examine the impact of 
earnings management on investment decisions. Their findings show that earnings 
management can influence internal decisions. 
Other studies have suggested that voluntary disclosure decisions are affected by 
earnings quality. Lougee and Marquardt (2004) find that firms with low earnings 
informativeness are more likely to disclose pro forma earnings than other firms.  
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 5.4.3 Cost of Capital 
Francis et al. (2004) examined the relationship between the cost of equity capital 
and seven attributes of earnings (as proxies for earnings management). They find 
that firms with least favourable values of each attribute experienced a larger cost 
of equity than firms with more favourable values. Bhattacharya et al. (2003) 
document that an increase in earnings opacity (decreased earnings quality) in a 
country is linked to an economically significant increase in the cost of equity and 
an economically significant decrease in trading the stock market of that country. 
Jayaraman (2008) found that smoother earnings or earnings that are more volatile 
than cash flows are associated with more information asymmetry and higher bid-
ask spreads.  Further evidence is provided by Hribar and Jenkins (2004) who 
found that firms manage earnings through stock repurchases to avoid a potentially 
large negative stock price response.  Also, Dechow et al. (1996) documented that 
firms manipulating earnings, experience significant increases in their cost of 
capital. When the earnings overstatements are recognised, investors will estimate 
the extent to which firm value was overstated and the stock price will decrease 
accordingly. Lower firm value implies more cost to raise capital. 
Similar evidence also exists for debt capital market. The cost of debt capital is 
higher when earnings management (earnings quality) proxies are higher (lower). 
Francis et al. (2005) find that poor accruals quality is associated with higher cost 
of both debt and equity. Firms with poor accruals incurred higher interest 
expenses. Also, Bhojraj and Swaminathan (2007) find evidence that corporate 
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bonds of firms with high operating accruals underperform corporate bonds with 
low operating accruals. 
5.5 Earnings management measures 
Prior studies used several proxies for earnings management. Some proxies are 
relevant to the properties of earnings like earnings smoothness and accrual-based 
earnings management. (Leuz et al., 2003; Gopalan and Jayaraman, 2012). Other 
proxies are either relevant to investor responsiveness to earnings (e.g., 
Holthausen and Verrechia 1988) or external indicators of earnings management 
(e.g., Dechow et al., 1996).  
However, it is believed that measures that use accruals are most effective in 
measuring earnings management. These measures attempt to directly capture 
problems with the accounting measurement system and are so in particular 
relevant in the research context of earnings management and earnings 
manipulation (Dechow et al., 2010). Therefore, several studies have used 
accounting accruals to capture earnings management (e.g., Jones, 1991; Dechow 
et al., 1995; Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Leuz et al., 2003; Francis et al., 2005; 
Kothari et al., 2005; Gopalan and Jayaraman, 2012). This section discusses two 
streams of using accrual-based earnings management, namely, abnormal accruals 
derived from modelling the accrual process and earning smoothness. 
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5.5.1 Abnormal Accruals and Modelling the Accrual process 
Abnormal accruals have been the focus of much empirical research in accounting. 
They have been used as a proxy of earnings management in most of the studies. 
The normal accruals reflect fundamental performance, but abnormal accruals are 
meant to capture distortions included by earnings management which are more 
likely to indicate opportunistic earnings management behaviour (Dechow et al., 
2010). 
The most widely used accruals models are Jones (1991), Modified Jones model 
by Dechow et al. (1995), performance matched discretionary accruals by Kothari 
et al. (2005), Dechow and Dichev (2002) approach, and discretionary estimation 
errors conducted by Francis et al. (2005). In a literature review of 300 earnings 
management studies, Dechow et al. (2010) summarised these models in an exhibit 
which is shown in Table 5.1. 
5.5.1.1 Jones (1991) Model 
The study conducted by Jones (1991) focuses on accruals to capture earnings 
management. In particular, the Jones (1991) model uses discretionary accruals to 
measure earnings manipulations. The contribution of the Jones (1991) model is 
that prior studies used the discretionary part of a single accrual account to capture 
earnings management as used in McNichols and Wilson (1988). However, Jones 
(1991) used the discretionary portion of total accruals to capture earnings 
management that are not mainly related to fundamental firm characteristics that 
are correlated to accruals. 
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Jones (1991) defines the accrual process as including working capital and 
depreciation as a function of sales growth and property, plant and equipment 
(hereafter PPE). Sales growth control non-discretionary working capital and PPE 
control non-discretionary depreciation expense (Bernard and Skinner, 1996). 
Total accruals are measured as the change in noncash working capital before 
income taxes payable less total depreciation expenses.  
The goal of the discretionary accruals model is to separate total accruals into 
discretionary and non-discretionary accruals. First, the total accruals model is 
estimated, then the researcher uses forecasted values to estimate non-
discretionary accruals and estimated discretionary accruals fall as the estimation 
error (Bernard and Skinner, 1996). 
Jones (1991) model has been criticised for the low explanatory power; it only 
explains around 10% of the variation in accruals. The reason of the low 
explanatory power of the model could be attributed to the managers’ discretion 
over the accrual process, which they use to mask fundamental performance 
(Dechow et al., 2010). Later studies have shown that the Jones (1991) model 
might be subject to Type I and Type II errors (Dechow et al., 2003, Dechow et al., 
2005; Dechow et al., 2010). Type I errors classifies accruals as abnormal when 
they are  a representation of fundamental performance. Type I error is suggested 
as the residuals are highly correlated with total accruals and with earnings 
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performance (Dechow et al., 1995). Type II errors classify accruals as normal 
when they are not. 
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Table 5.1 
Accruals Models 
Accrual Model Theory Notes 
Jones (1991) model 
Acc= α+β∆Rev+βPPE+ε 
Accruals are  a function of revenue growth 
and depreciation is a function of PPE. All 
variables are scaled by total assets 
Correlation on error with firm performance 
can bias tests. R Squared around 12%.  
Residual is correlated with accruals and cash 
flow 
Modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) 
Acc=β(∆ Rev-∆ Rec)+βPPE+ε 
Adjusts jones model to exclude growth  
in credit sales in years identified as  
manipulation years 
Provides some improvement in power in  
certain settings (when revenue is 
manipulated)  
Performance matched (Kothari et al., 2005) 
DisAcc-Matched firms DissAcc 
Matches firm-year observation with another 
from the same industry and year with the closest 
ROA. Discretionary accruals are from 
the Jones model (or the modified Jones model) 
Can reduce power of test. Apply only when  
performance is an issue 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) approach 
∆WC= α+βCFO (t-1)+β CFO (t-2)+β CFO (t-3)+ε 
Accruals are modelled as a function of past,  
present, and future cash flows given their 
purpose to alter timing of cash flow  
recognition of earnings 
σ(ε) or absolute ε proxies for accrual quality 
as an unsigned measure of the extent of  
accrual "errors". Focuses on short-term 
accruals does not address errors in 
long-term accruals 
Discretionary estimation errors (Francis et al., 2005) 
TCA=α+βCFO (t-1)+ β CFO (t)+β CFO (t+1)+β 
∆Rev+βPPE+ε 
σ(ε)=α+λ Size σCFO+λα(Rev)+λlog (opercycle)+λNegearn+v 
Decomposes the standard deviation of the  
residual from the accruals model into an  
innate component that reflects the firm's  
operating environment and a discretionary 
component (v) that reflects managerial  
choice 
Innate estimation errors are the predicted  
component from σ(ε) regression 
100 
 
5.5.1.2 Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al., 1995) 
Dechow et al. (1995) modify the Jones model to adjust for growth in credit sales 
aiming to reduce Type II errors. If managers used their discretion to accrue 
revenues at year-end it could be argued that these revenues have really been 
earned and should be recognized. “The Jones model orthogonalises the total 
accruals with respect to revenues and will therefore extract this discretionary 
component of accruals, causing an estimate bias of earnings management” 
Dechow et al. (1995). This limitation is recognised by the author (Jones, 1991).  
Dechow et al. (1995) presented a modified version of the Jones Model to be used 
in the empirical analysis. The modification was designed with the expectation that 
it will eliminate the measurement errors or biasness in the Jones Model. In the 
modified model, non-discretionary accruals are estimated during the periods in 
which the sampled firms has an extreme financial performance and hence it is 
expected that earnings have been managed. 
This modification increased the explanatory power of the Jones Model and it 
better reflects earnings manipulation. The problem that remains unresolved after 
modifying the Jones Model is the presence of Type I error and even more likely 
than in the Jones Model as the model experiences high correlations between 
residuals and earnings performance (Dechow et al., 2010). Several studies have 
attempted to overcome the problems associated with the modified Jones Model 
by estimating the normal relationship between total sales and credit sales to 
control for non-discretionary credit sales. Dechow et al., (2003), DeFond and 
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Jiambavlo (1994) estimate the regression by industry rather than by firm to lessen 
firm-year requirements. 
5.5.1.3 Performance Matched Discretionary Accruals (Kothari et al., 2005). 
Empirical evidence suggests that estimated discretionary accruals are correlated 
with firm performance. Thus, it is important to control for financial performance 
when estimating discretionary accruals (Wan, 2013). Kothari et al. (2005) find 
that performance matching on return on asset controls for the effect of 
performance on measured discretionary accruals enhances the reliability and the 
explanatory power of an earnings management model. The evidence provided by 
Kothari et al. (2005) supports the use of ROA to match performance. 
Kothari et al. (2005) identify a firm from the same industry and a close ROA to 
that of the sample firm and deduct the control firm’s discretionary accruals from 
those of the sample firm to generate the performance matched discretionary 
residuals. The weakness of this model is that the models that are initially used to 
produce the residuals can only explain minimal amount of the variance in 
accruals. Therefore, this approach is likely to add noise to the measure of 
discretionary accruals and it can extract too much discretion when earnings are 
being managed and consequently have low power tests (Dechow et al., 2010). 
5.5.1.4 Dechow and Dichev (2002) Approach 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) suggest a new measure of one aspect of the quality of 
working capital accruals and earnings. This measures model accruals as a 
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function of current, past and future cash flows because future cash flows can be 
expected through accruals. The results of this model show that firms with longer 
operating cycles, larger accruals, more volatile cash flows, accruals and earnings 
have lower accrual quality. The drawback of Dechow and Dichev (2002) is that it 
is an unsigned model which will lower the power of tests when the researcher 
predicts earnings management in a specific direction upwards or downwards. 
Using an unsigned measure of earnings management implies a lack of fit in 
estimation and produces biasness in the direction of rejecting the null hypothesis 
of no earnings management (Hribar and Nichols, 2007). 
5.5.1.5 Discretionary Estimation Errors (Francis et al., 2005) 
McNichols (2002) suggested that adding the change in revenues and property, 
plant and equipment (PPE) will expand the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model to 
a broader measure with more explanatory variables. In this model, working 
capital accruals reflect managerial estimates of cash flows, and the extent to 
which those accruals do not map into cash flows, changes in revenues and PPE 
are an inverse measure of accruals quality due to estimation errors (Francis et al., 
2005). 
Francis et al. (2005) argue that Dechow and Dichev (2002) model is limited to 
current accruals. While applying the same model to total accruals might produce 
an accruals quality metric that comprehensively measures accruals uncertainty. 
Thus, Francis et al. (2005) considered proxies for accruals quality that are based 
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on the absolute value of abnormal accruals, where the abnormal accruals are 
estimated using the modified Jones Model used by Dechow et al. (1995).  
According to Dechow et al. (2010), the discretionary estimated errors could still 
reflect estimation errors. These errors reduce the power of the test. Moreover, this 
model could induce bias in an unknown direction into the proxy for managerial 
discretion. However, more research is needed to evaluate the importance of these 
concerns. 
5.5.2 Earning Smoothing 
Earnings smoothing captures the degree to which managers use discretion over 
financial reporting to reduce the variability of earnings relative to the variability 
of cash flows (Gopalan and Jayaraman, 2012). This takes place by altering the 
accounting component of earnings, namely accruals (Leuz et al., 2003).  
Smoother earnings may be more informative if it is not associated with an 
opportunistic incentive. On the other hand, a firm’s accounting choices may be 
motivated by an opportunistic behaviour and this would impede the 
informativeness of earnings (Dechow et al., 2010).  
Earnings smoothness is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation of operating 
income and the standard deviation of operating cash flows (Leuz et al., 2003; 
Gopalan and Jayaraman, 2012). Cash flow from operations is computed by 
subtracting the accrual component from earnings where accrual component is 
calculated following Dechow et al. (2005) as: 
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Accruals= (∆CA-∆Cash) - (∆CL-∆STD) – Dep 
Where: 
∆CA= change in total current assets  
∆Cash= change in cash 
∆CL= change in current liabilities 
∆STD= change in short-term debt included in current liabilities  
Dep= depreciation and amortisation expense 
 
While prior studies do not provide a clear conclusion about smoothness as a 
proxy for earnings management, there is one main conclusion. In order to 
understand the consequences of smoothness, a measure of smoothness that is 
capable to distinguish artificial smoothness from the smoothness of the 
fundamental performance is needed (Dechow et al., 2010). 
5.6 Summary 
This chapter has presented a general understanding of earnings management. First, 
the definitions of earnings management were discussed. Afterwards, the different 
determinants of earnings management were presented accompanied with evidence 
from prior research on the importance of each of these determinants with regards 
to earnings management. This was followed by identifying the different 
consequences of earnings management in the light of earnings management 
literature. Finally, different models and proxies of measuring earnings 
management and their strengths and weaknesses were discussed.  
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Chapter Six 
Earnings Management, Related Party Transactions and Corporate 
Governance 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the relationship between earnings management (EM) and 
related party transactions (RPTs) for the firms listed on the Athens Stock 
Exchange (ASE). I examine EM using income smoothing and assess whether 
income smoothing is systematically related to RPTs. Moreover, I examine the 
association between earnings management and corporate governance activities, 
namely, audit quality as measured by audit firm size, size of the board of directors 
and independence of board members. 
Related party transactions (RPT) are potential means for insiders to expropriate 
outside shareholders through self-dealing (Ryngaert and Thomas, 2012) and have 
been directly associated with several cases of financial fraud scandals and 
declined earnings quality (Ge et al., 2010). Moreover, they provide direct 
opportunities for related parties to extract resources from minority shareholders 
(Djankov et al., 2008; Johnson et al., 2000). Although RPTs are usually used by 
controlling shareholders for their self-interest, not all RPTs are for expropriation 
purpose and some RPTs are conducted for a solely business purpose (Gordon et 
al. 2004).  
There are two contrasting views regarding RPTs. The first one suggests that RPTs 
are opportunistic means to produce misleading results and affect minority 
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shareholders’ wealth (Ge et al., 2010). The contrary view perceives RPTs as a 
widespread, long-standing form of business activity that can have positive effects. 
Where RPTs are conducted appropriately, companies can benefit from them by 
decreasing transaction costs and achieving better asset utilisation (Chien and Hsu, 
2010). According to the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 57 (SFAS 
57) Related Party Transactions are defined as transactions between a company 
and its subsidiaries, affiliates, principal owners, officers or their families, 
directors or their families, or entities owned or controlled by its officers or their 
families. The International Accounting Standards (IAS) definition of related 
parties is similar to that of the US GAAP:  “As mentioned in paragraph 29.2, IAS 
24 (revised) a related party can be a person, an entity, or an unincorporated 
business”. The standard’s definition is in two parts. The first part of the definition 
identifies general criteria that result in a person, or a close member of that 
person’s family, being a related party of the reporting entity. The second part of 
the definition identifies the conditions that result in an entity being related to the 
reporting entity. 
Accounting research has long been interested in earnings management (EM) 
(Chen et al., 2011) and recent literature found evidence that firms structure RPTs 
as a source of EM (Thomas et al., 2004; Aharony et al., 2010; Jian and Wong 
2010). Healy and Whalen (1999) point out that managers can manipulate reported 
earnings not only through accruals management, but also by structuring RPTs to 
alter a firm’s apparent financial position and reports.  
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Those earlier mentioned studies measured EM activity through discretionary 
accrual practices which are associated with well recognised problems (Guay et al., 
1996; Dechow et al., 2012) or through indirect measures of EM like changes in 
ROA pre and post IPO when investigating the association between EM and RPTs 
(Aharony et al., 2010; Jian and Wong 2010; Chen et al. 2011) and with a special 
focus on the Chinese setting which is unique in terms of ownership structure and 
regulations for RPTs (Jian and Wong, 2010). That said, the link between EM and 
RPTs is far from clear and remains an empirical question. The association 
between RPTs and a behaviour that would indicate EM (e.g. income smoothing) 
is not tested. In particular, if managers and controlling shareholders decided to 
structure RPTs to manage earnings or to extract private benefits they should 
conceal those benefits. Therefore, if RPTs are conducted to mask fraud or 
extraction they should be associated with EM. 
Moreover, it is important to investigate the relationship between EM and 
corporate governance. Corporate governance is assumed to mitigate any EM 
behaviour by the management. Prior studies found evidence that good corporate 
governance activities can improve the company’s reporting quality (Beasley 1996; 
Dechow et al. 1996; Klein 2002; Peansell et al. 2005). Corporate governance can 
also impede opportunistic behaviour of management, increase the value of a firm, 
reduce opportunistic RPTs and enhance efficient RPTs instead (Denis and 
McConnell, 2003; Gordon and Henry, 2005; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Chien and 
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Hsu, 2010 and Abdulwahab et al., 2010). Thus, corporate governance is assumed 
to mediate the relationship between EM and RPTs. 
I investigate the relationship between RPTs and EM from 2009 to 2011 across 
215 firm-year observations for companies listed on the Athens Stock Exchange 
(ASE). Luez et al. (2003) examined systematic differences in EM across 31 
countries. Among 31 countries Greece scores the highest EM score (same score 
as Austria). This indicates that Greece reflects the highest level of EM across all 
sample countries. Greece has often been in the spotlight for the inadequate quality 
of financial reporting (Tsipouridou and Spathis, 2012). Other empirical studies of 
international comparison among countries have illustrated that Greece exhibits 
the highest levels of EM (Bhattacharya et al., 2003). Hence, this study aims to 
investigate the relationship between EM and RPTs in a country with poor investor 
protection, low accounting quality and unhealthy financial reporting environment.  
The main concern is based on the notion that the absence of a positive significant 
association between EM as measured by income smoothing and RPTs in Greece 
would provide evidence that RPTs are not necessarily conducted to mask 
extraction and manipulate firm’s earnings and performance. Since Greece is weak 
in terms of investor protection, therefore if managers and controlling block 
holders have incentives to conduct RPTs that are fraudulent and harmful to the 
firm they can simply do this by managing the reported earnings to conceal those 
RPTs.  
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 I find a negative significant association between EM and RPTs. The dependent 
variable EM is measured by income smoothing following Gopalan and Jayaraman 
(2012). RPTs are measured by an indicator variable that is equal to one if the ratio 
of total RPTs to firm’s total assets is greater than one and zero otherwise 
following Ryngaert and Thomas (2012). Additionally, audit quality measured by 
audit firm size has shown a negative and significant association with EM. This 
implies that RPTs are negatively associated with income smoothing and that 
RPTs are not concealed using EM behaviour.  
This study contributes to the rapid growing literature on EM. Prior studies have 
provided evidence that executives engage in EM through accruals (Healy, 1985; 
Healy and Whalen 1999; Kothari, 2001; Fields, 2001) or through real activities 
manipulation (Roychowdhury, 2006). Moreover, Healy and Whalen (1999) that 
RPTs could be used to manage earnings, but the evidence on the link between 
EM when measured by an accrual based measure and RPTs to date is limited. 
This study aims to provide empirical evidence that whether RPTs are normal 
transactions conducted for solely business purposes, a mask to hide extraction of 
firm resources or a tool to manipulate financial statements.  
This study also contributes to the corporate governance literature examining the 
link between internal governance activities and EM. Although prior work has 
provided some evidence that corporate governance is an important determinant of 
EM, the results of these studies remain contradicting (Garcia-Meca and 
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Scanchez-Ballesta, 2009) and not sufficient to draw substantive conclusions 
(Larcker et al., 2007). This study provides evidence on the association between 
EM and corporate governance in Greece. The results show that audit quality is 
associated with lower levels of income smoothing and hence, EM.  Additionally, 
it shows that the negative association between EM and RPTs is robust only to the 
subsample of companies being audited by Big-4 firms. This shows that audit 
quality plays a major role in the association between EM and RPTs. 
There are three main differences between the current study and related prior 
studies. This study differs from the studies conducted by Cheung et al. (2009), 
Jian and Wong (2010) and Lo et al. (2010) in the institutional setting. The latter 
studies were conducted in the Chinese context which is affected by the 
concentrated ownership and controlling shareholders motives to expropriate 
shareholders and the inferences deduced from these studies do not necessarily 
apply to other markets (Gordon and Henry, 2005). This study also uses  different 
measures from the ones used by Gordon and Henry (2005). I refrain from 
following Gordon and Henry (2005) by measuring RPTs using monetary values 
as this includes nontrivial measurement error (Ryngaert and Thomas, 2012). I 
also avoid following them in the usage of the Jones (1991) model to estimate 
discretionary accruals to avoid measurement error as well (Dechow et al., 2010).  
Finally, this study also differs from the study conducted by Ryngaert and Thomas 
(2012) which investigates whether ex-ante RPTs have different impact on firm’s 
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value than ex-post RPTs in the US relying on the historical dimension of the 
transaction and providing evidence from a strong investor protection environment. 
The Chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 develops the hypothesis. In 
section 6.3, I delineate the research design and describe the data. Section 6.4 
presents the main analysis and results. Section 6.5 discusses the main results and 
finally, Section 6.6 summarises and concludes the chapter. 
6.2 Hypothesis Development 
Transactions between related parties have been highly considered in recent years. 
Corporate scandals have typically included non-arm's length transactions 
contrived between the reporting entity and related companies or affiliates. This 
resulted in a need for the relatively recent development of accounting standards 
on related party transactions (RPTs) (Chong and Dean 1985). 
Despite the continuous efforts of the regulatory bodies and accounting standards 
setters to further develop accounting standards governing the transactions 
between connected parties, the research on RPTs shows significant evidence that 
a lot of problems are arising from the RPT and the disclosures of such 
transactions. The corporate scandals have brought attention to the potential for 
accounting manipulations associated with RPTs producing a decline in perceived 
earnings quality (Ge et al., 2010). Djankov et al., (2008) mentioned that RPTs 
may provide direct opportunities for related parties to extract cash from listed 
companies (Johnson et al., 2000). Gordon and Henry (2005), Cheung et al., (2006, 
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2009), Berkman et al., (2009), Chen at al., (2009), Chalevas (2011), Ge et al., 
(2010), Lei and Song (2011) and others, recorded a significant relationship 
between the presence and the volume of RPTs and inflated earnings, decline of 
minority shareholder wealth, decline in firm value, and negative excess returns. 
Numerous studies have found an association between EM and RPTs. Chen et al. 
(2011) find evidence that controlling shareholders in Chinese firms structure 
RPTs in pre-IPO period and that RPTs are associated with accrual EM. Thomas et 
al. (2004) document that Japanese firms engage in earnings management using 
affiliated transactions in addition to accruals EM to avoid losses, earning declines 
and negative forecast errors. Moreover, Jian and Wong (2010) find that 
controlling owners of Chinese listed firms engage in earnings management 
through RP sales transactions. Finally, Aharony et al. (2010) provide evidence 
that 185 Chinese IPO firms used RPTs opportunistically during the period 1999-
2001 to manage earnings. However, this evidence is not necessarily applicable to 
other markets. The main explanation for this is attributed to institutional 
background and recent institutional developments that took place in the late 1990 
in Asia after the Asian financial crisis.  
Corporate governance has been instrumental in the recovery from the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997-1998 (Abdul Wahab et al., 2010). This crisis affected the 
majority of the Asian countries mentioned above. Several studies tackled 
corporate governance issues within Asian countries like Japan, China, Hong 
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Kong, Indoniesa, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and 
Thailand to investigate the state and role of corporate governance around the 
financial crises (Johnson et al., 2000; Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Joh 2003; and 
Baek et al., 2004). Local financial reporting and corporate governance regulations 
in these countries were assumed to be stricter after the crises in order to avoid any 
negative impacts of financial reporting or lack of corporate governance. 
Additionally, results from US studies are not necessarily generalisable to other 
countries either since US has strong investor protection (Leuz et al., 2003), 
securities regulation (LaPorta et al., 2006) and legal system (LaPorta et al., 1997).  
Thus, the link between RPTs and EM is far from clear.  
According to agency theory, RPTs are viewed as a facet of conflict of interest that 
can compromise management’s agency responsibility to shareholders or board of 
director’s monitoring function. RPTs are transactions between firm insiders; 
RPTs present opportunities to expropriate firm resources. If a firm’s executives or 
board members engage in RPTs to expropriate firm resources, then they have an 
incentive to manage earnings to mask the extraction of the firm’s resources 
(Gordon and Henry, 2005). 
Contrariwise, the other view shows RPTs as a natural part of business and that are 
not necessarily related to accounting or financial fraud (Gordon et al., 2007). 
RPTs can rationally fulfil other economic demands for the company, or are a 
mechanism that bonds the party to the company. In this case there would be no 
114 
 
need to manage earnings or to offset the RPTs as they were not conducted to 
mask an extraction of firm’s resources as the agency view would suggest. 
Consequently, a relation between EM and RPTs would not be expected (Gordon 
and Henry, 2005). 
Moreover, prior literature suggests that the assumption that RPTs are a facet of 
conflict of interest should be viewed with caution. Gordon and Henry (2005) and 
Ryngaert and Thomas (2012) suggest that the assumption that RPTs reflect 
opportunism or the agency problem should not be generalised as some RPTs have 
proven to be innocuous from the conflict of interest assumption. 
Hence, the relationship between the existence of RPTs and EM, which implies 
that RPTs are suspicious, remains an empirical question. To address this question 
there are several variables that should be taken into consideration. It is worth 
mentioning that reporting quality, disclosure requirements, investor protection 
and legal enforcement of regulations can vary significantly across different 
countries (Hope, 2003; Hail and Leuz; 2006). Compared to single-country 
settings, factors like economic development, growth, and investment 
opportunities are likely to vary across countries. Moreover, country level 
institutional variation also introduces econometric issues that the researcher must 
address (Gordon et al. 2013), albeit it is not always possible to control for all 
variations across countries. 
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 La Porta et al., (1998) examined legal rules covering protection of corporate 
shareholders and creditors in 49 countries and the results have shown that 
common-law countries have the strongest investor protection and those civil-law 
countries that include Greece, have the weakest legal protection for investors. 
Therefore, in Greece or in any poor investor protection environment, insiders 
manage earnings to conceal their private benefits from outsiders to avoid the 
disciplinary actions that might be taken by outsiders if those benefits were 
detected (Shelifer and Vishny, 1997; Leuz et al., 2003).   
Greece was among the first adopters of IFRS in Europe (Ballas et al., 2010) to 
bond itself to superior accounting standards in order to improve disclosure 
policies and accounting system to enhance the integration of domestic markets 
into world markets and to accelerate economic growth (Hope et al., 2006). 
However, higher quality standards do not guarantee higher quality of financial 
reporting (Ball, 2001). The conclusion stated by Ball (2001) was empirically 
supported in Greece by Tsipouridou and Spathis (2012) who found that IFRS did 
not impede opportunistic behaviour and EM practice attributing this to the strong 
influence of the Greek context characteristics where the economic bonding of 
auditors with their clients is strong, investor protection is low and enforcement 
mechanisms are weak. Therefore, the special financial reporting environment in 
Greece is one of the main explanations of the high practice of EM in Greece. 
Thus, given the accounting quality, EM level and legal enforcement issues in 
Greece it is expected that high EM is associated with RPTs. 
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H1: RPTs are positively associated with EM. 
Prior studies found evidence that good corporate governance activities can 
improve the company’s reporting quality (Beasley 1996; Dechow et al. 1996; 
Klein 2002; Peansell et al. 2005). Moreover, it can impede opportunistic 
behaviour of management, increase the value of a firm and move the RPTs from 
the conflict of interest to efficient transactions (Denis and McConnell, 2003; 
Gordon and Henry, 2005; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Chien and Hsu, 2010 and 
Abdulwahab et al., 2010). Hence, governance activities should be negatively 
associated with EM. Governance and control activities addressed in this study are 
auditors, board size and board independence respectively. 
Auditors play in important role in mitigating intentional and unintentional 
misstatements in the financial statements of the firm. The ability of the auditor to 
limit misstatements is dependent on the auditor’s ability to detect material 
misstatements and to adjust for or report it (DeAngelo, 1981).  It is hypothesized 
that the ability of the auditor to detect errors depends on the effort and the 
effectiveness of the auditor. Also, the auditor is usually driven by ethical and 
independence standards and reputation which require him to detect errors or fraud 
in the financial statements (Nelson et al., 2002). Agency theory supports the view 
that audit quality should be associated with less EM. According to Agency theory 
the external audit process is a monitoring tool that can facilitate for the firm 
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reducing its agency costs and impede management opportunism (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).  
Becker et al. (1998) assume that big audit firms have higher audit quality and 
examine the association between audit quality and EM. Their results show that 
audit quality is associated with lower EM. This evidence is consistent with Teoh 
and Wong (1993), DeFond and Subramaynam (1998) and Francis et al. (1999). 
The effectiveness of the external audit function in Greece has been questioned on 
a number of occasions by finance institutions, investors, journalists and 
politicians (Leventis and Caramanis, 2005). However, these doubts are not 
empirically or theoretically supported. Following agency theory I expect that the 
external audit process is a monitoring tool that is aimed to enhance the reporting 
quality and thus impede EM.  
H2: Firms audited by Big 4 auditors are associated with lower EM. 
Agency theory assumption that large boards negatively affect the effectiveness of 
the monitoring role of the board that supports reducing the number of board 
members (Jensen, 1993). To date, many studies have documented negative 
association between EM and board size (Peasnell et al., 2005; Klein et al., 2002). 
Thus, I expect that larger boards will be associated by less EM. 
H3: The number of the directors sitting on the board is negatively associated with 
EM. 
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Board independence is one of the most important characteristics of board 
structure  (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Jensen, 1993; Huther, 1997; 
Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1997; Eisenberg, et al., 1998). Higher degree of 
independence among directors will enhance the efficiency of their monitoring 
role (Bhagat and Black, 2002).  
 According to agency theory it should be expected that more independent 
directors sitting on the board could enhance the monitoring role of the board of 
directors. Therefore, it is assumed in the agency context that the presence of more 
independent directors will improve earnings quality and informativeness.  
Supporting evidence on the role of board independence in constraining EM is 
provided by several studies (Beasley, 1996; Abbott et al., 2004; Krishan, 2005; 
Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Farber, 2005; Vafeas, 2005). Moreover, agency 
theory assumes that increased board independence will improve earnings quality 
and thus impede EM. 
The general expectation in studying the association between board independence 
and EM is that independent directors act as more effective monitors than inside 
directors. Hence, board independence is expected to be negatively correlated with 
EM. However, the evidence to date is mixed (Chen et al. 2011). 
Prior studies have examined the association between board independence and EM 
using various proxies of EM. Using a sample of 692 firm-years, Klein (2002) 
finds that board independence is negatively correlated with EM measured by 
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abnormal accruals. Similar results were found by Garcia-Meca and Ballesta (2009) 
and Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2010) in Greece who used a  modified version 
of Jones model by Dechow et al. (1995) and Jones model (1991) measure of 
abnormal accruals as a proxy for EM.  
These models have been associated with several problems as explained by Guay 
et al. (1996), Hribar and Nichols (2007) and Dechow et al. (1995). In a recent 
review of all EM proxies Dechow et al. (2010) highlighted a major drawback of 
models extracting abnormal or discretionary accruals from total accruals that they 
lack the power needed to isolate discretionary accruals from total accruals.  
However, other studies found different results. For example Vafeas (2005) fails to 
report significant association between EM and board independence. Bowen et al. 
(2008) find that the proportion of executive directors is negatively correlated with 
the absolute value of normal accruals. Larcker et al (2007) fails to find a 
correlation between board independence and signed abnormal accruals.  
H4: The percentage of independent directors sitting on the board is negatively 
related to EM. 
6.3 Research Design 
I employ a single country study to provide evidence on the association between 
RPTs and EM in Greece in which accounting quality has been always doubted 
since the firms possess too much discretions over their reported earnings 
(Tsipouridou and Spathis, 2012). Moreover, prior literature ranked Greece as 
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exhibiting the highest levels of EM (Leuz, et al. 2003) and the minimum level of 
disclosure requirement and legal enforcement (Hail and Leuz, 2006).  
This study investigates the relationship between EM, RPTs and corporate 
governance. EM measured by income smoothing as the dependent variable. Thus, 
this study follows similar studies (Luez et al., 2003; Gopalan and Jayaraman, 
2012) and other several studies (e.g., Garcia-Meca et al., 2009) and applies 
multiple regression technique.  To establish evidence on the relationship between 
EM, RPTs and corporate governance, I run the following OLS regression. 
EM= α + β1 x RPT+ β2 x Big 4+ β3 x Board Independence + β4 x Board Size+ γ x Controls + ε
 (1) 
6.3.1 Sample 
The phenomenon of EM prevails in weaker investor protection countries. Greece 
follows the French civil law which is considered a weak system in investor 
protection. We use the index developed by Luez et al. (2003) and study the 
relationship between EM and RPT in a country with poor investor protection and 
high level of EM , thus the sample will include 215 firm year observations from 
the available firm-year data for the period 2009-2011 for firms listed in Athens 
Stock Exchange (ASE) in Greece. The population of listed firms in ASE is 237 
firms. RPTs and corporate governance data are collected manually from annual 
reports. Data for EM and control variables are collected from Orbis database 
supplied by Bureau Van Dijk. I exclude financial firms and firms suspended from 
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ASE. This leads to a sample of 549 firm-year observations for 183 unique firms. I 
lose a further 334 observations of firms that do not provide annual reports in 
English for any year of the sampled period or firms that do not provide annual 
reports at all for any year in the sample period. The details of sampling 
procedures is shown in Panel A, Table 6.1. The industry distribution for 
companies and firm-year observations is shown in Panel B, Table 6.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.1 
Sample Distribution 
Panel A 
  Firms Observations 
Population 237 711 
Financial Firms (29) (87) 
Suspended Firms (25) (75) 
Non-excluded  
Observations 183 549 
    
Missing Observations (334) 
    
Final Sample 84 215 
    
    
Panel B 
    
Industry Firms Observations 
Oil and Gas 1 3 
Chemicals 3 8 
Basic Resources 10 25 
Construction and Materials 14 31 
Industrial Goods and Services 14 35 
Food and Beverage 8 22 
Personal and Household Goods 10 28 
Health Care 4 9 
Retail 3 8 
Travel and Leisure 6 16 
Utilities 3 9 
Real Estate 3 7 
Technology 5 14 
    
Total 84 215 
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The nature of RPTs implies some limitations in terms of data. RPTs variable is 
calculated as the total value of RPTs between the listed company and its related 
parties. In another countries rather than Greece there was a problem arising from 
the unavailability of the transactions undertaken between a firm and its 
subsidiaries due to consolidation of financial statements. Therefore, due to the 
differences in financial reporting across countries and the underlying research 
question employ a single-country study. A single country study should not reduce 
the variability among corporate governance variables because those variables are 
not mandated by corporate governance codes in Greece. 
6.3.2 The Dependent Variable Definition and Descriptive Statistics 
Following Leuz et al. (2003) and Gopalan and Jayaraman (2012) EM can be 
proxied by income smoothing which is defined as the ratio of the standard 
deviation of operating income (scaled by lagged total assets) to the standard 
deviation of cash flows where both operating income and cash flows are scaled 
by lagged to totals assets, where standard deviations are calculated each year 
using a rolling windows of fine annual observations. Cash flows are computed by 
deducting accruals from earnings. Accruals are computed as: 
ACC= [∆ CA-∆Cash]-[ ∆CL-∆STD]-Dep   (2) 
Where: 
∆ CA=the change in total current assets 
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∆ Cash=the change in cash/cash equivalents 
∆ CL= the change in total current liabilities 
∆ STD= the change in short-term debt included in current liabilities 
∆ Dep= the depreciation and amortization expense 
Following Leuz et al. (2003) and Gopalan and Jayaraman (2012) the missing 
values of short-term debt are set to zero. Thus EM is defined as: 
EM= σ(Income)/ σ(CFO) (3) 
Higher values in this case reflect lower levels of EM. Thus, I multiply EM by -1 
so that higher values indicate more earnings as the volatility of earnings is lower 
than the volatility of cash flows (Gopalan and Jayraman, 2012).  The reported 
median for EM in Greece shown in Table 6.2 is similar to the median reported for 
Greece by Leuz et al. (2003).  
The median for EM in this study is -0.407 which is shown in Table 6.2, can 
closely compare to the median of Greece reported in Leuz et al. (2003) which is -
0.415. The descriptive statistics of EM variable in this study also shows some 
variation in the practice of income smoothing within sampled Greek listed firms. 
The minimum value for EM is -2.741 which indicates a significant level of 
income smoothing; on the other hand the maximum value is -0.021 which 
indicates that the volatility in earnings is higher than the volatility of cash flows 
as discussed by Leuz et al. (2003) and Gopalan and Jayaraman (2012). 
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Table 6.2 
 Descriptive Statistics 
 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std. Deviation 
 
EM 
 
215 
 
-2.741 -0.021 -0.468 
 
-0.407 
. 
0.358 
RPT 215 0.000 1.000 0.805 1.000 0.397 
BIG4 215 0.000 1.000 0.405 0.000 0.492 
Board Size 215 4.000 16.000 8.595 8.000 2.603 
Board 
Independence 
215 0.000 75.000 29.579 28.571 12.483 
Log of assets 215 13.842 21.921 18.873 18.850 1.362 
Loss 215 0.000 1.000 0.660 1.000 0.475 
Capital 
Intensity 
215 0.000 1.255 0.569 0.570 0.275 
Leverage 215 0.000 0.614 0.188 0.163 0.156 
Sales Growth 215 -91.000 103.000 -7.510 -7.577 29.617 
Operating 
Cycle 
215 0.000 79815.513 2636.988 1101.772 7316.189 
Days Payable 215 -2167.62 7923.366 30.054 0.255 600.701 
This table reports descriptive statistics for 215 firm-year observations for firms listed in Athens Stock Exchange 
(ASE). Data are obtained from the Orbis database supplied by Bureau Van Dijk. EM is the measure of income 
smoothing defined as the ratio of the standard deviation of operating income (scaled by lagged total assets) to the 
standard deviation of cash flows where both operating income and cash flows are scaled by lagged to totals assets), 
where standard deviations are calculated each year using a rolling windows of fine annual observations. Cash flows 
are computed by deducting accruals from earnings. Accruals are computed as the change in current assets minus the 
change in cash on hand less the change in current liabilities less depreciation. Standard deviations are calculated 
based on rolling windows of five annual observations. RPT represents related party transactions, is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if RPT/Totals Assets > 1 and 0 otherwise. Big4 measures audit quality by audit firm size, is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the auditor is a Big 4 audit firm and 0 otherwise. Board size is the number of people 
sitting on the board of directors of the firm. Board independence is the ratio of independent members of the board of 
directors to the total number of directors. Log of assets is the natural logarithm of firm’s total assets. Loss is a 
dummy variable that identifies years in which the firm reports a loss. Capital intensity is computed as long-term 
assets divided by lagged total assets. Leverage measures long-term debt and is calculated as the ratio of total long-
term debt to the book value of total assets. Sales growth is the percentage of sales growth rate. Operating cycle is the 
length of the firm’s operating cycle, defined as the number of days receivable plus the number of days inventory. 
Days receivable is computed as 360 divided by the ratio of average receivables to sales. Days inventory is defined as 
360 divided by the ratio of average inventory to cost of goods sold. Days payable is defined as 360 divided by the 
ratio of average accounts payable to cost of goods sold. 
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6.3.3 The independent Variables Definition and Descriptive Statistics 
To operationalise RPT, the current study applies the same measure used by Ryngaert 
and Thomas (2012). Ryngaert and Thomas (2012) measured RPT using a dummy 
variable equal to one if the sum of related party transactions disclosed in the annual 
report of the firm in the firm-year observation exceeds 1% of the firm’s total asset for 
the same year, and zero otherwise. The mean for RPTs is 0.8 which reflects that most 
firms in Greece conduct RPTs with value more than 1% of the firm’s total assets. 
The Big 4 variable is also a dummy variable that equals one if the company is audited 
by one of the Big 4 audit firms and zero otherwise. The mean for this variable is 0.405. 
The percentage of firms assigning to one of the Big 4 audit firms to audit the company’s 
financial statements is 40% of the companies in the sample. Caramanis and Lennox 
(2008) have found that only 34.5% of the Greek firms hire Big 4 audit firms for the 
financial statements audited in 2002. Their study showed that more than 60% of the 
firms appoint either international non-Big 4, or local audit firms. In another study, 
Tsipouridou and Spathis (2012) found that around 33% of the Greek firms’ financial 
statements are audited by a Big 4 audit firm. Their study covers years 2005-2009 and 
that might provide an explanation for decreased number of firms hiring a Big 4 audit 
firm. A possible explanation for the increased number of audits conducted by a Big 4 
audit firms in the current study is that adopting IFRS became mandatory in 2005. Thus, 
all firm-year observations are from an IFRS post-adoption period which is not the case 
neither with Caramanis and Lennox (2008) nor Tsipouridou and Spathis (2012)  . 
Companies might have been motivated to switch the audit to a Big 4 over this period. 
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This explanation is supported by the study conducted on a Greek sample by Comprix et 
al. (2012). Their study provides empirical evidence that IFRS mandatory adoption can 
be linked to hiring Big 4 audit firms and other auditor-client relationship changes.  
Considerable variation appeared in the numbers and percentages of independent 
directors serving on the board of directors. As shown in the Table 6.3, the minimum 
percentage of independent members serving on the board of directors is zero. This 
means that in one or more firms, all members of the board of directors are not 
independent. This could be explained by two facts. First, the minimum number of 
independent board members according to the Greek corporate governance code is two 
members. However, the strict compliance by the code is not mandatory as the code 
follows the “comply or explain” approach. On the other hand the mean for 
independence of board of directors’ members is 29.5% and the maximum is 75%.  
The previous reasons could also explain the reported average of independent members 
of the board of directors which is considered to be low. Meanwhile, none of the 
companies had all board of directors independent, where the max was 75%. The results 
show that the range of number of independent directors serving on the boards of 
sampled firms ranges from zero to eight members. 
Another aspect of internal corporate governance is the size of the board of directors. 
The size of the board of directors varied within a range from 4 to 16 members and the 
mean (median) was 8.59 (8.0) members respectively. In a study investigating corporate 
governance in Greece, Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2010) had a mean (median) of 
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7.81(7.00) members for a sample of Greek listed firms. Their study covered the time 
period 2000-2004.  
6.3.4 Control Variables 
Following the literature suggesting that EM measurement could be influenced by 
number of variables that should be controlled for (Dechow 1994; Dechow and Dichev 
2002; Hribar and Nichols 2007). Those variables are: Length of firm operating cycle, 
defined as the number of days receivables plus the number of days inventory. Days 
payable measured as 360 divided by ratio of average accounts payable to COGS. 
Capital intensity measured as long-term assets divided by lagged total assets. Leverage 
is measured by long term debt. The percentage of sales growth. Log of assets as an 
indicator for firm size and Loss a dummy variable that identifies years in which the firm 
reports a loss to control for profitability. Additionally, all models control for industry 
and year. 
6.4 Results 
6.4.1   Univariate Analysis 
Table 6.3 provides Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients of all variables. 
Significant correlations are flagged. There is no association between EM and RPTs 
according to the correlation coefficients. Although this does not support the research 
hypothesis, these results are consistent with findings of a US study conducted by 
Gordon and Henry (2005) who failed to find a significant association between RPTs and 
EM.  
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Consistent with H2 Table 6.3 shows that EM is negatively associated with the variable 
Big 4. EM had a significant negative association with the variable Big 4; this means that 
a firm that hires one of the Big 4 audit firms to audit its financial statements usually 
have a lower level of EM. This means that audit quality and EM are negatively related. 
Also EM appeared to have a positive significant association with capital intensity and a 
negative significant relationship with the variable loss.  
Corporate governance variables included in this study are Big 4, board size and board 
independence. With the exception of having the financial statements audited by one of 
the Big 4 audit firms, neither of the corporate governance activities studied show a 
significant association with either EM or the incidence of RPTs. These results are not 
consistent with Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2010) and Gordon et al. (2007) whose findings 
suggest that large boards can facilitate the making of RPTs. A possible explanation for 
this is that the higher the number of the directors sitting on the board, the more related 
parties the firm has and thus, RPTs might increase due to the increased number of the 
members of the board.  
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Table 6.3 
 Pearson's Correlation (below diagonal) and Spearman Rho’s Correlation (above diagonal) 
  EM RPT BIG4 Board Size Bind 
Log of 
loss Days Payable 
Operating 
Cycle 
Capital 
intensity Leverage 
Sales 
growth 
assets 
EM 
1 -0.066 -0.193** -0.012 0.034 -0.034 0.155* -0.026 -0.166* -0.184** -0.044 -0.137* 
 
(0.337) (0.004) (0.863) (0.621) (0.625) (0.023) (0.709) (0.015) (0.007) (0.524) (0.045) 
RPT 
-0.102 1 0.095 0.035 0.012 0.088 .142* 0.004 .161* -0.039 -0.068 -0.03 
(0.137) 
 
(0.163) (0.612) (0.866) (0.198) (0.037) (0.954) (0.018) (0.571) (0.319) (0.661) 
BIG4 
-0.207** 0.095 1 0.162* -0.007 0.162* -0.009 0.061 0.254** 0.077 -0.111 0.053 
(0.002) (0.163) 
 
(0.017) (0.923) (0.017) (0.893) (0.373) (0.000) (0.258) (0.105) (0.437) 
Board Size 
-0.065 0.032 0.143* 1 -0.510** 0.381** 0.139* -0.042 0.144* 0.136* 0.094 0.100 
(0.340) (0.644) (0.036) 
 
(0.000) 0 (0.042) (0.542) (0.035) (0.047) (0.171) (0.145) 
Board 
Independence 
0.115 -0.002 0.017 -.383** 1 -.302** -0.076 0.267 0.01 0.128 -0.01 -0.008 
(0.094) (0.980) (0.800) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.267) (-0.027) (0.886) (0.062) (0.886) (0.907) 
Log of assets 
-0.083 0.032 0.076 .190** -.164* 1 -0.008 0.019 0.071 0.026 -0.038 0.069 
(0.226) (0.640) (0.268) (0.005) (0.016) 
 
(0.905) (0.782) (0.298) (0.700) (0.578) (0.317) 
Loss 
0.144* .142* -0.009 .153* -0.072 -0.048 1 -0.011 .223** 0.046 0.115 .306** 
(0.035) (0.037) (0.893) (0.025) (0.294) (0.481) 
 
(0.877) (0.001) (0.499) (0.092) (0.000) 
Days Payable 
-0.009 0.039 -0.055 0.071 -0.027 -.206** 0.043 1 -0.06 -0.064 -0.066 .209** 
(0.900) (0.574) (0.425) (0.302) (0.695) (0.002) (0.534) 
 
(0.384) (0.351) (0.339) (0.002) 
Operating 
Cycle 
0.02 -0.04 0.042 .182** -0.042 -.306** .139* .374** 1 -0.031 -0.043 .185** 
(0.774) (0.561) (0.538) (0.008) (0.542) (0.000) (0.042) (0.000) 
 
(0.646) (0.530) (0.006) 
Capital 
intensity 
-0.155* -0.018 0.036 0.108 .142* 0.092 0.039 -.145* -.139* 1 .340** -0.027 
(0.023) (0.791) (0.601) (0.114) (0.037) (0.178) (0.565) (0.034) (0.042) 
 
(0.000) (0.691) 
Leverage 
-0.035 -0.087 -0.077 0.117 0.015 -0.069 0.085 -0.093 -0.049 .300** 1 -0.024 
(0.609) (0.205) (0.261) (0.086) (0.822) (0.313) (0.217) (0.176) (0.473) (0.000) 
 
(0.727) 
Sales growth 
0.081 -0.048 0.074 0.098 -0.026 0.03 .297** 0.018 0.08 -0.032 -0.03 1 
(0.235) (0.479) (0.277) (0.152) (0.702) (0.658) (0.000) (0.797) (0.242) (0.640) (0.662) 
 
130 
 
 This table reports Pearson's (below diagonal) and Spearman's (above diagonal) correlations between all variables and significance levels (in parentheses). EM is the 
measure of income smoothing defined as the ratio of the standard deviation of operating income (scaled by lagged total assets) to the standard deviation of cash flows 
where both operating income and cash flows are scaled by lagged to totals assets), where standard deviations are calculated each year using a rolling windows of fine 
annual observations. RPT represents related party transactions, is a dummy variable equal to 1 if RPT/Totals Assets > 1 and 0 otherwise. Big4 measures audit quality by 
audit firm size, is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the auditor is a Big 4 audit firm and 0 otherwise. Board size is the number of people sitting on the board of directors of 
the firm. Board independence is the ratio of independent members of the board of directors to the total number of directors. Log of assets is the natural logarithm of firm’s 
total assets. Loss is a dummy variable that identifies years in which the firm reports a loss. Capital intensity is computed as long-term assets divided by lagged total assets. 
Leverage measures long-term debt and is calculated as the ratio of total long-term debt to the book value of total assets. Sales growth is the percentage of sales growth 
rate. Operating cycle is the length of the firm’s operating cycle, defined as the number of days receivable plus the number of days inventory. Days receivable is computed 
as 360 divided by the ratio of average receivables to sales. Days inventory is defined as 360 divided by the ratio of average inventory to cost of goods sold. Days payable 
is defined as 360 divided by the ratio of average accounts payable to cost of goods sold.  
* and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% respectively. 
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6.4.2 Regression Results 
Table 6.4 reports the regression results of the model in Equation (1) and control 
for industry and year for 215 firm-year observations for firms listed in Athens 
Stock Exchange (ASE). The variables that have shown significance in the 
regression model are RPT and Big 4. Regression results show that RPTs have 
significant, negative association with EM. This implies that conducting RPTs is 
not associated with income smoothing, on the contrary, it is associated with lower 
levels of income smoothing in all regression models.  
The Big 4 variable had a negative significant relationship with EM. This means 
that having one of the Big 4 auditors might be a factor that can reduce the 
occurrence of EM. These results can be linked to the results of Caramanis and 
Lennox (2008) who found out that Big 4 audit firms have higher audit quality and 
are more capable of constraining EM in Greek listed firms.  
Additional regressions were run to check the robustness of the results.  First, 
regression was run using the ratio of RPT to total assets instead of the RPT 
dummy variable used before to check whether the results are sensitive to another 
RPTs proxy or not. This model report similar results. These regression results are 
reported in column 2 Table 6.4. 
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Table 6.4 
 Earnings Management, Related Party Transactions and Corporate Governance 
  
1 2 3 4 
RPT -0.112* 
(0.057)  
-0.004** 
(0.035) 
-0.275* 
(0.086) 
-0.149** 
(0.035) 
BIG4 -0.126** 
(0.012) 
-0.100** 
(0.055) 
-0.267* 
(0.052) 
-0.232 
(0.093)* 
Board Size 0.010 
(0.380) 
0.007 
(0.503) 
0.119 
(0.132) 
0.110 
(0.160) 
Board 
Independence 
 
0.003 
(0.158) 
0.003 
(0.220) 
0.113 
(0.136) 
0.110 
(0.147) 
Log of assets -0.000 
(0.998) 
-0.003 
(0.884) 
0.045 
(0.545) 
0.043 
(0.559) 
Loss 0.083 
(0.132) 
0.062 
(0.250) 
0.308** 
(0.039) 
0.286 
(0.053)* 
Capital Intensity -0.259*** 
(0.005) 
-0.233** 
(0.013) 
-0.259*** 
(0.000) 
-0.233*** 
(0.001) 
Leverage -0.030 
(0.847) 
-0.013 
(0.933) 
-0.003 
(0.966) 
-0.003 
(0.969) 
Sales Growth 0.001 
(0.440) 
0.001 
(0.223) 
0.106 
(0.143) 
0.122* 
(0.088) 
Operating Cycle 0.000 
(0.936) 
0.000 
(0.917) 
-0.174** 
(0.021) 
-0.172** 
(0.022) 
Days Payable 
 
 
0.000 
(0.757) 
0.000 
(0.804) 
-0.044 
(0.499) 
-0.029 
(0.659) 
R Square 0.283 0.286 0.334 0.339 
 
Durbin Watson 1.326 1.346 1.197 1.119 
 
Regression Untransformed 
data  
RPT/Total Assets Normal Scores  
of Continuous 
Variables 
Normal Scores  
of Continuous Variables 
&  
RPT/TA 
This table shows the regression results and the significance levels (in parentheses) relating EM to RPTs and corporate governance.  EM is 
the measure of income smoothing defined as the ratio of the standard deviation of operating income (scaled by lagged total assets) to the 
standard deviation of cash flows where both operating income and cash flows are scaled by lagged to totals assets). Cash flows are 
computed by deducting accruals from earnings. Accruals are computed as change in current assets minus change in cash on hand less 
change in current liabilities less depreciation. Standard deviations are calculated based on rolling windows of five annual observations. 
RPT represents related party transactions, is a dummy variable equal to 1 if RPT/Totals Assets > 1 and 0 otherwise. Big4 measures audit 
quality by audit firm size, is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the auditor is a Big 4 audit firm and 0 otherwise. Board size is the number of 
people sitting on the board of directors of the firm. Board independence is the ratio of independent members of the board of directors to the 
total number of directors. Log of assets is the natural logarithm of firm’s total assets. Loss is a dummy variable that identifies years in 
which the firm reports a loss. Capital intensity is computed as long-term assets divided by lagged total assets. Leverage measures long-term 
debt and is calculated as the ratio of total long-term debt to the book value of total assets. Sales growth is the percentage of sales growth 
rate. Operating cycle is the length of the firm’s operating cycle, defined as the number of days receivable plus the number of days 
inventory. Days receivable is computed as 360 divided by the ratio of average receivables to sales. Days inventory is defined as 360 
divided by the ratio of average inventory to cost of goods sold. Days payable is defined as 360 divided by the ratio of average accounts 
payable to cost of goods sold. All models control for industry and year. 
*,**and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Second, regressing the normal scores of EM on the normal scores of all 
continuous variables with the dummy variables RPT and Big 4. This can give an 
indication of whether the results are affected by any abnormality in the variables. 
The motivation for running this specific regression is to avoid any bias that might 
be caused by skewness in the variable EM. Thus, it is better to check whether that 
normally distributed observations for EM will lead to the same results. The 
results of this regression are presented in column 3 of Table 6.4. Finally, for 
further assurance, a regression using normal scores for all continuous variables, 
dummy variables and normal scores for RPT scaled by total assets. The results 
are similar to prior results and are reported in column 4 of Table 6.4. The models 
run using normal scores of continuous variables have a higher explanatory power 
as shown in columns 3 and 4, Table 6.4. 
6.5 Discussion 
6.5.1 Earnings Management 
The median value for EM in Greece -0.407, which is high, compared to the scores 
of other countries studied by Leuz et al. (2003). There are several reasons that can 
explain the high level of EM score reported in Greece. The main explanations can 
be attributed to investor protection and accounting framework in Greece. Investor 
protection is a key institutional factor affecting corporate policy choices (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997) and  EM (Leuz et al., 2003). Strong and well enforced outsider 
rights for shareholders can limit the insiders’ (managers or controlling 
shareholders) incentives to manage earnings. Private control benefits range from 
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perquisite consumption to transfer of firm assets to other firms owned by insiders 
or their families (Luez et al., 2003). Therefore, it is expected that EM are more 
likely to occur in poor investor protection countries (Leuz et al., 2003).  
Greece has often been in the spotlight for inadequate quality of financial reporting. 
Before the implementation of IFRS to all consolidated and individual accounts of 
publicly listed firms beginning on January 1, 2005, the quality of Greek 
accounting standards and disclosure practices had been criticised in the European 
financial press and investors’ community (Tsipouridou and Spathis, 2012). Some 
of the complaints were that Greek accounting standards allowed firms to use too 
much discretion over their earnings, lacked detailed disclosures, permitted 
reporting that was too heavily influenced by tax avoidance strategies, and had no 
effective enforcement mechanisms (Tsipouridou and Spathis, 2012). This caused 
Greece to be empirically exhibiting the highest levels of EM (Luez et al., 2003) 
and earnings opacity (Bhattacharya et al., 2003).  
According to Cohen et al. (2004) the practice of EM indicates a breakdown in the 
financial reporting process. When the users of the financial statements are in 
doubt, they turn their attention to the external auditor’s report. However, the 
effectiveness of auditing in Greece has also been questioned by regulators and 
financial analysts (Leventis and Caramanis, 2005). Therefore, weak investor 
protection and the financial reporting environment are two main factors that can 
explain the high levels of EM in Greece. 
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6.5.2 Related Party Transactions 
The negative significant relationship in the multiple regression models as shown 
in Table 6.4, suggests that RPTs can explain part of the variation in EM, however, 
not in the predicted direction. This negative association indicates that although 
RPTs might be used to manage earnings or mask firm resources extraction from 
shareholders, those transactions are not necessarily linked to income smoothing 
systematically. When RPTs are conducted to manipulate earnings or mask 
extraction of resources, this might affect accruals or cash flows, but it does not 
necessarily affect both (Chen et al., 2011).   
The negative association might also be attributed to corporate governance 
activities. Denis and McConnell (2003) and Gordon and Henry (2005) specified 
corporate governance as a main factor that can mitigate the relationship between 
EM and RPTs and move RPTs from a facet of conflict of interest to an efficient 
transaction by providing efficient and effective monitoring. Independent auditors 
are one of monitoring tools that aims to assure that the financial statements reflect 
the economic reality of firms. The results of the current study indicates that Big 4 
audit firms have higher audit quality and are associated with less EM. These 
results are significant and consistent with prior literature (Francis et al., 1993).   
Therefore, the negative association between RPTs and EM could be related to 
audit quality. To test this conjecnture I split the sample into two subsamples. 
Companies that are audited by Big 4 audit firms and companies that are audited 
by a non-Big 4 audit firms and run the model for each sample separately. The 
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results show that the negative and significant association between EM and RPTs 
is only robust to the first subsample. The results of these regressions are presented 
in Table 6.5. This means that RPTs are only negatively and significantly 
associated to EM when the firm is audited by one of the Big-4 audit firms. This 
implies that the conflict of interest view of agency theory is not supported  and 
that RPTs are not associated with EM. 
The conflict of interest view was not supported as all the multiple regression 
models failed to record any positive significant relationship between RPTs and 
EM. These results are consistent with the study conducted on a Greek sample by 
Antonios et al. (2011). Antonios et al. (2011) failed to find a positive association 
between RPTs and EM after 2005. They implemented their findings that the 
association between RPTs and EM are attributed to IFRS adoption especially that 
they record different results in the observations prior to IFRS adoption in 2005. 
The main difference between this study and Antonios et al. (2011) is that the later 
uses value relevance as a proxy for EM and hence the findings of Antonios et al. 
(2011) is not necessarily applicable to this study. The negative significant 
relationship between RPTs and EM in all regression models suggests that the 
hypothesis related to RPTs effect on EM (i.e. H1: There is a positive association 
between RPT and EM) should be rejected. 
 
 
137 
 
Table 6.5 
 Related Party Transactions and Corporate Governance 
  
1 2 
RPT -0.452*** 
(0.003) 
-0.036 
(0.573) 
Board Size 0.038 
(0.155) 
0.003 
(0.845) 
Board Independence 
 
-0.001 
(0.765) 
0.002 
(0.542) 
Log of assets 0.025 
(0.712) 
-0.005 
(0.864) 
Loss 0.133 
(0.175) 
0.169** 
(0.014) 
Capital Intensity -0.094 
(0.643) 
-0.168 
(0.144) 
Leverage 0.212 
(0.524) 
-0.210 
(0.280) 
Sales Growth -0.001 
(0.580) 
0.002 
(0.165) 
Operating Cycle 0.000 
(0.536) 
0.000 
(0.277) 
Days Payable 
 
 
0.000 
(0.918) 
0.000 
(0.657) 
R Square 0.496 0.306 
Durbin Watson 1.640 1.167 
Regression 
 
 
Observations 
 
Firms audited by Big-4 
auditors  
 
87 
Firms audited by non-Big 4 
auditors 
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This table compares the regression results and the significance levels (in parentheses) relating EM to RPTs and 
corporate governance for two subsamples, namely, companies audited by Big-4 audit firms and companies audited 
by non—Big 4 audit firms.  EM is the measure of income smoothing defined as the ratio of the standard deviation 
of operating income (scaled by lagged total assets) to the standard deviation of cash flows where both operating 
income and cash flows are scaled by lagged to totals assets). Cash flows are computed by deducting accruals from 
earnings. Accruals are computed as change in current assets minus change in cash on hand less change in current 
liabilities less depreciation. Standard deviations are calculated based on rolling windows of five annual 
observations. RPT represents related party transactions, is a dummy variable equal to 1 if RPT/Totals Assets > 1 
and 0 otherwise. Big4 measures audit quality by audit firm size, is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the auditor is a 
Big 4 audit firm and 0 otherwise. Board size is the number of people sitting on the board of directors of the firm. 
Board independence is the ratio of independent members of the board of directors to the total number of directors. 
Log of assets is the natural logarithm of firm’s total assets. Loss is a dummy variable that identifies years in which 
the firm reports a loss. Capital intensity is computed as long-term assets divided by lagged total assets. Leverage 
measures long-term debt and is calculated as the ratio of total long-term debt to the book value of total assets. Sales 
growth is the percentage of sales growth rate. Operating cycle is the length of the firm’s operating cycle, defined as 
the number of days receivable plus the number of days inventory. Days receivable is computed as 360 divided by 
the ratio of average receivables to sales. Days inventory is defined as 360 divided by the ratio of average inventory 
to cost of goods sold. Days payable is defined as 360 divided by the ratio of average accounts payable to cost of 
goods sold. All models control for industry and year. 
*,**and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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6.5.3 Corporate Governance 
The results for the variable Big 4 which measures the audit firm size which could 
be referred to as audit quality as well show negative significant relationship with 
EM as Table 6.4 shows. This relationship implies that the presence of one of the 
Big 4 audit firms as an external auditor is associated with less EM. These results 
are consistent with the results of DeFond and Subramanyam (1998), Francis et al. 
(1999) and Becker et al. (2008) whose results suggested that significantly lower 
levels of EM are associated with the presence of a Big 4 auditor.  
Similar results were found in Greece by prior studies. Leventis and Caramanis 
(2005) and Caramanis and Lennox (2008) tested the effect of audit effort on EM 
and they found that Big 4 audit firms exert more efforts in the audit process and 
provide better audit quality. Thus, they found that audits conducted by Big 4 audit 
firms are associated negatively with firms’ attempts to manage earnings upwards 
to meet or beat their earnings benchmark.    
Although Leventis and Caramanis (2005) and Caramanis and Lennox (2008) used 
the auditor’s effort as the proxy for audit quality which is different from the proxy 
of the current study, but it can be argued that both proxies will yield the same 
results for two reasons. First, by definition audit quality is the probability that an 
existing material error is detected and reported by the auditor (DeAngelo, 1981). 
The auditing literature concludes that the audit quality of Big 4 auditors is 
superior to that of non-big 4 auditors (Lawrence et al., 2011). DeAngelo (1981) 
argues that accounting firm size is a proxy for audit quality, as no single client is 
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important to larger accounting firms and hence, larger accounting firms are less 
likely to compromise their independence. Second, the results of Caramanis and 
Lennox (2008) supported this by finding that big 4 audit firms exert more audit 
effort than their non-big 4 counterparts.  
The results provide empirical evidence that Big 4 audit firms can have an impact 
on the level of EM in Greek listed firms. These results suggest that the hypothesis 
expecting a positive association between big 4 and EM should not be rejected: H2 
There is a negative association between EM and Big 4. 
The relationship between board size and EM appeared to be insignificant in all 
regression models. Hence, board size fails to explain any variation in the level of 
income smoothing as measured by EM in Greek listed firms. These results are 
consistent with the results of Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2010) who examined 
the effect of board composition on the informativeness and quality of earnings in 
Greece and reported an insignificant relationship. 
A plausible explanation that smaller boards are more efficient in constraining EM 
than large boards is that they have a higher level of membership coordination and 
communication efficiency and lower incidence of free-rider problems 
(Dimitripoulos and Asteriou, 2010). Moreover, independent directors are less 
likely to work effectively on large boards as it is more difficult for them to 
express their opinions which affect the efficiency of decision making and control 
(Jensen, 1993). Therefore, according to agency theory large boards impede the 
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efficiency and effectiveness of the monitoring role of the board which makes the 
theory in a position where smaller boards are more favoured. 
The results of the current study do not provide any evidence to support agency 
theory concerning board size. Consequently, the hypothesis relevant to board size 
has to be rejected: H3 There is a positive association between board size and the 
variable EM.  
Results of the regression models show that board independence had an 
insignificant relationship with EM in all models. The main phenomenon that 
should be discussed is the direction of association between board independence 
and EM. The results of the four regression models show a positive relationship 
between board independence and EM. 
The findings of the current study fail to support agency theory and record a 
negative and insignificant relationship with EM. The mixed prior evidence makes 
it difficult to predict whether EM will decrease when board independence 
increases (Chen et al., 2011). Moreover, prior studies that examine cross-sectional 
correlation between EM and board independence could be subject to endogeneity 
issues as pointed out by Bowen (2008) and Bushman (2009) as having lower 
board independence and higher EM can be a part of a general equilibrium and is 
not a certain indication that board independence reduces EM.   
The abovementioned endogeneity problem is mitigated to some extent because 
cross-sectional data was not used in this study. Higher EM in cross-sectional 
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studies might be due to endogenous variables affecting the dependent variable 
and not being controlled for in the study.   
The significance of the variable board independence and the direction of the 
association provide empirical evidence that agency theory should not be 
supported with regards to board independence assumptions. Moreover, the 
relevant hypothesis should be rejected. H4: There is a positive association 
between board independence and the variable EM. 
6.6 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter examines whether RPTs are associated with EM across a sample of 
215 firm-year observations of companies listed on the Athens Stock Exchange 
(ASE). The existence of this link, between RPT and EM, is not obvious and 
depends on institutional factors and is affected by the proxy used to capture EM 
(Dechow et al. 2012). Using income smoothing as a proxy for EM, I do not find 
any significant association between EM and RPTs. Thus, my results do not 
provide evidence that RPTs are associated with EM as measured by income 
smoothing. The negative association between earnings management and RPTs is 
only significant for firms audited by Big-4 audit firms. 
Further, I examine the relationship between EM and three corporate governance 
variables, namely, audit quality, size of the board of directors and board 
independence. Audit quality, as measured by the audit firm size showed a 
negative and significant association with EM. This implies that firms that hire Big 
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4 audit firms are less able to engage in income smoothing. On the other hand, 
board independence and board size did not record any significant relationship 
with EM.  
Finally, several caveats should be highlighted. First, my study focuses on the link 
between RPTs and EM in the Greek context. The Greek context is special due to 
the relatively poor investor protection, enforcement mechanisms, and reporting 
quality. Hence, investigating the link between RPTs and EM in this context is 
important as it supports the notion that RPTs are not necessarily a mean for 
managing earnings. This implies that these results might not be generalisable to 
other countries. Second, as mentioned in prior studies (Ryngaert and Thomas, 
2012; Gordon et al., 2005) studying RPTs is challenged by the availability of the 
data. Data on RPTs needs to be hand collected and requires extensive amounts of 
time and effort to be spent in analysing, idenitfying and collected data from 
annual reports. Finally, researchers studying RPTs must rely on transactions 
disclosed in the annual report issued by the firm. Therefore, it is still possible that 
there are RPTs that were not disclosed. Hence, the reporting entity can always 
decide which RPTs to disclose and which RPTs to hide.  
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Chapter Seven 
Related Party Transactions and Accounting Quality 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the relationship between related party transactions 
(RPTs) and accounting quality. RPTs have received considerable attention in the 
recent decade especially in Asian economies where concentrated ownership 
structure and insider controlled firms are dominating (La Porta et al., 2000). Prior 
research has investigated the relationship between RPTs and expropriation of 
firms’ resources by controlling shareholders. These studies found evidence on the 
association between expropriation and RPTs (Djankov et al., 2008; Johnson et al., 
2000) this evidence is consistent with the argument that managers can manage 
reported earnings by structuring RPTs (Healy and Whalen, 1999).  
Other studies have found evidence that RPTs are conventional transactions and 
are not necessarily conducted to manage earnings or to expropriate firms’ 
resources. For example, Chien and Hsu (2010) argue that RPTs might lead to 
lower transaction costs and enable the firm to utilise its assets more efficiently. 
Additionally, Ryngaert and Thomas (2012) find that not all RPTs are serving the 
interests of insiders or controlling shareholders. Their findings support the 
inferences provided by Gordon and Henry (2005) that the assumption that RPTs 
are a facet of conflict of interest should be implemented with caution and should 
not be generalised.  
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Accounting quality is the term used to describe the extent to which reported 
earnings reflect the financial performance of the reporting entity (Schipper and 
Vincent, 2003). Therefore, low accounting quality indicates that reported figures 
could be a tool used by managers and controlling shareholders to mislead other 
shareholders or to achieve private control benefits (Leuz et al., 2003).  
The results presented in this chapter are based on a sample of 215 firm-year 
observations from 84 unique firms listed on Athens Stock Exchange (ASE). 
Greece is a country with special context. It is characterised by poor investor 
protection (Leuz et al., 2003), high earnings management levels (Bhattacharya et 
al., 2003) and inefficient accounting and auditing environment (Tsipouridou and 
Spathis, 2012). Accounting quality might be affected by the accounting standards 
adopted (Barth et al., 2008). This implies that if part of the sample firms are not 
adopting the same set of standards, the results might be biased. Although 
differences in accounting standards could be controlled for, studying the 
relationship between RPTs and accounting quality in Greece provides empirical 
evidence that it is less likely to be affected by applying different accounting 
standards or differences in institutional settings. In this case all firms are adopting 
IFRS and operate within the same economic environment and are exposed to the 
same institutional factors. Additionally, accounting quality is related to country 
level factors such as disclosure requirements, investor protection and legal 
enforcement of regulations (Hope, 2003; Hail and Leuz; 2006). This study is a 
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single country study and these factors do not vary within the same country. Thus, 
these factors are controlled for within the context of this study. 
In this study I compare accounting quality proxies for two groups of firms, 
namely, firms with RPTs worth more than 1% of their total assets (RPTs firms) 
and firms that have RPTs worth less than 1% of total assets (non-RPTs firms). 
The accounting quality proxies used control for differences in firm’s reporting 
incentives by including factors that are more likely to affect voluntary accounting 
decisions like size, growth and leverage. The results do not provide evidence that 
non-RPTs firms have higher accounting quality compared to RPTs firms. In 
particular RPTs firms have similar variance of change in net income, ratio of the 
variances of change in net income and change of cash flows as non RPTs firms, 
and do not exhibit less negative correlation between accruals and cash flows nor 
lower frequency of small positive net income compared to non-RPTs firms. 
This study extends the literature on RPTs by examining the relationship between 
accounting quality and RPTs. The contribution of this chapter to the RPTs 
literature is twofold. First, prior studies have investigated and found evidence on 
the association between accounting quality and RPTs (Chen et al., 2011; Jian and 
Wong, 2010; Aharony et al 2010). Those studies have used indirect measures that 
could not be attributed to accounting quality or financial reporting system. They 
used changes in ratios like ROA or price earnings (Chen et al., 2011; Aharony et 
al., 2010) or operating profits (Jian and Wong, 2010) as an indication of earnings 
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manipulation around IPOs without investigating accounting quality attributes. 
Second, the vast majority of RPTs studies were conducted using samples from 
Asian countries that enjoy a unique and different institutional setting. Those 
results are not generalisable for other settings as the Asian countries are 
characterised by concentrated ownership and hence, more motives for 
shareholders’ wealth expropriation (Gordon and Henry, 2005). Therefore, the 
question whether RPTs are associated with lower accounting quality remains an 
empirical question with insufficient evidence. 
This chapter also contributes to accounting quality literature. Prior accounting 
quality literature focuses almost entirely on comparing accounting quality 
between firms applying IFRS and their non-IFRS counterparts. Thus, this study 
aims to extend the scope of accounting quality literature by examining whether 
RPTs are associated with lower accounting quality. 
The Chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 develops the hypothesis. In 
Section 7.3 I discuss the research design. Section 7.4 presents the results and 
Section 7.5 concludes.   
7.2 Hypothesis Development 
In recent years, research in the areas of accounting and corporate governance has 
increasingly shifted focus from the conflict of interest between managers and 
diffuse shareholders to the conflict of interest between minority or external 
shareholders and insiders (Berkman et al., 2009).  The reason for this is that in 
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most countries (excluding USA and UK) it is more common for firms to be 
controlled by insiders (La Porta et al., 1998). The insiders usually have 
concentrated ownership and enjoy rights that are far in excess to their cash flow 
rights (Gopalan and Jayaraman, 2012). 
Insiders and managers have incentives and opportunities to expropriate outsider 
shareholders through firm’s operating and financial decisions (Lins, 2003). In 
order for insiders and managers to enjoy private control benefits they need to 
conceal those benefits from outsiders ; thus they have incentives to mask true 
firm performance to hide the private control benefits that they, as insiders have 
access to (Leuz et al., 2003). For example, insiders can use their financial 
reporting discretion to overstate earnings and avoid reporting losses that might 
prompt interference from outsiders. Insiders and managers can also use their 
accounting discretion to create reserves for future periods by understating 
earnings in years of good performance (Leuz et al., 2003).  
Controlling shareholders in many companies resort to RPTs to achieve private 
benefits at the cost of minority shareholders (Cheung et al., 2006; Dahya et al. 
2008; Gao and Kling, 2008; Dow and McGuire, 2009). Prior evidence shows an 
association between RPTs and earnings management (Chen et al., 2011; Thomas 
et al., 2004; Jian and Wong, 2010). Although several studies have examined the 
association between earnings management (as a measure of accounting quality) 
and RPTs recently, it is still possible to describe the empirical evidence on this 
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link as underdeveloped. The main reason for the lack of evidence is that most of 
the studies that attempted to examine the association between RPTs and EM were 
conducted in Asian countries which has a different institutional setting especially 
after the Asian financial crisis (Abdul Wahab et al., 2010). For example, Aharony 
et al. (2010) provide evidence that 185 Chinese IPO firms managed earnings 
upwards using RPTs during the period 1999-2001. Aharony et al. (2010) mention 
that China provides a unique institutional setting and RPT data and Chinese IPOs 
are required since 1997 to publish RPT information in their financial statements. 
Similar evidence was found in Hong Kong (Cheung et al., 2006), Japan (Thomas 
et al., 2004) and China (Chen et al, 2011; Jian and Wong, 2010).  
Another study that tried to examine the association between RPTs and earnings 
management was conducted using a US sample by Gordon and Henry (2005).  
They did not find sufficient evidence on the association between earnings 
management and RPTs. That said, results from US studies are not necessarily 
applicable to other economies since the US is an outsider economy with dispersed 
ownership structure combined with strong investor protection (Leuz et al., 2003), 
securities regulation (La Porta et al., 2006), and an efficient legal system (La 
Porta et al., 1997) 
Djankov et al. (2008) provide evidence that RPTs can serve managers and 
controlling shareholders incentives to expropriate minority shareholders through 
tunnelling activities. RPTs can also be used to manage earnings upwards to avoid 
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reporting losses (Friedman et al., 2003).  Several studies have investigated the 
consequences of RPTs and found that they are associated with negative firm 
valuation effects (Djankov et al., 2008; Johnson et al., 2000; Gordon and Henry, 
2005, Cheung et al., 2009) and have been associated with several corporate 
collapses such as Adelphia, Conrad Black’s corporate group, Hollinger and the 
Riga family’s corporate group (Ge et al., 2010). These corporate scandals raise a 
question of whether RPTs are associated with lower accounting quality for 
reporting firms.  
Therefore, studying the association between RPTs and accounting quality in 
Greece provides evidence on the matter from a weak investor protection 
environment. When investor protection is weak, incentives for expropriation of 
minority shareholders by managers and controlling shareholders are higher. 
Therefore, with weak investor protection, a firm that conducts RPTs to mask 
wealth extraction and hide this by managing earnings an act that will affect 
accounting quality negatively, is less likely to  face legal consequences.  Thus, the 
absence of positive relation between RPTs and low accounting quality will 
support the argument the RPTs are conventional transactions that are mainly 
conducted for business purposes. 
Although accounting quality is well researched, there is no widely accepted 
terminology for this construct (Shcipper and Vincent, 2003). Usually whether a 
study uses the term accounting quality or earnings quality it is referring to the 
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same construct. I use the definition provided by Dechow et al. (2010) that 
describes accounting quality as “the extent to which reported earnings are 
informative in reflecting the firm’s financial performance”. Several proxies have 
been used to measure accounting quality. These include properties of earnings 
(e.g. earnings persistence, abnormal accruals, earnings smoothness, timely loss 
recognition), investor responsiveness to earnings (e.g. earnings response 
coefficient), or external indicators of earnings misstatements.  
I examine whether firms adopting RPTs exhibit lower accounting quality than 
their non-RPTs counterparts in Greece. I aim to provide empirical evidence on 
the association between RPTs and accounting quality. The main analysis of the 
study is based on the differences in accounting quality measures between RPTs 
and non-RPTs firms. Given the investor protection environment, financial 
reporting environment, efficiency of legal system in Greece and prior evidence on 
the link between RPTs and earnings management, I predict that firms having 
RPTs exhibit lower accounting quality compared to other firms listed in ASE. 
This prediction is based on the notion that firms that undertake RPTs are more 
likely to have incentives to manage reported earnings. 
Greece is a country with high earnings management level (Bhattacharya et al., 
2003; Leuz et al., 2003), poor investor protection and legal enforcement (La Porta 
et al., 1997) and a questioned quality of financial reporting environment 
(Tsipourdiou and Spathis, 2012). There are advantages associated with focusing 
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on individual countries relative to using a sample from many countries. For 
example, focusing on a particular country removes the need to control for 
potential effects of country-specific factors unrelated to the financial reporting 
system (Barth et al., 2008). Furthermore, I develop empirical procedures to 
mitigate the effects of factors unrelated to the financial reporting system like 
reporting incentives and economic environment. 
I follow (Barth et al., 2008; Lang et al., 2006) and use earnings management as a 
proxy for accounting quality. Consistent with prior research firms with higher 
quality of earnings exhibit less earnings management. I examine two 
manifestations of earnings management, earnings smoothing and managing 
towards positive earnings. I expect that earnings of RPTs firms to be more 
managed than earnings of non-RPTs firms since prior evidence shows that firms 
that conduct RPTs are more likely to conduct them to manage earnings. This 
prediction is supported by several studies (Cheung et al., 2006; Dahya et al. 2008; 
Gao and Kling, 2008; Dow and McGuire, 2009). Prior research indicates that 
firms with more income smoothing exhibit less earnings variability (Lang et al. 
2003; Leuz et al. 2003; Ball and Shivakumar 2005).  To examine this relationship 
I use two metrics of earnings variability, namely, variability of change in net 
income and variability of change in net income relative to the variability of 
change in cash flow. 
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Firms with more income smoothing exhibit a more negative correlation between 
accruals and cash flows (Lang et al. 2003; Leuz et al. 2003). A more negative 
correlation between accruals and cash flows reflects more income smoothing as 
managers respond to negative cash flow outcomes by increasing accruals (Land 
and Lang, 2002; Myers et al. 2007). Ball and Shivakumar (2005) show that higher 
earnings quality, attenuates the negative correlation between accruals and cash 
flow. Therefore, It is expected that RPTs firms exhibit a more negative 
correlation between accruals and cash flows than non-RPTs firms. 
The second manifestation of earnings management is managing earnings towards 
positive earnings and is measured by the frequency of small positive net income. 
Prior research uses the frequency of small positive net income as a metric to 
provide evidence of managing towards positive earnings.  Firms prefer to report 
small positive net income rather that a negative net income (Barth et al. 2008). 
Therefore, firms with small positive net income are considered to be managing 
their earnings towards positive income. It is  expected that RPTs firms report 
small positive net income more frequently than non-RPTs firms. 
I expect firms that undertake RPTs to exhibit less accounting quality which is 
indicated by less variability of change of net income, less variability of change in 
net income relative to variability of change in cash flows, a more negative 
correlation between accruals and cash flows and   report small positive net 
income more frequently than firms that do not undertake RPTs. 
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Hypothesis: RPTs firms exhibit less accounting quality than non-RPT firms. 
7.3 Research Design 
This section presents the research design used in the study. First, I introduce the 
definition of the variable used to measure RPTs. Then, I discuss the proxies for 
earnings management and how they are constructed. Finally, I describe the 
sample of the study, present descriptive statistics for the variables used and 
identify the sources of the data used in the analysis.  
I measure accounting quality using different proxies of earnings management. 
Measures of accounting quality reflect effects that are attributable to the financial 
reporting system. However, they also include effects that could not be attributable 
to the financial reporting system. These effects are due to differences in the 
economic environment where firms operate or differences in incentives for firms 
in terms of financial reporting (Barth et al., 2008). These differences are 
controlled for in the current study for two reasons. First, I employ a single 
country study. This indicates that all sample firms are operating in the same 
economic environment. Second, when constructing accounting quality proxies 
relating to earnings management, I include controls that are identified as 
associated with firm’s reporting incentives. 
I interpret less managed earnings to be of higher accounting quality. My metrics 
for earnings management are based on the variance of change in net income, 
variance of change in net income to the variance of change in cash flows, the 
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correlation between accruals and cash flows and the frequency of small positive 
net income. I interpret higher variance of the change in net income, higher ratio of 
the variances of the change in net income and change in cash flows, less negative 
correlation between accruals and cash flows and lower frequency of small 
positive less income as evidence of less earnings management. 
7.3.1 Related Party Transactions 
To operationalise RPT, the current study applies the same measure used by 
Ryngaert and Thomas (2012). In their study Ryngaert and Thomas (2012) 
measured RPT using a dummy variable equal to one if the sum of related party 
transactions conducted in the firm-year observation exceeds 1% of the firm’s total 
assets for the same year, and zero otherwise to study US RPTs disclosed during 
1999 and 2000 in 234 US companies.  
Several studies used the total dollar amount to measure RPTs. For example, 
Gordon et al. (2004) measure RPTs differently in a sample with similar 
characteristics to this study (224 firm years). They rely more on the number and 
dollar value of RPTs collected from SEC filings for fiscal years 2000 and 2001. 
This study uses the measure defined by Ryngaert and Thomas (2012) because it is 
preferable to avoid the relying on assigning dollar values to RPTs as this involves 
potential and significant measurement error (Ryngaert and Thomas, 2012) 
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7.3.2 Earnings Management 
I use four earnings management metrics, three for earnings smoothing and one for 
managing earnings towards a target. The first earnings smoothing measure is 
based on the variability of the change in net income scaled by total assets, ∆NI 
(Lang et al. 2006). A smaller variance of the change in net income indicates more 
earnings smoothing. That said, it is important to control for other factors that can 
influence the change in net income rather than the financial reporting system 
(Barth et al. 2008). Therefore, for the earnings variability  metric I use the 
residuals from the regression of the change in net income on control variables 
which results in the variable ∆NI*: 
∆NI=  α + β1 SIZE+  β 2 SALES GROWTH+  β 3 LEV+  β 4 CF+  β 5 BIG 4+ ε.                   (1) 
Where: 
SIZE= the natural logarithm of assets; 
SALES GROWTH= percentage of change in sales; 
LEV= end of year total liabilities divided by end of year equity book value; 
CF= annual net cash flow from operating activities divided by end of year total 
assets; 
BIG 4= an indicator variable that equals one if the firm is one of the Big 4 audit 
firms and zero otherwise. 
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I estimate equation (1) controlling for industry and year, then divide the 
companies into RPTs and non-RPTs firms and compare the variance in the 
residuals across the two groups. Regression results of equation (1) are presented 
in Column 1, Appendix 2. 
My second earnings smoothing metric is based on the ratio of the variability of 
change in net income to the variability of change in cash flows, ∆CF. Firms with 
more volatile cash flows typically have more volatile net income, and this metric 
controls for this effect. Firms that manage earnings are assumed to have less 
variability in net income than the variability in cash flows. Similar to ∆NI, ∆CF 
could be affected by other factors beside the financial reporting system. Therefore, 
I run a regression similar to equation (1) with ∆CF as a dependent variable and 
controlling also for industry and year using dummy variables. The residuals of the 
regression will be used to calculate the variance of the change in operating cash 
flows ∆ CF*. The resulting second metric is the ratio of the variability in ∆NI* to 
variability of ∆ CF*. Regression results of equation (2) is presented in Column 2, 
Appendix 2. 
∆CF=  α 0+  β 1 SIZE+  β 2 SALES GROWTH+  β 3 LEV+  β 4 CF+  β 5 BIG 4+ ε.               (2) 
The third earnings smoothing metric is based on the Spearman correlation 
between accruals and cash flows. I compute accruals as: 
ACC=[∆CA-∆Cash]-[∆CL-∆STD]-Dep                                                                                         (3)                                                                
Where: 
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∆CA= the change in total current assets 
∆Cash= the change in cash/cash equivalents 
∆CL= the change in total current liabilities 
∆STD= the change in short-term debt included in current liabilities 
Dep= depreciation and amortization expense 
Similar to equations (1) and (2) and following Barth et al. (2008) I compare 
correlations of residuals from equations (4) and (5), CF* and ACC*, rather than 
correlations between cash flows and accruals directly. Both CF and ACC are 
regressed on control variables and industry and year dummy variables, but 
excluding CF: 
Regression results of equations (4) and (5) are presented in Columns 3 and 4, 
Appendix 2. 
CF= α 0+  β 1 SIZE+  β 2 SALES GROWTH+  β 3 LEV+  β 4 BIG 4+ ε.                                  (4) 
ACC=  α 0+  β 1 SIZE+  β 2 SALES GROWTH+  β 3 LEV+  β 4 BIG 4+ ε.                              (5) 
Following Ahmed et al. (2012) my metric for managing towards positive income 
is SPOS, an indicator variable equals one if net income scaled by average total 
assets is between 0.00 and 0.01. I estimate the following logistic regression 
including dummy variables to control for industry and year. I interpret a positive 
β 1 as an indication that RPTs firms manage earnings towards small positive net 
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income to avoid reporting a loss. The regression coefficients of equation (6) are 
presented in column 5, Appendix 2. 
SPOS= α 0+β 1 RPT+ β 2 SIZE+ β 3 SALES GROWTH+β 4 LEV+ β 5 BIG 4+ε.                   (6) 
7.3.3 Data and Sample 
The sample comprises of 215 firm-year observations for firms listed in Athens 
Stock Exchange (ASE) between 2009 and 2011. Data for accounting quality 
proxies and control variables are obtained from Orbis data base which is supplied 
by Bureau Van Dijk. RPTs data are collected from companies’ annual reports 
available at the investor relations section on companies’ websites.  
I start the analysis by obtaining the list of listed firms from ASE website. The 
number of total listed firms is 237. I exclude suspended firms, firms without 
websites and firms that do not provide financial statements in English. I also 
exclude firms in the financial sector. Next, I identify firm-years that have 
sufficient information to obtain RPTs data in years between 2009 and 2011. The 
final sample is 215 firm-year observations from 84 unique firms listed in ASE. 
The details of sampling procedures is shown in Panel A, Table7.1. The industry 
distribution for companies and firm-year observations is shown in Panel B, Table 
7.1. 
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Table 7.1 
Sample Distribution 
Panel A 
  Firms Observations 
Population 237 711 
Financial Firms (29) (87) 
Suspended Firms (25) (75) 
Non-excluded  
Observations 183 549 
    
Missing Observations (334) 
    
Final Sample 84 215 
    
    
Panel B 
    
Industry Firms Observations 
Oil and Gas 1 3 
Chemicals 3 8 
Basic Resources 10 25 
Construction and Materials 14 31 
Industrial Goods and Services 14 35 
Food and  Beverage 8 22 
Personal and Household Goods 10 28 
Health Care 4 9 
Retail 3 8 
Travel and Leisure 6 16 
Utilities 3 9 
Real Estate 3 7 
Technology 5 14 
    
Total 84 215 
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Table 7.2 presents descriptive statistics relating to variables used in the analysis. 
Table 7.2 shows that non-RPTs firms have fewer incidents of small positive 
earnings and more incidents of large negative earnings than do RPTs firms. 
Although, these descriptive statistics do not control for other factors, they suggest 
that RPTs firms are more likely than non-RPTs firms to manage earnings towards 
a target and are less likely to recognise losses in a timely manner. Descriptive 
statistics for control variables show that RPTs firms are larger, less highly levered  
and are more likely to be audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms. RPTs firms 
achieve a more negative sales growth than their non-RPTs counterparts. 
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7.4 Results 
Table 7.3 presents results comparing the quality of accounting amounts for RPTs 
and non-RPTs firms in the period between 2009 and 2011. It shows that firms 
conducting RPTs generally do not evidence more earnings management than non-
RPTs. 
The first finding relating to earnings management indicates that RPTs firms do 
not exhibit higher variability of change in net income. Table 7.3 shows that there 
is no difference in variance between RPTs and non-RPTs firms. If the variance 
was less for RPTs this would have provided evidence of  more income smoothing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.2 
Descriptive Statistics 
RPTs 
N=173 
Non-RPTs 
N= 42 
  Mean Median  
Standard 
Deviation   Mean Median  
Standard 
Deviation 
Test Variables 
∆NI -0.017 -0.012 0.061 -0.017 -0.006 0.064 
∆CF -0.010 -0.013 0.199 -0.039 -0.017 0.191 
ACC -0.065 -0.054 0.144 -0.031 -0.012 0.150 
CF 0.086 0.068 0.162 0.034 0.024 0.174 
SPOS 0.104 0.000 0.306 0.095 0.000 0.297 
Control Variables 
SIZE 18.895 18.901 1.400 18.785 18.504 1.206 
SALES GROWTH -8.220 -7.978 28.249 -4.588 -6.807 34.930 
LEV 0.184 0.163 0.146 0.204 0.158 0.156 
CF  0.086 0.068 0.162 0.034 0.024 0.174 
BIG 4 0.428 0.000 0.496 0.310 0.000 0.468 
This table reports descriptive statistics for 215 firm-year observations for firms listed in Athens Stock 
Exchange (ASE). Data obtained from Orbis database supplied by Bureau Van Dijk. ∆NI is the change 
in annual earnings, where earnings is scaled by total assets; ∆CF is the change in annual net cash flow, 
CF where cash flow is scaled by total assets; ACC is  ACC=[∆CA-∆Cash]-[ ∆CL-∆STD]-Dep, where 
CA is current assets, CL is current liabilities, STD is short-term debt and Dep is depreciation and 
amortization expense; SPOS is an indicator that equals 1 for observations with annual earnings scaled 
by total assets between 0 and 0.01; SIZE is the natural logarithm of firm's total assets; SALES 
GROWTH is the percentage of sales growth rate; LEV is long-term debt and is calculated as the ratio 
of total long-term debt to the book value of total assets; BIG 4 is an indicator that equals 1 if the auditor 
is one of the large international audit firms. 
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than the non-RPTs firms. The variance reported for RPTs and non-RPTs is 0.004 . 
Hence, The difference of residual variances of net income,  ∆NI represents 0% of 
the total variance in the change in net income (0.000/0.004). 
The second finding is consistent with the first in that it indicates that the ratio of 
the variance of change in net income, ∆NI*, to the variance of change in cash 
flow, ∆CF*, is not significant. Although, the variance is lower for RPTs firms 
than for non-RPTs firms, the difference is insignificant and is not sufficient to 
support the hypothesis that RPTs have lower quality of accounting. The ratios are 
0.100 for RPTs and 0.111 for non-RPTs.  
The third finding indicates that correlation between accruals, ACC*, and cash 
flow, CF*, is less negative for RPTs firms -0.647 than for non-RPTs firms -0.784.  
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The difference is not significant and the results show that RPTs firms do  not 
exhibit more negative correlation between accruals and cash flows. This shows 
that the hypothesis that RPTs firms smooth earnings more likely compared to 
non-RPTs firms should be rejected. Finally, the relationship between RPTs and 
SPOS is negative -0.703 and insignificant, which suggests that RPTs firms do not 
report small positive earnings more frequently which does not provide evidence 
of managing earnings towards an earning target.  
In general, this study provides evidence that RPTs are not associated with lower 
quality of reported earnings as measured by smoothing of earnings and managing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.3 
Comparison of RPTs and non-RPTs Firms Accounting Quality 
  
RPT 
  
Non-RPT Difference 
Earnings Management Metric 
VAR ∆NI* 0.004   0.004 0 
VAR ∆NI*/VAR ∆ CF* 0.100   0.111 -0.011 
Corr (ACC*, CF*) -0.647   -0.784 0.137 
Small Positive NI (SPOS) -0.703 
  
This table presents comparative statistics between RPTs and non-RPTs firms (T-Tests for VAR ∆NI* and 
VAR ∆NI*/VAR ∆ CF* and Z-Test for Corr (ACC*, CF*)  .Variables denoted  
with an asterix (*) are residuals from regressions of each respective variable on a set of controls.  
VAR ∆NI* is the variance of ∆NI*. VAR ∆NI*/VAR ∆ CF* is the variance of ∆NI* divided by the variance 
of ∆ CF*. Corr (ACC*, CF*) is the spearman correlation between ACC* and CF*.  
 I regress SPOS  using a logistic regression on RPT and controls. SPOS is an indicator variable that equals 
one when annual net income scaled by total assets is between 0 and 0.01- 
*Indicates significance difference between RPTs and non-RPTs firms at 10% level 
**Indicates significantly different from zero at the 10% level 
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earnings towards a target. The results show that there is no significant differences 
in accounting quality between RPTs firms, which are firms that conduct RPTs 
valuing more that 1% of the value of the firm’s total assets and non-RPTs. The 
results of this study does not provide evidence to support the argument that RPTs 
is a facet of conflict of interest that reflects and agency problem. These results 
support the arguments made by Ryngaert and Thomas (2012) and Gordon and 
Henry (2005) about the nature of RPTs. 
7.5 Summary and Conclusion 
Using a sample of 215 firm-year observations from 84 unique firms listed in 
Athens Stock Exchange I examine the association between RPTs and accounting 
quality. Evidence do not show any indication that RPTs firms are more likely to 
engage in earnings management. This is indicated by failure to find any 
significance of earnings management measures; a smaller variance of the change 
in net income, smaller variance of the ratio of change in net income to the change 
of cash flows, more negative correlation between accruals and cash flows for 
RPTs firms.  
My results provide evidence that accounting quality of Greek firms that engage in 
RPTs is not different when compared  to that of firms do not conduct RPTs. In 
particular the reported results have shown that non-RPTs firms do not exhibit less 
income smoothing, or that they are less likely to manage earnings towards a 
benchmark and report large losses more frequently. Accounting quality measures 
do not show any significant differences between the two groups.  
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My results also do not show that RPTs firms are more likely to manage their 
earnings towards a target. This is indicated by a lower frequency of reporting 
small positive net income within RPTs firms compared to non-RPTs firms. This 
shows that RPTs are not associated with trials to avoid reporting losses by the 
reporting firm. 
In spite of employing a single country research design which eliminates the need 
to control for the differences in the economic environment in which the sampled 
firms operate, there is still other factors that could influence the results which are 
relevant to specific firms’ reporting incentives. These firm-specific effects are 
controlled for by the research design features. However, as indicated by Barth et 
al. (2008) the researcher cannot be sure that the  findings are solely attributable to 
financial reporting factors rather than changes in firms’ incentives or economic 
environment.  
Finally, this study is subject to limitations. First the sample size might be 
considered relatively small. However, sample sizes of similar studies are closely 
compared to my sample.2 The relatively small sample size is due to the lack of 
data. As mentioned earlier, some firms did not have websites nor an alternative 
source frim where data on RPTs could be obtained. Moreover, other firms did not 
supply annual reports in English.  Second, my study focuses Greece. Greece has a 
special institutional background. Greece witnesses highest levels of earnings 
management (Leuz et al., 2003), earnings opacity (Bhattacharya et al., 2003) and 
                                                          
2
 See  Ryngaert and Thomas (2012) and Gordon and Henry (2005) 
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investor protection. Both reasons limit the possibility to widely generalise the 
findings to other settings. 
Similar to Asian countries findings from studies that are based on a Greek sample 
do not necessarily apply everywhere else. However, this special context also 
opens up a new stream of literature where focusing on whether the link between 
accounting quality and RPTs is significantly affected by the institutional 
background and investor protection environment or not. Studies using data from 
several countries where the comparison between institutional settings and how 
they could affect the results is attainable is needed to fill in this void in the 
literature.  
Future research should focus on a research setting that mainly allows for variation 
in investor protection regulations as this will affect or mitigate firms’ incentives 
to manage earnings (Leuz et al., 2003) and hence, it will be useful to investigate 
how the association between earnings management and RPTs vary depending on 
the effectiveness of investor protection regulations. I intend to leave this for 
future research. 
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Chapter Eight 
Summary and Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the research conducted. The next section 
provides a brief overview of the research project. Section 8.3 recaps the 
objectives and research questions of the study and presents a summary of the key 
findings. Section 8.4 discusses the contribution of the study and the implications 
of the findings. Section 8.5 highlights the limitations of the study and suggestions 
for future research. 
8.2 Overview of the Current Study 
This study investigates whether Related Party Transactions (RPTs) are associated 
with Earnings Management (EM) practices in Greece. A number of prior 
empirical studies that have provided  international comparisons among countries 
have consistently found that Greece to exhibit high levels of EM (Leuz et al., 
2003; Bhattacharya et al., 2003), and low levels of investor protection (La Porta 
et al. 1998). Given the institutional and investor protection background prevalent 
in Greece insiders are anticipated to manage earnings to conceal their private 
benefits from outsiders to avoid the disciplinary actions that might be taken by 
the outside financial stakeholders if those benefits were detected (Shelifer and 
Vishny, 1997; Leuz et al., 2003).   
In spite of the reported low investor protection Greece was among the first 
adopters of IFRS in Europe (Ballas et al., 2010). It is possible that this was 
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intended to enable the countries financial markets to adopt superior accounting 
standards in order to improve disclosure policies and accounting system. 
Consequently, this might be expected to enhance the integration of domestic 
Greek markets into world markets and accelerate economic growth (Hope et al., 
2006). However, higher quality standards do not guarantee higher-quality of 
financial reporting (Ball, 2001). The concerns stated by Ball (2001) were 
supported by empirical evidence based on sample of firms from Greece by 
Tsipouridou and Spathis (2012) who found that IFRS did not appear to reduce 
opportunistic behaviour and EM practice. This was mainly attributed to the strong 
influence of the Greek context characteristics where the economic bonding of 
auditors with their clients is strong, investor protection is low and enforcement 
mechanisms are weak. Therefore, the special financial reporting environment in 
Greece is one of the main explanations of the high practice of EM. 
This study investigates whether RPTs are associated with EM in Greece, where 
due to weaknesses in institutional environment, investor protection and financial 
reporting, controlling shareholders are more likely to expropriate minority 
shareholders’ wealth. In order to examine this prediction this study investigates 
the association between EM and RPTs to seek evidence whether EM is conducted 
to mask the extraction of resources resulting from RPTs or not. An association 
between EM and RPTs provides evidence that managers and controlling 
shareholders extract firm resources by conducting RPTs and they aim to conceal 
this extraction using EM.  
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I start by introducing the study and setting the background in Chapter One. Next, 
I discuss the Greek context and its relevant peculiarities in Chapter Two which 
discusses the investor protection environment, accounting environment, audit 
market and regulation and corporate governance and its developments in Greece. 
In Chapter Three, the theoretical background of the study was detailed and 
explained. The main overarching theories discussed where Agency Theory and 
Transaction Cost Economics as they are considered to be opposing theoretical 
underpinnings that explain the nature of RPTs. Additionally, Stakeholder and 
Stewardship theories were discussed as alternatives to Agency theory. 
A review of the RPTs literature was provided in Chapter Four. In this chapter, I 
begin with a discussion on RPTs, how these activities have been associated with 
corporate scandals and the expropriation of shareholder wealth. I present the 
definition of RPTs, the main types of different RPTs, the proxies used to 
operationalise RPTs and comment on the weaknesses of those proxies. I also 
accumulate and present evidence on the determinants and consequences of RPTs 
and discuss the weaknesses and challenges of RPTs research. A review of the EM 
literature was provided in Chapter Five. This chapter discussed different 
definitions, determinants, consequences and proxies used to measure earnings 
management. 
In Chapter Six, I investigate the association between RPTs and EM. Chapter Six 
examines the relationship between EM and RPTs for the firms listed on the 
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Athens Stock Exchange (ASE). Moreover, it examines the association between 
earnings management and various identifiable corporate governance activities.  
In Chapter Seven I investigate the relationship between RPTs and accounting 
quality for the firms listed on the ASE. In particular, in this chapter I compare 
accounting quality across two groups of firms. The first group consists of firms 
that conduct material RPTs and the second sample group was constructed of firms 
that do not conduct RPTs valuing more than 1% of the firm’s total assets.  
8.3 Research Objectives, Questions and Findings 
Based on the review of the RPTs literature this research aimed to achieve specific 
objectives to fill in the gaps in the literature. The current research had the 
following objectives: 
1. Assess the extent of EM and RPTs in Greece 
2. Investigate the association between the existence of RPTs and EM in Greece. 
3. Investigate the association between corporate governance and EM in Greece. 
4. Investigate the association between corporate governance and RPTs in Greece. 
5. Investigate the impact of RPTs on the quality of accounting reports in Greece. 
The current study applies the same measure used by Ryngaert and Thomas (2012). 
Ryngaert and Thomas (2012) measured RPT using a dummy variable equal to 
one if the sum of related party transactions disclosed in the annual report of the 
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firm in the firm-year observation exceeds 1% of the firm’s total asset for the same 
year, and zero otherwise. The mean for RPTs is 0.8  as shown in Chapter Six, 
Table 6.2, which is reflects that 80% of the firms in Greece conduct RPTs with an 
aggregate value exceeding 1% of the firm’s total assets. 
The median for EM in this study is -0.407 which is shown in Chapter Six, Table 
6.2. EM is measured using the income smoothing measure used in Gopalan and 
Jayaraman (2012). The descriptive statistics associated with the EM variable 
show a degree of variation in the practice of income smoothing within sampled 
Greek listed firms as discussed by Leuz et al. (2003) and Gopalan and Jayaraman 
(2012). The minimum value for EM which is -2.741 indicates that the volatility in 
earnings is higher than the volatility of cash flows. On the other hand the 
maximum value is -0.021 which indicates a significant level of income 
smoothing . 
Regarding the second research objective, univariate and multivariate analysis in 
Chapter Six and in particular Tables 6.3 and 6.4 show a negative and significant 
association between RPTs and EM. The significant and negative relationship in 
the multiple regression models as shown in Table 6.4, suggests that RPTs can 
explain part of the variation in EM, however, not in the predicted direction. This 
negative association indicates that although RPTs might be used to manage 
earnings or mask the extraction of firm resources from shareholders, those 
transactions are not necessarily linked systematically to income smoothing. When 
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RPTs are conducted to manipulate earnings or mask extraction of resources, this 
might affect accruals or cash flows, but it does not necessarily affect both 
together (Chen et al., 2011). The results of the current study does not indicate an 
association between RPTs and income smoothing behaviour.  
The negative association might also be attributed to legitimate corporate 
governance activities. Denis and McConnell (2003) and Gordon and Henry (2005) 
specified corporate governance as a main factor that can mitigate the relationship 
between EM and RPTs and move RPTs from a facet of conflict of interest  to an 
efficient transaction by providing efficient and effective monitoring. Independent 
auditors can be seen to act as one of the monitoring tools that has the aim of 
assuring that financial statements reflect the economic reality of firms. The results 
of the current study indicates that Big 4 audit firms have higher audit quality and 
are associated with less EM. These results are significant and consistent with 
prior literature (Francis et al., 1993).  Additionally, this study provides evidence 
that the negative association between RPTs and EM is attributed to audit quality. 
Results in Table 6.5 in Chapter Six, show the results of this test. 
The relationship between corporate governance and EM in Greece raised by the 
third research objective is also presented in Chapter Six in Table 6.4. The results 
for the variable Big 4 which measures audit quality as well show negative 
significant relationship with EM. This relationship implies that the presence of 
one of the Big 4 audit firms as external auditor is associated with lower values of 
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EM. This means that Big 4 audit firms are associated with lower levels of income 
smoothing represented by the low value of the variable EM. These results are 
consistent with the results of DeFond and Subramanyam (1998), Francis et al. 
(1999) and Becker et al. (2008) whose results suggested that significantly lower 
levels of EM are associated with the presence of a Big 4 auditor. Results for 
board size and board independence are insignificant.  
The fourth research objective was to investigate whether RPTs are associated 
with corporate governance or not. Table 6.3 in Chapter Six also shows that RPTs 
are not correlated to any of the corporate governance activities examined with the 
exception of having a Big 4 auditor. This was not in line with prior literature (e.g. 
Gordon et al., 2007; Kohlbeck and Mayhew, 2010). These contradicting results 
might be due to the differences in investor protection environment. Prior research 
shows that the effectiveness of corporate governance activities is affected by the 
investor protection environment (La Porta et al., 2000). 
Finally, the fifth research objective is achieved in Chapter Seven. Table 7.1 in 
Chapter Seven presents results comparing the quality of accounting reports for 
RPTs and non-RPTs firms in the period between 2009 and 2011. It shows that 
firms having RPTs do not exhibit less accounting quality than non-RPTs. The 
first finding in this Chapter indicates that RPTs firms do not exhibit higher 
variability of change in net income. 
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The second finding in Chapter Seven is consistent with the first in that it indicates 
that the ratio of the variance of change in net income, ∆NI*, to the variance of 
change in cash flow, ∆CF*, is not significantly lower for RPTs firms than for 
non-RPTs firms. The third finding indicates that correlation between accruals, 
ACC*, and cash flow, CF*, is more highly negative for non-RPTs firms. This 
shows that the hypothesis that the likelihood that RPTs firms take actions to 
smooth earnings more than non-RPTs firms should be rejected. Finally, the 
relationship between RPTs and SPOS is negative -0.703 and insignificant, which 
suggests that RPTs firms do not report small positive earnings more frequently. 
This does not provide evidence of managing earnings towards an earning target. 
This indicates that firms that conduct RPTs with material amounts (equal to 1% 
or more of the firms’ total assets) are as likely to report small positive earnings as 
their non-RPTs counterparts. 
The findings reported in Chapter Seven support the findings reported in Chapter 
Six and shows that the results of the study are robust for alternative proxies of 
RPTs and EM. Additionally, the results are robust across normal scores of 
continuous variables as shown in Table 6.4, Chapter Six. 
8.4. Contributions and Implications of Research 
The research makes theoretical contributions and has policy implications. First, 
the research contributes to several streams of literature. This research contributes 
to EM and RPTs literature by investigating the link between them in a unique 
context with poor investor protection. Moreover, it contributes to corporate 
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governance literature and extends the literature on accounting quality.  Second, 
this research has policy implications related to the disclosure of related parties 
and RPTs that would allow more transparency and protection for the investors. 
Theoretical contributions are discussed in Section 8.4.1 while policy implications 
are discussed in Section 8.4.2. 
8.4.1 Theoretical Contributions 
There are three main differences between the current study and related prior 
studies. This study differs from the studies conducted by Cheung et al. (2009), 
Jian and Wong (2010) and Lo et al. (2010) in the institutional setting. These 
studies were conducted in the Chinese context which is affected by highly 
concentrated ownership and the tendency for controlling shareholders to 
expropriate shareholders. The inferences deduced from these Chinese studies do 
not necessarily apply to other markets (Gordon and Henry, 2005). The vast 
majority of RPTs studies to date have been conducted using samples from Asian 
countries which exhibit a unique and different institutional setting which suggests 
that those results may not be generalisable to other settings (Gordon and Henry, 
2005).  Therefore, investigating the relationship in different settings provides a 
contribution to the literature by addressing this limitation. 
This study also uses different measures from those adopted by Gordon and Henry 
(2005). I refrain from following Gordon and Henry (2005) measuring RPTs using 
monetary values as this includes nontrivial measurement errors (Ryngaert and 
Thomas, 2012). I also avoid following them in the usage of the Jones (1991) 
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model to estimate discretionary accruals  also in an attempt to avoid or reduce 
measurement errors (Dechow et al., 2010).  Finally, this study also differs from 
the study conducted by Ryngaert and Thomas (2012) which investigates whether 
ex-ante RPTs have a differential impact on firm value compared to ex-post RPTs 
in the US context. Their study relying on the historical dimension of the 
transaction to categorise RPTs and provides evidence from a strong investor 
protection environment. 
This study contributes to a growing literature on EM. Prior studies have provided 
evidence that executives engage in EM through accruals (Healy, 1985; Healy and 
Whalen 1999; Kothari, 2001; Fields, 2001) or through the manipulation of real 
activities (Roychowdhury, 2006). Healy and Whalen (1999) argue that while 
RPTs could be used to manage earnings, the evidence on the link between EM 
when measured by an accrual based measure and RPTs is limited. This aim of 
this study has been to provide empirical evidence on whether RPTs are normal 
transactions conducted solely for normal business and corporate governance 
purposes, or a mask that may be used to hide the extraction of firm resources or to 
manipulate financial statements.  
This study contributes to the corporate governance literature by examining the 
link between internal governance activities and EM. Although prior work has 
provided some evidence that corporate governance is an important determinant of 
EM, the results of these studies remain contradicting (Garcia-Meca and 
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Scanchez-Ballesta, 2009) and not sufficient to draw substantive conclusions 
(Larcker et al., 2007). This study provides further evidence on the association 
between EM and corporate governance in Greece. The results suggest that audit 
quality is associated with lower levels of income smoothing and hence, EM.  
Additionally, it shows that the negative association between EM and RPTs is 
robust only to the subsample of companies being audited by Big-4 firms. This 
indicates that audit quality plays a major role in the association between EM and 
RPTs. 
This study also extends the literature on RPTs by examining the relationship 
between accounting quality and RPTs. Prior studies have investigated and found 
evidence of an association between earnings management and RPTs (Chen et al., 
2011; Jian and Wong, 2010;  Aharony et al 2010). Those studies have used 
indirect measures of earnings management that could not be attributed to 
accounting quality or financial reporting system. They used changes in ratios such 
as ROA or price earnings (Chen et al., 2011; Aharony et al., 2010) operating 
profits (Jian and Wong, 2010) as an indicator of earnings manipulation involving 
IPOs without investigating accounting quality attributes. Therefore, the question 
whether RPTs are associated with lower accounting quality was not empirically 
investigated by earlier studies. 
Finally,  prior accounting quality literature focuses almost entirely on comparing 
accounting quality between firms applying IFRS and their non-IFRS counterparts. 
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Thus, this study aims to extend the scope of accounting quality literature by 
examining whether RPTs are associated with lower accounting quality. 
8.4.2 Policy Implications 
Researchers always have to rely on information of RPTs disclosed by the firm. 
This implies that RPTs that are not disclosed or transactions with parties who are 
not known to the public or auditors remain unobserved. Although auditor failure 
to recognise or to disclose a related party is cited as one of the most common ten 
audit deficiencies, in the biggest related party transactions, namely Adelphia and 
Enron, the auditors were clearly aware of RPTs and related parties in these 
contexts (Gordon et al. 2007). These undisclosed transactions are more likely to 
be used for achieving private benefits by controlling shareholders as controlling 
shareholders are likely to be motivated to conceal their private benefits so that 
external shareholders do not observe those benefits. Therefore, the nature of 
RPTs can provide opportunities for controlling shareholders to achieve private 
control benefits through undisclosed RPTs. This suggests that one solution that 
could possibly mitigate the effect of this problem is that the regulations and 
accounting standards oblige auditors and not the firm, to disclose all relations and 
transactions with related parties they are aware of. This could help the public and 
the researchers to assess the degree of opportunism in the conducted RPTs. 
8.5. Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research  
The RPTs literature suffers from the several weaknesses. This section sheds the 
light on this weaknesses of RPTs research and presents some suggestions to 
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constrain these weaknesses in the future. Moreover, this section discusses the 
main limitation of the current study.  
The main problems in the RPTs research are the lack of multi-county studies and 
international comparisons and the insufficient coverage of RPTs by research 
databases. The main limitation in the current study is that the sample size and the 
context of the research do not allow the results to be generalisable. I discuss these 
weaknesses and limitations hereafter.   
First, RPTs are mainly discussed as either a tool to expropriate minority 
shareholders or manage reported earnings. Although the incidence of both 
investor expropriation and earnings management depend on the institutional 
background and investor protection (La Porta et al., 1999; Leuz et al., 2003), the 
RPTs literature is silent on the role of institutional and contextual differences 
across countries in examining the association between RPTs and shareholder 
expropriation or earnings management.  
There is dearth of studies comparing RPTs evidence across countries. With the 
exception of Dayha et al. (2008) who examine the relationship between RPTs, 
corporate governance and firm value no study covers RPTs in more than one 
country to the best of the researcher’s knowledge. Although this helps researchers 
to remove external variables that might affect the investigated relationship, it also 
keeps RPTs literature with an observed weakness as there is no evidence on how 
the negative outcomes of RPTs might vary as the institutional background and 
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investor protection environment changes. Similar to corporate governance, it is 
possible that the institutional background can play significant role in constraining 
the negative effects of RPTs and ensure that RPTs are efficient transactions that 
are conducted solely for business purposes. For example, more evidence on the 
effect of the interaction between RPTs and investor protection on firm value, 
stock returns and ROA needs to be presented. The main problem now that persists 
with the current state of RPTs research is the lack of evidence on the determinants 
of the effect of RPTs on firm value and shareholders’ wealth. 
Second, another main weakness in RPTs research which might be contributing to 
the first weakness is the availability of data. Similar to other disclosures, data on 
RPTs must be manually collected from annual reports. This might be one of the 
main difficulties of collecting cross country data for RPTs as RPTs are 
complicated transactions where disclosed transactions describe a lot of 
information like the type, value and parties of the transaction. I hope that this 
study will encourage data providers to make more RPTs data available. The 
availability of detailed RPTs data will allow the pursuit of additional interesting 
research questions for RPTs studies. Additionally, this research was constrained 
by data availability as a result of the lack of similar data sets across countries. For 
example, in this research several attempts were made to include other countries 
with weak investor protection laws similar to Greece. These attempts were not 
successful because of the large number of firms in countries such as France, 
Spain, Netherlands and Italy that publish only consolidated financial statements. 
181 
 
The availability of consolidated financial statements only eliminates data on 
transactions between subsidiaries and retains only final balances for the parent 
firm. Careful examination of the accounting information available in these 
countries indicated that only a trivial number of firm-year observations could be 
found severely reducing the usefulness of attempting cross-country comparison. 
This has made a cross-country comparison a very difficult venture. 
Finally, the main limitation for this study is that it focuses on the link between 
RPTs and EM in the Greek context. The Greek context can be considered 
distinctive because of the reported relatively poor investor protection, 
enforcement mechanisms, and reporting quality( Leuz et al., 2003; Hail and Leuz, 
2006). Hence, investigating the link between RPTs and EM in this context is 
important as it supports the notion that RPTs are not necessarily a mean for 
managing earnings. This implies that these results might not be generalisable to 
other countries. More research needs to be conducted on a cross country level to 
assess the impact of institutional factors on RPTs and their effects so that the 
generation of more generalisable conclusions might be made possible. 
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Appendices 
 Appendix 1 
Related Party Transactions Literature: Summary of Findings 
Authors Country Findings 
Hwang et al. (2013) China Disclosure regulation reduces discretionary abnormal accruals of firms engaging in RPTs. 
Yeh et al. (2012) Taiwan Good governance constraints RPTs, related sales is correlated with seasoned equity offerings and the 
condition of capital issuance. 
Ryngaert and Thomas 
(2012) 
USA Overall RPTs are not significantly associated with Tobin's Q, Ex ante RPTs are not associated with 
operating profitability and are positively related to Tobin's Q.  
 
Ex-Post RPTs are negatively associated with profitability, declined share prices upon disclosure,  
increased likelihood that the firm will enter financial distress or deregister. 
Lei and Song (2011) Hong 
Kong 
Firm value is negatively associated with RPTs. 
Peng et al. (2011) China When a firm is in a healthy financial position, controlling shareholders are more likely to use  
RPTs to tunnel from the listed firm to benefit other member firms. 
When a firm is in poor financial condition, controlling shareholders are more likely to use  
RPTs to prop up the listed firm. 
Lo and Wong (2011) China Firms that make voluntary disclosure of the pricing methods of RPTs are negatively associated with 
earnings management (abnormal RPTs) and RPTs incentives (performance-linked bonuses 
and earning targets. They are positively associated with independent directors and governmental 
ownership. 
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Chen et al. (2011) China Controlling shareholders structure operating RPTs in pre-IPO period and these RPTs are associated 
with firm performance followed by a negative future performance. 
Nekhili and Cherif (2011) France RPTS are mainly influenced by voting rights of controlling shareholder, board size, independence of 
audit committee, Big 4 auditors, debt ratio. RPTs negatively affect firm value. 
Kohlbeck and Mayhew 
(2010) 
USA RP firms have significantly lower valuations and marginally lower subsequent returns than non-RP 
firms. 
Jian and Wong (2010) China Firms prop up earnings by using abnormal related sales to their controlling owners. 
Lo et al. (2010) China Firms with independent board, duality, experts on audit committee are less likely to engage in 
transfer pricing manipulations through RPTs. 
Aharony et al. (2010) China RP sales could be used opportunistically to manage earnings upwards in the pre-IPO period 
non-repayment by Chinese parent company of net outstanding corporate loans. 
Earnings management via abnormal sales. 
Ge et al. (2010) China Reported earnings of firms selling goods or assets to related parties exhibit a lower valuation 
coefficient that other firms. This result is only observed after a new fair value measurement rule 
for RPTs came into effect. 
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Jiang et al. 2010 China Results show the widespread use of corporate loans by controlling shareholders to extract funds 
from listed firms. These loans are of long term nature and made to related parties. Firms with  
large other receivables experience worse future operating performance and are much more likely 
to become candidates for delisting. 
Cheung et al. (2009a) Hong 
Kong 
Publicly listed firms enter deals with RP at unfavourable prices compared t similar arms' length 
deals. Firm acquire assets from RP by paying a higher price compared to similar arms' length  
deals. In contrast, when they sell assets to related parties, they receive a lower price. With the 
exception of the presence of an audit committee, corporate governance have limited impact on 
transaction prices. Firms with AC pay lower prices to RP for acquisitions and receive higher from 
RP from divestments. 
Cheung et al. (2009b) China Minority shareholders seem to be subject to expropriation through tunnelling but also gain from 
propping up from RPTs. On balance, there seems to be more tunnelling than propping up. Both  
types of firms have larger state ownership compared to the rest of Chinese market but firms 
are larger and have larger state ownership than firms subject to tunnelling. Propped up firms 
are more likely to have foreign shareholders and to be cross listed abroad compared to firms that are 
subject to tunnelling. Propped up firms also tend to have worse operating performance in the fiscal 
year preceding the announcement of the related party transaction. Finally, related part transactions 
representing tunnelling are accompanied by less information disclosures compared to related party 
transactions representing propping. 
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Berkman et al (2009) China Issuance of Related Guarantees is less likely at smaller firms, at more profitable firms with 
higher growth prospects. They also find that the identity and ownership of block holders affect 
the likelihood of expropriation. Q, ROA and dividend yield are significantly lower, and that leverage 
is significantly higher, at firms that issued related guarantees. 
Gao and Kling (2008) China Independent board members, audit without non-clean opinion and dispersed ownership 
prevent tunnelling, 2) Belonging to a business group issuing B or H share enhances tunnelling. 
Institutional ownership does not prevent embezzlement of assets. Governance mechanisms 
Gallery et al. (2008) Australia They find only weak evidence on the association between strong governance and RPTs. The  
results show that financial condition dominates the decision to engage in RPTs and suggests that 
external monitoring (associated with larger firm size and the quarterly reporting phase)  
are a more effective restraint on the magnitude of RPTs 
Dayha et al. (2008) 22 
countries 
Firm values are lower for RPT firms and independent directors reduce the occurrence of RPTs 
Balsam and Gifford (2007) USA RPTs are positively associated with CEO tenure, insider ownership, excess CEO compensation. 
RP loans which are prohibited by SOX act 2002 decline post SOX 
Cheung et al. (2006) Hong 
Kong 
Firms announcing connected transactions earn significant excess returns, significantly lower than 
firms announcing similar arms' length transactions. Investors cannot predict expropriation 
and revalue firms only when expropriation does occur 
Gordon and Henry  (2005) USA Adjusted absolute abnormal accruals are positively associated with RPTs 
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Appendix 2 
Regressions Accounting Quality Measures 
  
1 2 3 4 5 
RPTs 
    
-0.657 
Size 0.004 0.041 -0.004 -.032 0.050 
Sales growth 0.001 0.000 0.002 .000 -0.009 
Leverage 0.043 0.079 0.067 -.096 1.579 
CF 0.054 0.872    
BIG4 0.007 -0.031 -0.020 .051 0.254 
Technology 0.020 -0.052 -0.085 .126 -0.025 
Real Estate 0.008 -0.035 0.068 -.018 18.881 
Utilities -0.004 0.023 -0.010 .013 19.262 
Travel -0.007 -0.053 .002 .099 20.039 
Retail  -0.005 -0.024 -0.118 .171 -0.037 
Health Care -0.055 -0.070 -0.029 -.048 18.986 
Personal -0.005 -0.031 -0.052 .094 18.877 
Food and 
Beverage 
-0.005 0.040 -0.031 .031 18.251 
Construction -0.010 -0.019 -0.029 .032 19.074 
Basic Materials 0.007 -0.045 -0.066 .055 19.102 
Chemicals 0.006 0.047 -0.063 .065 17.766 
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Oil and Gas 0.004 0.133 -0.054 -.051 19.462 
R Square 0.223 0.069 0.144 0.199 0.142 
Durbin Watson 2.243 2.607 2.621 1.964 
Dependent 
Variable 
∆ NI ∆CF ACC CF SPOS 
This table reports the regression results of equations 1,2,4,5 and 6 of Chapter Six. Those regressions 
were run to construct accounting quality proxies used in the study. All models control for year. 
Column 1 shows the regression coefficients of equation (1): ∆NI=  α + β1 SIZE+  β 2 SALES 
GROWTH+  β 3 LEV+  β 4 CF+  β 5 BIG 4+ ε. The variance of the residuals from this equation 
constructed ∆NI*the first proxy for accounting quality. Column 2 shows the regression coefficients of 
equation (2): ∆CF=  α 0+  β 1 SIZE+  β 2 SALES GROWTH+  β 3 LEV+  β 4 CF+  β 5 BIG 4+ ε.  
The variance of the residuals of this regression is the variability of ∆ CF*. The ratio of variability of 
∆NI* to the variability of  ∆ CF* is the second proxy for accounting quality. Columns and 4 shows the 
regression coefficients of equations (4) CF= α 0+  β 1 SIZE+  β 2 SALES GROWTH+  β 3 LEV+  β 4 
BIG 4+ ε and (5) ACC=  α 0+  β 1 SIZE+  β 2 SALES GROWTH+  β 3 LEV+  β 4 BIG 4+ ε, 
respectively. The third proxy for accounting quality is based on Spearman's correlation between 
accruals and cash flows. The residuals of the regression of each of accruals and cash flows are used to 
assess the correlation between accruals and cash flows. Column 5 shows the regression coefficients of 
the logistic model in equation (6): SPOS= α 0+β 1 RPT+ β 2 SIZE+ β 3 SALES GROWTH+β 4 
LEV+ β 5 BIG 4+ε. SPOS is the fourth proxy for accounting quality. This model examines whether 
RPTs firms have are more likely to report small positive income. RRPT represents related party 
transactions, is a dummy variable equal to 1 if RPT/Totals Assets > 1 and 0 otherwise. Size is the 
natural logarithm of firm’s total assets. Sales growth is the percentage of sales growth rate. Leverage 
measures long-term debt and is calculated as the ratio of total long-term debt to the book value of total 
assets. CF is the annual net cash flow from operating activities divided by end of year total assets and 
BIG 4 is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm is one of the Big 4 audit firms and zero 
otherwise. Industry dummies are indicators that receive the value of 1 when the firm is operating in the 
industry dummy. All models control for year.  
 *,**and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.                
 
 
 
 
